The 1895 Japanese-Korean Crisis: Power, Intrigue, and the Struggle for Control

The Precarious Balance of Power in Joseon Korea

In the summer of 1895, tensions between Japan and Korea reached a boiling point following the First Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895). The Treaty of Shimonoseki had nominally granted Korea independence from Chinese suzerainty, but in reality, Japan sought to exert dominant influence over the peninsula. The Korean court, however, was deeply divided between pro-Japanese reformers like Park Yeong-hyo (朴泳孝) and conservative factions led by Queen Min (later Empress Myeongseong), who increasingly turned to Russia for support.

This period saw Japan attempting to consolidate its position through military garrisons and political interference. Historian Kim Munja’s research reveals that on June 20, 1895, Japanese Minister of Justice Yoshikawa Akimasa (芳川顕正) communicated with Itō Hirobumi and Yamagata Aritomo, outlining a decisive policy to station Japanese troops in Korea—a move not directly tied to later plots against Queen Min but indicative of Japan’s tightening grip.

The Struggle Over Military Garrisons

By late June, Japanese diplomats in Seoul, led by Acting Minister Sugimura Fukashi (杉村濬), pressured the Korean government to formalize Japan’s military presence. Park Yeong-hyo, then Interior Minister, attempted to push through a plan to replace the royal palace guards with Japanese-trained troops, but King Gojong (高宗) vehemently opposed it. On June 25, Gojong confronted Prime Minister Park Jeong-yang (朴定陽), declaring that recent decrees had been forced upon him and should be revoked.

Despite royal resistance, Sugimura secured a dubious document on June 29—purportedly from the Korean Foreign Ministry—requesting Japanese garrisons in Seoul, Busan, and Wonsan. Kim Munja notes this was done without the king’s knowledge, highlighting the fragility of Japan’s reliance on Park Yeong-hyo.

The Fall of Park Yeong-hyo and Russian Intervention

The crisis escalated on July 6 when Gojong accused Park Yeong-hyo of treason, allegedly for plotting against Queen Min. Park fled to the Japanese legation and was smuggled to Japan, leaving Japan’s pro-reform faction in disarray. Russian diplomat Karl Weber seized the moment, criticizing Japan’s heavy-handed interference. In dispatches to St. Petersburg, Weber condemned Japan’s violation of Korean sovereignty, while King Gojong privately confided his hope for Russian support to counterbalance Japan.

Emperor Nicholas II, alarmed by Japan’s growing control, urged a firmer stance: “Japan’s seizure of Korea is far more critical than their occupation of Liaodong.” Meanwhile, in Tokyo, Russian Ambassador Hitrovo cautiously proposed Russo-Japanese collaboration to stabilize Korea—a fleeting opportunity for diplomacy that Japan ignored.

The Rise of Miura Goro and the Path to Tragedy

With Japan’s position weakening, hardliners demanded a new approach. In August, Miura Goro (三浦梧楼), a retired general with ties to nationalist circles, was appointed minister to Korea. Backed by strategists like Shiba Shirō (柴四朗), Miura advocated aggressive measures to counter Russian influence. His arrival in September marked a turning point.

Behind the scenes, Miura, Sugimura, and Japanese military advisors plotted to eliminate Queen Min, whom they saw as the linchpin of anti-Japanese resistance. On October 8, 1895, Korean troops—trained by Japanese officers—stormed the palace, assassinating Queen Min in a brutal attack later dubbed the “Eulmi Incident.” Miura’s justification—that Queen Min was conspiring with Russia to dismantle Japanese reforms—was steeped in paranoia, as no evidence of such a treaty existed.

Aftermath and Historical Legacy

The assassination backfired spectacularly. International outrage forced Japan to recall Miura and temporarily retreat from overt interference. Gojong, traumatized by the event, sought refuge in the Russian legation in 1896, further undermining Japan’s position.

The 1895 crisis exposed the dangers of imperial overreach and the volatility of Korea’s geopolitical position. For Japan, it was a cautionary tale about the limits of coercion; for Korea, it underscored the peril of being caught between rival powers. The events also foreshadowed the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905), as Russia’s foothold in Korea became an intolerable threat to Tokyo.

Today, the Eulmi Incident remains a stark reminder of how nationalism, misjudgment, and great-power rivalry can spiral into tragedy—a lesson with enduring relevance in East Asia’s contested history.