The Gathering Storm: Ming China in Crisis

By 1637, the Ming Dynasty had ruled China for over two centuries but found itself in dire straits. Beyond the Great Wall, the rising Qing state had challenged Ming authority for 21 years, steadily chipping away at border territories. Within China proper, peasant rebellions had raged for a decade, sweeping across the Central Plains like wildfire. Compounding these crises was the young Chongzhen Emperor – just 27 years old after a decade on the throne – whose mercurial temperament and political inexperience exacerbated the empire’s troubles.

The military situation initially showed promise. In the eighth month of 1637, the rebel leader Zhang Xianzhong suffered defeat in Henan at the hands of Ming general Zuo Liangyu, leading to his temporary surrender. By October 1638, another major rebel commander, Luo Rucai, also submitted to imperial authority. Only Li Zicheng’s forces remained actively rebellious, though they too suffered defeats in Gansu and Shaanxi under the command of Ming general Hong Chengchou. By late 1638, Li’s forces had been reduced to a mere thousand men hiding in mountainous border regions between Shaanxi, Huguang and Sichuan.

Just as the Ming court believed internal threats were being neutralized, disaster struck from the north. In August 1638, the Qing launched their fourth major invasion across the Great Wall.

The Qing Invasion of 1638-39

The Qing invasion force divided into two wings under the command of Dorgon and Yue Tuo, breaching the Ming defenses at weak points along the wall. The eastern wing under Yue Tuo encountered minimal resistance at the strategically vital Zijing Pass because the Ming commanders were attending a birthday celebration for eunuch Deng Xizhao. The western wing under Dorgon met similarly feeble opposition at Qingshan Pass.

The two Qing armies converged near Beijing in October 1638, plunging the capital region into chaos. The Chongzhen Emperor urgently recalled forces from across the empire, including Hong Chengchou’s elite Shaanxi troops who had been suppressing rebels. He also appointed the capable Lu Xiangsheng as Supreme Commander of imperial forces.

Behind this invasion lay complex diplomatic maneuvers. Earlier in 1638, the Ming had secretly explored peace negotiations with the Qing through a fortune-teller named Zhou Yuanzhong. These overtures reflected the growing power imbalance – the Qing had recently subjugated Korea and consolidated control over Mongol tribes, leaving the Ming increasingly isolated.

The Tragedy of Lu Xiangsheng

Lu Xiangsheng’s appointment as Supreme Commander came at a critical juncture. A veteran of suppressing peasant rebellions, he advocated aggressive military action against the Qing invaders. However, his position was undermined by political infighting at court, particularly with Grand Secretary Yang Sichang who favored negotiation.

Despite receiving honors from the emperor that seemed to endorse his militant stance, Lu found his plans thwarted at every turn. A proposed night attack was vetoed by eunuch Gao Qiqian, who controlled elite frontier troops. Forced to divide his forces, Lu was left with fewer than 20,000 men to face the Qing onslaught.

The situation deteriorated further as Lu clashed openly with Yang Sichang during a heated meeting where he accused the Grand Secretary of treasonous peace overtures. By December 1638, Lu’s isolated force of just 5,000 starving soldiers made a desperate last stand at Jiazhuang. After six hours of brutal combat, Lu led a final cavalry charge, killing dozens of Qing soldiers before falling under a hail of arrows and blades. His subordinate Yang Lukai died protecting Lu’s body, struck by twenty-four arrows.

The Qing Rampage Through North China

With Lu Xiangsheng dead and Ming resistance crumbling, the Qing armies ran rampant across northern China. In early 1639, they turned toward Shandong province, bypassing the heavily defended Dezhou route that Yang Sichang had expected them to take. The provincial capital Jinan fell easily on January 22, 1639, after just one day of fighting.

The sack of Jinan was particularly brutal. The Qing slaughtered 130,000 residents and carried off the Prince of De as captive. When Ming reinforcements under Zu Kuan arrived belatedly, his 300 cavalry were annihilated outside the city walls. By March 1639, the Qing withdrew northward with staggering loot: over 460,000 captives, 4,039 taels of gold, and 977,460 taels of silver.

The economic devastation was catastrophic. Official reports described the Beijing region as “a thousand li of brambles and rubble” with 90% of the southern capital district’s population dead. The Ming’s northern defenses lay in tatters, forcing Yang Sichang to transfer Shaanxi troops to plug the gaps.

The Resurgence of Peasant Rebellions

Even as the Qing threat receded, the Ming faced renewed rebellion from previously surrendered leaders. In May 1639, Zhang Xianzhong rebelled again from his base at Gucheng, joining forces with Luo Rucai. Their combined armies defeated Zuo Liangyu at Fang County in July, killing Ming general Luo Dai and nearly annihilating Zuo’s force of 10,000.

This disaster prompted the Chongzhen Emperor to appoint Yang Sichang as Supreme Commander against the rebels in September 1639. Yang implemented a comprehensive strategy, but his efforts were undermined by insubordinate generals like Zuo Liangyu and He Renlong who prioritized personal power over imperial orders.

Despite initial successes – including a major victory at Ma’nao Mountain in February 1640 where Zhang Xianzhong’s wife and strategist were captured – Ming forces failed to deliver a decisive blow. Rebel mobility and knowledge of local terrain allowed them to outmaneuver the lumbering imperial armies.

The Fall of Xiangyang and Luoyang

The year 1641 proved disastrous for the Ming. In February, Zhang Xianzhong captured the strategic city of Xiangyang, executing the Prince of Xiang and plundering the city’s wealth. This was followed in April by Li Zicheng’s capture of Luoyang, where the Prince of Fu – the Chongzhen Emperor’s uncle – met a gruesome end.

These twin blows had profound political implications. The execution of imperial princes demonstrated the rebels’ growing confidence and organization. Li Zicheng in particular showed signs of state-building, appointing local officials and attempting to garrison captured cities.

The psychological impact on the Chongzhen Emperor was severe. Upon learning of his uncle’s death, he wept openly in court, lamenting “I could not protect even one uncle.” The emperor observed three days of mourning, but the damage to Ming prestige was irreparable.

The Siege of Kaifeng

Li Zicheng’s next target was Kaifeng, the Central Plains’ greatest city and former Northern Song capital. His first attack in February 1641 failed against determined resistance organized by censor Gao Mingheng and supported by the Prince of Zhou, who spent 1.2 million taels of silver to bolster defenses.

Undeterred, Li returned in December 1641 with 100,000 troops (including many coerced peasants). His siege tactics evolved from direct assaults to systematic starvation. By June 1642, conditions inside Kaifeng became horrific – residents ate leather, medicinal herbs, and eventually each other as grain supplies vanished.

A massive Ming relief force of 180,000 under Ding Qirui and Yang Wenyue marched to break the siege in May 1642. However, their advance collapsed at Zhuxian Town when Zuo Liangyu’s forces fled without fighting, triggering a general rout. The Ming lost 7,000 horses and countless weapons in this debacle.

Kaifeng’s fate was sealed when the Yellow River burst its banks in September 1642, flooding the starving city. The disaster provided a grim conclusion to one of the longest sieges of the late Ming period.

The Final Collapse

The Ming’s last hope rested with veteran commander Sun Chuanting, recently released from prison where he had been confined since 1639. Despite misgivings, Sun led a reconstituted Shaanxi army against Li Zicheng in late 1643.

Initial success at Baoqing turned to disaster at the Battle of Jia County (known as the “Persimmon Garden Battle” after the unripe fruit starving soldiers ate). Ming forces were lured into overextension, then crushed when Li Zicheng counterattacked. Sun retreated to Tong Pass, but Li’s forces stormed the fortress in October 1643, killing Sun and destroying the Ming’s last field army.

With Shaanxi lost and Beijing exposed, the Ming Dynasty’s fate was sealed. Li Zicheng proclaimed the Shun Dynasty in Xi’an before marching on the capital in April 1644. The Chongzhen Emperor’s suicide on April 25 marked the formal end of Ming rule, though loyalist resistance would continue for decades.

Legacy and Analysis

The Ming collapse resulted from multiple interrelated failures. Militarily, the court vacillated between aggressive suppression and appeasement, while field commanders like Zuo Liangyu prioritized personal power over imperial service. The simultaneous threats from peasant rebels and the rising Qing state stretched Ming resources beyond breaking point.

Economically, widespread famine in the 1630s – exacerbated by climate change and administrative breakdown – fueled popular discontent. The government’s inability to provide relief or reduce taxes turned starving peasants toward rebel leaders who offered food and vengeance against corrupt officials.

Politically, the Chongzhen Emperor’s suspicious nature and frequent personnel changes prevented consistent policy implementation. Capable officials like Lu Xiangsheng and Sun Chuanting were undermined by factional politics or imperial second-guessing.

Ultimately, the Ming fell not from a single blow but from death by a thousand cuts – each crisis weakening the system until complete collapse became inevitable. The lessons of this failure would shape Qing policies for centuries to come, as China’s new rulers sought to avoid repeating their predecessors’ mistakes.