The Postwar World Order and China’s Expectations

As the guns fell silent in November 1918, marking the end of World War I, the victorious Allied powers turned their attention to reshaping the global order. The Paris Peace Conference, convened in January 1919 at the Palace of Versailles, brought together representatives from twenty-seven nations, including China as an Allied member. This gathering promised to establish new international relations based on President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points, which championed self-determination and open diplomacy.

For China, participation in the conference represented a glimmer of hope after decades of imperialist encroachment. Since the mid-19th century, China had suffered under unequal treaties, extraterritoriality, and foreign spheres of influence. The Chinese delegation, led by Foreign Minister Lu Zhengxiang, arrived in Paris with cautious optimism, believing Wilson’s principles might finally deliver justice for their nation.

The Shandong Question Takes Center Stage

The conference’s agenda took an unexpected turn on January 27 when Japan raised the issue of German concessions in Shandong Province. During the war, Japan had seized Germany’s holdings in Qingdao and along the Shandong Peninsula, despite China’s 1917 declaration of war against Germany. Japanese delegate Baron Makino Nobuaki demanded direct transfer of these territories to Japan, bypassing China entirely.

This development shocked the Chinese delegation, who had assumed Japan would honor its 1915 and 1918 agreements to eventually return Shandong to China. The young diplomat Wellington Koo (Gu Weijun), then only 31 years old, found himself thrust into the spotlight as China’s primary advocate before the Council of Ten.

Koo’s Masterful Defense of Chinese Sovereignty

On January 28, Koo delivered what would become one of the most celebrated speeches in modern Chinese diplomatic history. With eloquence and precision, he presented China’s case for direct restitution of Shandong:

“Shandong is the sacred birthplace of Chinese civilization, where Confucius and Mencius taught. Its 36 million people are ethnically, culturally, and linguistically Chinese. Geographically, Qingdao serves as the gateway to northern China and its railway connects directly to the capital. Economically, the densely populated province cannot sustain foreign colonization.”

Koo’s performance earned immediate praise from Western delegates, with Wilson reportedly calling it “an excellent presentation of China’s position.” The contrast with Japan’s legalistic arguments based on secret treaties created a temporary advantage for China in the court of international opinion.

The Web of Secret Agreements

The conference soon revealed the complex web of wartime commitments that constrained decision-making. Japan produced the 1917 Lansing-Ishii Agreement with America and similar understandings with Britain, France, and Italy, all recognizing Japan’s “special interests” in China. Most damaging was China’s own 1918 “gladly agree” note, signed under financial pressure from Japan, which seemed to acknowledge Japanese claims.

When pressed to disclose these secret documents, Koo brilliantly argued that treaties signed under duress during wartime held no moral or legal validity. He maintained that China’s declaration of war against Germany had automatically nullified all Sino-German agreements, returning Shandong to Chinese sovereignty by default.

Great Power Politics and Betrayal

As April progressed, geopolitical realities overwhelmed principle. Japan threatened to withdraw from the conference following Italy’s departure over territorial disputes. Faced with potential collapse of the entire peace process, Wilson reluctantly abandoned China. On April 30, the Big Three (Wilson, Lloyd George, and Clemenceau) granted Japan all former German rights in Shandong without requiring explicit provisions for eventual Chinese recovery.

The decision shocked the Chinese delegation. Their May 4 protest denounced the settlement as “sacrificing China to maintain conference unity,” transforming their country into “a bargaining chip for Allied interests.” This betrayal of Wilsonian ideals would have profound consequences.

The May Fourth Movement Erupts

News of the Shandong decision reached Beijing on May 3, sparking immediate outrage. The next day, approximately 3,000 students from thirteen universities gathered at Tiananmen, carrying banners proclaiming “Return Qingdao to Us” and “Punish the Traitors.” The protest escalated into China’s first mass student demonstration, with marchers attacking the home of pro-Japanese official Cao Rulin and beating his colleague Zhang Zongxiang.

This May Fourth incident ignited a nationwide movement that quickly expanded beyond student circles. By June, Shanghai’s merchants and workers had joined through strikes and boycotts—the first time China’s emerging urban classes united in political action. The movement’s targets expanded from foreign imperialism to China’s own political culture, demanding “Mr. Science” and “Mr. Democracy” to replace traditional Confucian values.

Diplomatic Resistance and Domestic Consequences

Under intense public pressure, the Beijing government vacillated. While initially ordering the delegation to sign the treaty with reservations, it ultimately left the decision to the diplomats in Paris. On June 28, 1919, the Chinese delegation made history by refusing to sign the Treaty of Versailles—the only Allied power to do so.

This unprecedented act of defiance came at considerable cost. The pro-Japanese officials Cao Rulin, Zhang Zongxiang, and Lu Zongyu were forced to resign, but the broader movement had already transformed Chinese politics. The May Fourth Movement discredited the Anfu Club-dominated government and marked the rise of mass nationalism as a potent political force.

Legacy of the Paris Peace Conference for China

The Versailles settlement left deep scars on China’s political consciousness. The betrayal by Western powers discredited liberal internationalism, pushing many intellectuals toward more radical solutions. For the emerging Chinese Communist Party (founded 1921), the episode validated Marxist critiques of imperialism. Even moderate nationalists like Sun Yat-sen drew the lesson that China must develop its own power rather than rely on international justice.

Wellington Koo’s performance established a model for Chinese diplomacy—combining legal acumen with appeals to universal principles—that would influence generations. The Shandong issue was eventually resolved at the 1921-22 Washington Conference through gradual Japanese withdrawal, but the psychological impact of 1919 endured.

The May Fourth Movement’s intellectual ferment spawned China’s New Culture Movement, permanently altering the country’s educational and literary landscapes. Its emphasis on vernacular language, women’s rights, and scientific thinking laid foundations for modern Chinese society. Perhaps most significantly, the events of 1919 demonstrated the power of coordinated popular action, providing a template for future political movements in 20th century China.