The Warlord Landscape and Origins of the Coup

In the turbulent years following the collapse of imperial China, the nation found itself fractured under competing warlord factions. By 1924, two dominant factions had emerged: the Zhili clique led by Wu Peifu and Cao Kun in central China, and the Fengtian clique under Zhang Zuolin controlling Manchuria. This rivalry culminated in the Second Zhili-Fengtian War, a brutal conflict that would reshape China’s political landscape.

Feng Yuxiang, a Zhili-affiliated commander with reformist tendencies, had grown increasingly disillusioned with Wu Peifu’s autocratic leadership. Secretly aligning with anti-Zhili forces including Sun Yat-sen’s southern revolutionaries and Zhang Zuolin’s Fengtian army, Feng meticulously planned his move against the Zhili leadership. The stage was set for what would become one of the most consequential military coups of the warlord period.

The Coup Unfolds: October 1924

On October 23, 1924, Feng Yuxiang executed his daring plan. Leading his troops back to Beijing from the frontlines, he seized control of key government buildings and placed President Cao Kun under house arrest. This surprise maneuver, coordinated with fellow commanders Hu Jingyi and Sun Yue, caught the Zhili leadership completely off guard.

The coup’s immediate military consequences were profound. With Feng’s forces suddenly withdrawn from the front, the Zhili army found itself outflanked. Wu Peifu desperately attempted to rally his troops, pulling forces back from the Shanhaiguan front to defend Beijing, but the strategic initiative had been lost. The Fengtian army, sensing weakness, intensified its attacks along the Great Wall.

Political Aftermath and Power Struggles

Feng’s hastily organized Beiyuan Conference on October 24 revealed the coup’s strategic limitations. While successful in removing Wu Peifu from power, the conspirators had given little thought to governance afterward. Their five-point “National Reconstruction Program” advocated clean government and meritocracy but offered no concrete roadmap for political transition.

The power vacuum drew in competing factions. Zhang Zuolin, sensing opportunity, pushed his Fengtian forces southward while publicly advocating for the return of former premier Duan Qirui. Regional warlords like Shanxi’s Yan Xishan and Shandong’s Zheng Shiqi became crucial swing players, their allegiances potentially determining the conflict’s outcome.

The Tianjin Conference and Duan’s Return

November 1924 saw the key power brokers converge in Tianjin. Feng Yuxiang, Zhang Zuolin, and the resurgent Duan Qirui negotiated China’s political future in tense meetings. The resulting compromise installed Duan as provisional executive, a position combining presidential and prime ministerial powers.

The Tianjin agreements attempted to balance competing interests:
– Feng’s Guominjun (National Army) gained control of northwest China
– Zhang’s Fengtian clique expanded into the Yangtze region
– Wu Peifu was allowed to retreat south without pursuit
– A national reconstruction conference was promised

Cultural and Social Impacts

The coup’s reverberations extended beyond military circles. Beijing’s intellectual class, long critical of warlord rule, initially welcomed Feng as a reformer. His subsequent expulsion of the last emperor Puyi from the Forbidden City in November symbolized a break with imperial traditions.

However, Feng’s Christian beliefs and perceived Soviet connections made him suspect among conservative elites. Meanwhile, the invitation to Sun Yat-sen to discuss national reunification raised hopes for constitutional government, though these would be dashed by Sun’s untimely death in 1925.

Legacy and Historical Significance

The Beijing Coup marked several critical developments in China’s warlord period:

1. It destroyed the Zhili clique’s dominance, creating space for regional powers like Feng’s Guominjun and Zhang’s expanded Fengtian faction.

2. The temporary alliance between Feng, Zhang, and Duan demonstrated the fluidity of warlord politics, where ideological differences were often subordinated to tactical advantage.

3. It accelerated the militarization of Chinese politics, with provincial governors increasingly dependent on local armies rather than central authority.

4. The coup’s aftermath saw the brief flourishing of constitutional discussions before descending into renewed conflict between Feng and Zhang in 1925-26.

Ultimately, the 1924 Beijing Coup exemplified the contradictions of China’s warlord era – moments of potential political breakthrough consistently undermined by the lack of unifying national institutions and the centrifugal forces of regional militarism. While temporarily altering the balance of power, it failed to provide lasting solutions to China’s governance crisis, paving the way for the Northern Expedition and eventual Nationalist reunification in 1928.