Two Reformers, One Revolutionary Legacy
By 1985, Western observers and even Mikhail Gorbachev’s own aides had begun drawing comparisons between the Soviet Union’s new leader and Nikita Khrushchev, the maverick reformer of the 1950s-60s. Though separated by generation, education, and temperament, these two men shared striking similarities: peasant origins, an almost missionary zeal for reform, unshakable optimism, moral discomfort with Stalinist legacies, and faith in the Soviet people’s common sense. Both believed in communism’s core ideals while recognizing the urgent need for systemic change—a paradox that would define their tumultuous tenures.
As William Taubman, Khrushchev’s biographer, noted, Gorbachev saw his mission as completing the de-Stalinization that Khrushchev had begun before being ousted by conservative forces under Brezhnev. Yet their approaches diverged dramatically. Where Khrushchev bulldozed through resistance like a “tank assault,” Gorbachev preferred consensus-building and bureaucratic maneuvering. This contrast in styles would shape the outcomes of their reforms—and ultimately, the fate of the USSR.
The Unlikely Rise of a Reformer
Gorbachev’s ascent to power in 1985 was remarkably smooth, a testament to the network of reform-minded officials cultivated by his mentor Yuri Andropov. Unlike Khrushchev—who survived Stalin’s purges, World War II, and the dangerous plot against Lavrentiy Beria—Gorbachev had never faced mortal peril. His rivals, like aging Premier Nikolai Tikhonov and Leningrad party boss Grigory Romanov, quietly stepped aside. Even the military endorsed his candidacy.
This easy victory masked deeper challenges. In his first Politburo speech as General Secretary, Gorbachev cautiously pledged continuity with Brezhnev-era policies, calling them “true Leninism.” Only months later, during a televised visit to Leningrad, did he hint at the seismic shifts to come, introducing the term perestroika (restructuring)—a euphemism for reforms still undefined. Like Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal, Gorbachev sought to salvage socialism through systemic renewal, yet initially lacked a clear roadmap. As he later admitted in his memoirs: “One cannot immediately free one’s consciousness from what had previously blinded and bound it.”
The False Starts of Perestroika
Gorbachev’s early domestic policies followed Andropov’s playbook: anti-corruption campaigns and labor discipline drives. Hundreds of regional party bosses were purged, while a disastrous anti-alcohol initiative (meant to boost productivity) backfired, creating a fiscal crisis and thriving black markets.
Economically, the Politburo recycled Khrushchev’s old ambition—catching up to America—by pledging a 20% industrial output increase by 2000. This “acceleration” strategy relied on deficit spending and centralized planning, ignoring market mechanisms. Not until 1987 would Gorbachev embrace radical economic reforms, but by then, stagnation had deepened.
Glasnost and the Thaw of Soviet Society
Where Gorbachev moved boldly was in foreign policy. By 1986, his “New Thinking” rejected Stalinist paranoia, emphasizing global interdependence. He replaced hardliner Andrei Gromyko with Eduard Shevardnadze at the Foreign Ministry and surrounded himself with reformist intellectuals like Alexander Yakovlev, who secretly advocated ending one-party rule.
Cultural liberalization followed. Censorship eased, dissidents were released, and citizens regained the right to meet foreigners—a dramatic reversal of Stalinist isolationism. Gorbachev’s wife Raisa, a sociology graduate, played an unprecedented role, hosting salons where ideas flowed freely. These changes endeared him to intellectuals but alienated party conservatives.
The Nuclear Gamble and U.S. Relations
Gorbachev’s visceral opposition to nuclear weapons—shaped by his wartime childhood—drove his diplomacy. At the 1985 Geneva Summit, he stunned Reagan by proposing total nuclear disarmament by 2000. Though dismissed as propaganda, this reflected his genuine alarm after learning of “nuclear winter” scenarios.
Yet contradictions remained. Despite withdrawing SS-20 missiles from Europe, he escalated Afghanistan’s war until 1988, fearing retreat would signal weakness. Similarly, Reagan’s “Star Wars” (SDI) program obsessed him; Soviet scientists warned that countermeasures would be ruinously expensive, yet Gorbachev kept demanding solutions.
Legacy: The Unfinished Revolution
By 1987, Gorbachev’s reforms had unleashed forces he couldn’t control. Perestroika’s economic half-measures caused shortages, while glasnost (openness) exposed systemic failures. His 1986 Party Congress speech—declaring “security can only be achieved through political means”—effectively abandoned Marxist class struggle dogma, yet failed to stabilize the USSR.
Unlike Khrushchev, who was simply ousted, Gorbachev presided over the Soviet Union’s dissolution. Yet both men shared a tragic fate: their genuine belief in reforming communism ultimately undermined the system they sought to save. Today, their twin legacies endure as cautionary tales about the perils—and possibilities—of top-down revolution.