The Fractured Republic: China’s Post-Imperial Dilemma

When Xu Shichang assumed China’s presidency in October 1918, he inherited a nation torn apart by nearly a decade of internal strife following the 1911 Revolution. The Beijing government controlled northern China while various southern factions established rival regimes in Guangzhou. This political fragmentation mirrored deeper societal fractures – between traditionalists and modernizers, between warlord factions, and between competing visions for China’s future.

The international context added layers of complexity. World War I’s conclusion in November 1918 reshaped global power dynamics, with Western powers reasserting influence in East Asia after years of Japanese dominance. This geopolitical shift created both opportunities and challenges for Chinese leaders seeking to navigate foreign pressures while addressing domestic divisions.

The Gathering Storm: International Pressures for Peace

As 1918 drew to a close, an unprecedented convergence of international forces pushed China toward reconciliation. The victorious Allied powers, particularly the United States under Woodrow Wilson’s idealistic leadership, saw Chinese unity as crucial for regional stability. On October 10, 1918 – Xu Shichang’s inauguration day – President Wilson sent a congratulatory message urging Chinese factions to “sacrifice all disputes” and achieve unification.

Japan, sensing the changing tides, dramatically altered its China policy following Prime Minister Terauchi’s September 1918 resignation. The new Hara government distanced itself from its predecessor’s pro-Anhui clique stance, halting military loans to Duan Qirui’s faction. Japanese diplomats even positioned themselves as potential mediators, telling Western counterparts they bore “the empire’s vanguard responsibility” for facilitating peace.

This international consensus manifested in coordinated diplomatic pressure. On November 19, 1918, consuls from five nations presented identical peace appeals to both Beijing and Guangzhou governments. British Minister John Jordan captured the interventionist mood, warning Chinese leaders that without reconciliation, the country faced “unthinkable” consequences.

The Human Cost: Warlordism’s Devastating Toll

Beneath these diplomatic maneuvers lay a humanitarian catastrophe. Years of Anhui clique militarism under Duan Qirui had devastated central China. In Hunan province, warlord Zhang Jingyao’s troops perpetrated atrocities like the three-day massacre at Pingjiang. Liling county witnessed particularly horrific violence in April 1918, with contemporary accounts describing soldiers “looting all valuables,” burning homes, and committing widespread sexual violence against women of all ages.

The economic burden proved equally crushing. Military spending skyrocketed from 102 million yuan in 1910 to 203 million by 1918. To finance these campaigns, the Beijing government resorted to predatory taxation and reckless borrowing. Between 1912-1919, land taxes increased sevenfold, salt taxes tripled, and some regions saw taxes collected twenty years in advance. This fiscal vampirism drained China’s economic vitality while enriching warlords and their foreign backers.

The Peace Movement Rises: Civil Society Responds

Emerging from this suffering came China’s first nationwide peace movement. Inspired by Wilsonian ideals and war-weary desperation, urban elites mobilized across political divides. Commercial associations in Tianjin, Beijing, and Hankou issued impassioned appeals. Intellectuals like Zhang Jian and Cai Yuanpei lent their prestige to the cause. New organizations proliferated – Peace Promotion Societies, Peace Achievement Associations – their very names reflecting popular yearning for stability.

This civic awakening carried political weight. The movement’s leaders included former premiers (Xiong Xiling), prominent industrialists (Zhang Jian), and respected scholars (Cai Yuanpei). Their combined influence created momentum that neither northern nor southern factions could ignore. Even warlords recognized the changing mood, with Zhili clique commanders like Wu Peifu publicly embracing peace rhetoric.

The Conference Unfolds: High Hopes, Hard Realities

Against this backdrop, the Shanghai Peace Conference opened on February 20, 1919, at the former German Club. The ceremonial pomp couldn’t mask underlying tensions. Southern delegate Tang Shaoyi spoke hopefully of turning “swords into plowshares,” while northern representative Zhu Qiqian pledged to “remove boundaries” between factions. Their optimism proved tragically misplaced.

The conference immediately deadlocked over two explosive issues: the Shaanxi conflict and military reorganization. In Shaanxi, Anhui-aligned governor Chen Shufan continued attacking Yu Youren’s constitutionalist forces despite ceasefire orders. Southern delegates demanded Chen’s removal, suspending talks on March 2 when Beijing refused. Meanwhile, northerners balked at southern proposals to disband Duan Qirui’s prized “War Participation Army” and reveal secret Sino-Japanese agreements.

The Fractious Table: Why Negotiations Failed

When talks resumed on April 9 after international mediation, delegates confronted six contentious agenda items: legislative legitimacy, financial reform, military demobilization, political restructuring, postwar arrangements, and unresolved prior issues. Each became a battleground for competing interests.

The May 6 session provided the conference’s sole meaningful achievement – a joint telegram supporting Chinese claims at the Paris Peace Conference regarding Shandong. This fleeting unity underscored the Shanghai talks’ fundamental dysfunction: delegates could agree on resisting foreign imperialism but not on governing China.

Tang Shaoyi’s May 13 ultimatum encapsulated southern demands, including rejecting the Versailles terms, voiding “unequal treaties,” disbanding warlord armies, and restoring the pre-1917 parliament. Zhu Qiqian’s refusal to compromise on parliamentary legitimacy triggered the conference’s collapse.

The Hollow Spectacle: Contemporary Reactions

Observers quickly recognized the conference’s farcical nature. The journal Weekly Commentary dismissed it as “special interest warlords dividing power,” noting that “national welfare and people’s livelihood” never entered discussions. Chen Duxiu, writing in New Youth on May 4, 1919, scorned both Shanghai and Paris conferences as “two useless peace talks” focused solely on “partitioning spoils.”

The final act came when Beijing appointed notorious Anhui clique politician Wang Yitang as chief negotiator. Shanghai residents greeted him with protest flyers branding him “traitor representative.” After a staged assassination attempt in October, Wang slunk back north, ending the peace charade.

Legacy of a Failed Reconciliation

The Shanghai Conference’s collapse had profound consequences. It demonstrated the impossibility of unifying China through warlord negotiations, radicalizing a generation of intellectuals who turned toward more revolutionary solutions. The May Fourth Movement erupted simultaneously, channeling popular disillusionment with both domestic elites and international diplomacy.

Historically, the episode reveals how foreign interference and militarism sabotaged China’s early republican experiment. Yet it also showcased emerging civil society forces that would later challenge both warlordism and imperialism. The conference’s failure thus marked not just a diplomatic breakdown, but a crucial turning point in China’s long revolution.