The Powder Keg of the Middle East

In May 1967, as Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol grappled with escalating tensions, Jordan’s King Hussein faced an equally untenable situation. The region stood on the brink of war following Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s provocative closure of the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping on May 22—an act Israel had long declared would be a casus belli. While crowds across the Arab world celebrated Nasser’s bold move, Hussein watched with deepening dread. Unlike the jubilant masses, the 31-year-old monarch understood the catastrophic risks ahead.

Jordan’s precarious position stemmed from its contested 1948 annexation of the West Bank and East Jerusalem—a legacy of Hussein’s grandfather, King Abdullah I. These territories transformed Jordan from a desert backwater into the custodian of Islam’s third holiest site, the Al-Aqsa Mosque. Yet this prize came with peril: 800,000 Palestinian refugees now comprised two-thirds of Jordan’s population, viewing Hussein’s throne as a temporary stopgap until Israel’s destruction. The king’s survival instincts were honed by personal tragedy—in 1951, he witnessed his grandfather’s assassination by a Palestinian gunman at Al-Aqsa, surviving only because a medal deflected the bullet meant for his own heart.

The No-Win Dilemma

Hussein detested Nasser’s bullying rhetoric—the Egyptian leader had publicly mocked him as “Jordan’s whore” using Arabic wordplay—yet pan-Arab solidarity demanded he feign unity. When Nasser mobilized Arab forces against Israel, Hussein faced two catastrophic options:

1. Join Egypt’s War Coalition
– Risk losing the West Bank to Israeli forces with uncertain Egyptian support
– Surrender command of Jordan’s elite Arab Legion to Cairo’s control

2. Remain Neutral
– Face insurrection from Jordan’s Palestinian majority
– Endure accusations of betraying the Arab cause

On May 30, Hussein made his choice. In a dramatic secret flight to Cairo, he signed a mutual defense pact with Nasser, agreeing to place Jordan’s forces under Egyptian command. The ultimate humiliation came when Hussein was forced to share his return flight to Amman with Ahmed Shukeiry—leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which had openly called for his overthrow.

The Illusion of Victory

Hussein’s return to Amman became an unexpected triumph when Cairo Radio leaked his secret diplomacy. Cheering crowds lifted his car off the streets, celebrating Jordan’s alignment with Nasser’s anti-Israel bloc. The king achieved his immediate goal: no Palestinian could now accuse him of insufficient zeal against Israel. Privately, Hussein gambled that Nasser’s brinkmanship wouldn’t spark actual war—a miscalculation that would soon prove fatal.

The calculus shifted radically on June 1 when Israel appointed war hero Moshe Dayan as defense minister. In Syria, PLO operative Yasser Arafat watched with satisfaction—his strategy of provoking Israeli retaliation through cross-border attacks had successfully escalated tensions toward all-out war.

Egypt’s Fateful Decision

As Dayan mobilized Israeli forces, Nasser convened his generals on June 2. Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer urged a preemptive strike, boasting Egypt’s military readiness. Soviet intervention had foiled an earlier planned attack on May 27, when Moscow—warned by U.S. intelligence—pressured Nasser to stand down.

Air Force Commander Sidqi Mahmoud warned that Israel’s first strike could destroy 15-20% of Egypt’s planes. “What could you achieve with the remaining 80%?” Nasser asked. “Destroy 60-70% of their air force,” came the reply. Satisfied with these odds, Nasser vetoed preemption, believing political victory was already his.

The Gathering Storm

Three tectonic forces now collided:
– Hussein’s desperate bid to preserve his throne
– Arafat’s calculated provocation strategy
– Nasser’s overconfidence in Arab military superiority

None grasped that Dayan’s appointment signaled Israel’s intent for a devastating first strike. When war erupted on June 5, Hussein’s worst fears materialized: Israel captured East Jerusalem and the West Bank in 48 hours, while Egypt lost 85% of its air force by noon on the first day.

Legacy of a King’s Gamble

The Six-Day War’s aftermath reshaped the Middle East:
– Jordan’s loss of Jerusalem shattered Hussein’s legitimacy project
– Palestinian refugees flooded into Jordan, destabilizing the kingdom
– Arafat’s PLO emerged strengthened, eventually challenging Hussein’s rule in 1970’s Black September

Hussein’s 1967 dilemma endures as a case study in the perils of weak states navigating great power rivalries. His attempt to balance Palestinian aspirations, Arab nationalism, and Western alliances ultimately failed—but his survival against impossible odds cemented his reputation as the region’s ultimate political survivor. The war’s territorial disputes remain unresolved, ensuring Hussein’s fateful choices still echo through today’s Israeli-Palestinian conflicts.