The Gathering Storm: Britain’s Naval Dilemma in 1939

On September 3, 1939, Winston Churchill returned to a familiar office in the Admiralty, sitting in the same chair he had occupied twenty-five years earlier during the First World War. As his eyes fell upon the wooden map case he had installed in 1911 and the North Sea charts marked by Naval Intelligence at his direction, the weight of history pressed upon him. Britain had just declared war on Germany following the invasion of Poland, and Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain had appointed Churchill as First Lord of the Admiralty – the very position he held during the previous global conflict.

The strategic situation facing Britain was dire. As an island nation, Britain’s survival depended entirely on maintaining open sea lanes. At the outbreak of war, the country imported 75% of its oil, 95% of its copper, 99% of its lead, 88% of its iron ore, and overwhelming majorities of its food supplies. The British merchant fleet, comprising 31.8% of global shipping tonnage, operated approximately 2,500 vessels daily across more than 80,000 nautical miles of sea routes. These lifelines pumped vital “nutrients” and “oxygen” into the British Isles, sustaining both civilian population and war effort alike.

Churchill’s Immediate Challenges at the Admiralty

Churchill recognized two immediate threats to Britain’s maritime dominance: Germany’s surface raiders and its U-boat fleet. While the Royal Navy vastly outnumbered the Kriegsmarine in surface ships (12 battleships and 3 battlecruisers against Germany’s 2 outdated battleships and 3 battlecruisers), the German U-boats presented an insidious danger. The sinking of the passenger liner SS Athenia by U-30 on September 3, the very day Britain declared war, confirmed Churchill’s worst fears about submarine warfare.

Within his first week, Churchill implemented critical measures:
– Reinstated the convoy system for merchant shipping
– Established combined British-Canadian escort groups
– Moved his residence into the Admiralty building to maintain constant operational awareness
– Created an advanced operations room with comprehensive naval maps

The early losses of HMS Courageous (aircraft carrier) and HMS Royal Oak (battleship) to U-boat attacks in September underscored the urgency of these measures. Churchill later reflected in his memoirs that the submarine threat caused him greater anxiety than even the prospect of aerial bombardment – it was a “most destructive disaster” that targeted Britain’s economic lifeline.

Germany’s Naval Strategy: Raeder’s “Cruiser Warfare” Concept

In Berlin, Grand Admiral Erich Raeder faced his own strategic dilemmas. As architect of Germany’s naval rebuilding program, Raeder had long advocated “cruiser warfare” (Kreuzerkrieg) – using surface raiders to attack British shipping lanes far from home waters. His 1928 treatise argued correctly that Britain’s military, economic, and national survival depended on maintaining maritime trade routes.

Raeder’s ambitious “Z Plan” envisioned a massive fleet by 1948 including:
– 6 new 50,000-ton battleships
– 12 armored ships (Panzerschiffe)
– 4 aircraft carriers
– Numerous light cruisers
– 233 submarines

However, Hitler’s premature war in 1939 caught the Kriegsmarine unprepared. Raeder possessed only a fraction of his planned surface fleet, forcing him to improvise with what ships he had. His decision to prioritize surface raiders over U-boats (despite recommendations from submarine commander Karl Dönitz) would prove fateful.

The Graf Spee’s Commerce Raiding Campaign

The centerpiece of Raeder’s strategy became the pocket battleship Admiral Graf Spee, named after World War I Admiral Maximilian von Spee. This 12,500-ton warship combined battleship-caliber guns (6 x 11-inch) with cruiser speed (26 knots), making it ideal for commerce raiding. Commanded by Captain Hans Langsdorff, the Graf Spee had sailed before hostilities began, positioning itself in the South Atlantic.

From September to December 1939, the Graf Spee conducted a highly successful raiding campaign:
– Sank 9 British merchant ships (50,000 total tons)
– Evaded multiple Royal Navy hunting groups
– Created widespread disruption to Allied shipping

The British Admiralty responded by forming eight hunting groups comprising 28 major warships. Commodore Henry Harwood’s Force G (HMS Exeter, Ajax, and Achilles) finally intercepted the raider near the River Plate estuary on December 13.

The Battle of the River Plate: Tactical Duel

The ensuing engagement demonstrated classic naval tactics. Harwood divided his force to attack from multiple angles, forcing Langsdorff to split his fire. The British suffered heavily – HMS Exeter sustained critical damage that knocked out three turrets and killed 61 crew. However, concentrated fire from the lighter cruisers Ajax and Achilles inflicted significant damage on Graf Spee:
– Multiple 6-inch shell hits on superstructure
– Destruction of freshwater processing plant
– Severe damage to galley and food stores
– 36 German sailors killed

Langsdorff broke off the action and made for neutral Uruguay, seeking repairs at Montevideo. What followed became a diplomatic battle as Britain pressured Uruguay to expel the German ship while gathering overwhelming force outside territorial waters.

The Graf Spee’s Dramatic End

Facing impossible odds, Langsdorff made his fateful decision. On December 17, after Uruguay denied extended repairs, he:
– Transferred most crew to German merchant ships
– Scuttled the Graf Spee in the Plate estuary on December 18
– Took his own life three days later in Buenos Aires

The sinking represented both a tactical victory (removing a dangerous raider) and strategic propaganda coup for Britain. More significantly, it exposed flaws in Germany’s surface raider strategy while validating Churchill’s focus on convoy protection.

Legacy and Historical Significance

The Graf Spee episode marked several turning points:
1. Demonstrated limitations of surface raiders against coordinated naval responses
2. Validated British intelligence and hunting group tactics
3. Accelerated shift toward U-boat focused strategy in Germany
4. Boosted British morale during the “Phony War” period

Churchill’s return to the Admiralty and his handling of this crisis foreshadowed his leadership during Britain’s darkest hours. The events underscored how control of sea lanes would determine the war’s outcome – a lesson both sides took to heart as the Battle of the Atlantic intensified in coming years.

The wooden map case in Churchill’s office had witnessed history repeat itself – different war, same strategic imperatives. But this time, the Admiralty under Churchill’s leadership proved more adept at meeting the challenge, setting patterns that would ultimately help secure Allied victory.