A Statesman in the Twilight of Imperial China
Li Hongzhang (1823–1901) stands as one of the most complex and consequential figures of late Qing China. As a leading diplomat, military commander, and reformer during an era of imperial decline, his career intersected with nearly every major crisis of the 19th century—from the Taiping Rebellion to the Sino-Japanese War. Among his most controversial decisions was advocating for the cession of Taiwan to Japan following China’s defeat in 1895. His extensive writings on the subject reveal not just geopolitical calculations, but a deeply conflicted worldview shaped by China’s humiliations at the hands of foreign powers.
The Taiwan Question: Li’s Early Skepticism
Long before the Treaty of Shimonoseki formalized Taiwan’s transfer to Japan, Li harbored dismissive views about the island’s value to China. In private manuscripts (likely composed in 1897), he referred to Taiwan by ancient names but also derogatory terms like “land of sea bandits” and “barbaric island.” His perspective stemmed from childhood impressions of Taiwan as a lawless frontier, reinforced by his father’s accounts of pirate executions.
By the 1870s, Li’s position hardened into policy recommendations. As he recounted:
“When British merchants complained to me in Tianjin in 1873, I pleaded with the court to either properly administer Taiwan or let the British manage this wretched island.”
This early proposal nearly cost him his career, earning sharp rebukes from the Qing leadership for suggesting territorial concessions.
The Geopolitical Calculus of 1895
The First Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895) forced the Taiwan issue to the forefront. As China’s chief negotiator at Shimonoseki, Li faced Japan’s demand for the island alongside the Liaodong Peninsula. His private writings reveal surprising ambivalence:
“When Ito Hirobumi made Taiwan’s cession a treaty clause, I initially resisted—yet alone in my quarters, despite my assassination attempt injuries, I nearly danced with concealed satisfaction.”
Li’s rationale blended realpolitik with startling contempt:
1. Strategic Burden: He viewed Taiwan as a financial drain requiring military commitments better spent elsewhere
2. Racial Prejudices: His descriptions of Taiwanese as “the lowest, filthiest race” reflected prevailing Han Chinese biases
3. Balance of Power: He believed Japanese control might check European ambitions in East Asia
Cultural Blind Spots and Missed Opportunities
Li’s dismissal of Taiwan’s potential reveals critical limitations in Qing governance:
– Economic Myopia: Despite Liu Mingchuan’s modernization efforts in the 1880s (railways, industries), Li dismissed Taiwan’s developmental prospects
– Naval Neglect: He acknowledged Taiwan’s value as a naval base—if China had maintained a strong fleet—but the Qing failed to invest adequately
– Frontier Mentality: Like many mainland officials, Li saw Taiwan as peripheral rather than integral to China’s future
His comparison to Hong Kong is particularly telling:
“The British took Hong Kong permanently yet never sought larger Taiwan—they understood its possession wouldn’t strengthen them.”
The Diplomat’s Dilemma: Weakness and Accommodation
Li’s Taiwan stance epitomized the impossible position of late Qing reformers:
– Domestic Constraints: Conservative factions attacked any territorial concessions as treason
– International Realities: Without military strength, negotiation became surrender by other means
– Personal Paradox: Though he privately celebrated Taiwan’s transfer, publicly he bore blame for “losing sacred territory”
His bitter reflection captures this tension:
“These past two years, court and country alike accuse me of surrendering China’s most precious land… Yet I would have gladly added Taiwan to any of the emperor’s demands.”
Li’s Global Engagements and Foreign Assessments
Beyond the Taiwan controversy, Li’s diaries offer fascinating glimpses of his interactions with world leaders:
### The Russian Connection
His warm relationship with Tsar Nicholas II—including exchanges of lavish gifts during the 1896 coronation—highlighted attempts to play powers against each other. The Tsar’s personal charm contrasted sharply with growing Russian territorial ambitions in Manchuria.
### Western Advisors and Adversaries
– Robert Hart: The British inspector-general of China’s Maritime Customs earned Li’s grudging respect as “one of our truest foreign friends” despite initial distrust
– Ito Hirobumi: Li respected Japan’s prime minister as a formidable negotiator, though lamented his nation’s ambitions
– American Encounters: Meetings with figures like Governor Hastings of Pennsylvania revealed Li’s curiosity about U.S. institutions, though he struggled to comprehend democratic retirement (as with President Cleveland)
Legacy: Reevaluating Li’s Taiwan Stance
Modern historians debate whether Li’s position reflected:
1. Strategic Foresight: Recognizing Taiwan as indefensible given Qing weaknesses
2. Cultural Arrogance: Devaluing non-Han territories and populations
3. Pragmatic Realism: Sacrificing peripheries to preserve core interests
His writings underscore the tragic paradox of late Qing reformers—simultaneously recognizing the need for modernization while remaining bound by imperial worldview limitations. The Taiwan question, which Li considered resolved in 1895, continues echoing through East Asian geopolitics over a century later.
Conclusion: The Weight of Impossible Choices
Li Hongzhang’s Taiwan deliberations reveal the agonizing decisions faced by Chinese officials as their civilization encountered industrialized empires. Whether viewed as pragmatic statesman or compromised bureaucrat, his career illuminates the impossible tensions of 19th-century statecraft—where territorial integrity, cultural identity, and sheer survival demanded contradictory sacrifices. The “scorched island” he dismissed as worthless would become one of Asia’s economic miracles, rendering his assessment perhaps the greatest miscalculation in a career filled with controversial choices.