A Continent in Flux: Europe’s Shifting Balance of Power

The spring of 1859 marked a pivotal moment in European history, as French and Piedmontese forces clashed with Austria in the plains of Lombardy. This conflict over Italian unification sent shockwaves through the German Confederation, forcing its member states to confront existential questions about their own political future. At the heart of the debate stood Prussia—a rising power torn between tradition and ambition—and Austria, the fading guardian of the post-Napoleonic order established in 1815.

The Crimean War (1853-1856) had already weakened Austria’s prestige, exposing cracks in the conservative alliance that had dominated Europe since the Congress of Vienna. Now, as Napoleon III championed Italian nationalism against Habsburg rule, German intellectuals and politicians saw both danger and opportunity. Would Prussia support its traditional rival Austria to maintain the Germanic status quo? Or would Berlin exploit Vienna’s vulnerability to redefine Central Europe’s power structure?

The Battle of Ideas: Competing Visions for Germany

### The Kleindeutschland Advocates

Leading Prussian historians and liberal thinkers—Johann Gustav Droysen, Heinrich von Sybel, and Georg Waitz—articulated a pragmatic position: Prussia should aid Austria only if Vienna recognized Hohenzollern leadership over non-Austrian German states. Their “Kleindeutsch” (Small Germany) solution excluded the multiethnic Habsburg domains, envisioning a unified Germany under Prussian hegemony.

### The Großeutschland Coalition

Remarkably, calls for Prussian-Austrian military cooperation came from strange bedfellows:
– Conservative hardliners like Leopold and Ludwig von Gerlach
– Democratic supporters of a “Großdeutschland” (Greater Germany) including Benedict Waldeck
– Socialist theorists Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, who saw Napoleon III as revolution’s greatest enemy
– Former National Assembly president Heinrich von Gagern, who abandoned his Kleindeutsch stance

### The Radical Alternative: Bismarck’s Gambit

Most audacious was Otto von Bismarck’s secret proposal to Prussia’s regent: let Austria and France exhaust each other, then march south to “plant boundary markers where Protestantism ends.” The future architect of German unification already envisioned rebranding Prussia as a “German Kingdom”—a vision shared unexpectedly by socialist Ferdinand Lassalle, who urged exploiting nationalist fervor to annex Schleswig-Holstein.

The Culture War: Nationalism vs. Revolution

The Italian conflict became a proxy battle for Germany’s soul. Liberal and democratic factions found common ground in the newly formed German National Association (1859), modeled after Italy’s nationalist movements. This coalition of educated bourgeoisie—lawyers, academics, and reformers—organized shooting clubs, gymnastic societies, and fundraising drives for a German navy.

Meanwhile, Marx and Engels denounced such bourgeois nationalism. In Po und Rhein (April 1859), Engels argued that revolutionary interests required weakening France’s “obstacle to progress,” dismissing moral concerns about national self-determination. The socialist vision prioritized class struggle over ethnic unification—a divergence that would haunt German politics for decades.

Prussia’s Constitutional Crisis: Blood and Budgets

Austria’s defeat at Solferino (June 1859) had immediate domestic consequences. As Vienna experimented with federalist reforms through the October Diploma (1860), Prussia faced its own reckoning. King Wilhelm I’s military reforms—extending conscription from two to three years—sparked a constitutional crisis when the liberal-dominated Landtag refused to approve budgets.

The 1861 formation of the Progressive Party marked Germany’s first modern political organization, uniting liberals and democrats behind constitutional government and shorter military service. Their electoral victories in 1861-1862 precipitated a showdown with the monarchy—a crisis Bismarck resolved through his infamous “gap theory” of unconstitutional governance.

His September 1862 “Blood and Iron” speech laid bare the new reality: German unity would come through Prussian power, not parliamentary debate. For four years, Bismarck governed without approved budgets, creating a template for authoritarian rule that balanced pseudo-constitutional forms with executive dominance.

The Long Shadow: Legacy of the 1859 Watershed

The Italian War’s indirect consequences proved more enduring than its battles:
1. The Habsburg Decline Accelerated: Austria’s loss of Lombardy exposed its vulnerability, forcing constitutional experiments that ultimately failed to preserve the empire.
2. Prussian Ascendancy Cemented: Germany’s middle classes now looked to Berlin, not Vienna, for protection—a psychological shift Bismarck would exploit in 1866.
3. The National Liberal Template: The National Association’s blend of bourgeois nationalism and limited liberalism became the model for Germany’s unification movement.
4. Bismarck’s Playbook Emerged: His manipulation of nationalist sentiment, constitutional gray zones, and great-power diplomacy all took shape during this crisis.

When German unification finally came in 1871, its foundations had been laid in the ideological ferment and realpolitik maneuvers of 1859-1862. The “Italian question” had forced Germans to choose between nostalgic conservatism, revolutionary socialism, and Bismarck’s third way—a authoritarian nationalism dressed in constitutional trappings. This crossroads moment determined not only Germany’s borders, but its troubled political culture for generations to come.