The Delicate Balance of Power in Late Qing China
In early 1898, the Qing dynasty stood at a crossroads. The imperial court’s Grand Council comprised key figures: Prince Gong (奕䜣), Prince Li (whose son married Ronglu’s daughter), Gangyi, Liao Shoufeng, and Weng Tonghe—the latter being both Grand Secretary and former tutor to Emperor Guangxu. Meanwhile, Dowager Empress Cixi resided leisurely in the Summer Palace, accompanied by Ronglu’s wife and her adopted eldest princess.
Cixi’s apparent retirement masked her enduring influence. While enjoying Kunming Lake boat rides, temple visits, and artistic pursuits, she maintained ironclad control through loyalists like Gangyi and Prince Li, who reported all palace affairs. Though she had nominally transferred power to Guangxu, their relationship followed strict protocols: the emperor knelt outside her chambers for thirty minutes before audiences, while eunuchs like the powerful Li Lianying openly disrespected him. This humiliating dynamic—where even palace servants treated Guangxu with less deference than Manchu nobles—fueled the emperor’s later radicalism during the Hundred Days’ Reform.
The North-South Factional Divide
At the heart of Qing politics simmered a decades-long rivalry between two intellectual factions:
– Northern Faction: Led by conservative Han officials Xu Tong (a tutor to Emperor Tongzhi) and Li Hongzao, they allied with Manchu traditionalists like Ronglu. Xu famously accused Guangxu of being a “Han traitor.”
– Southern Faction: Centered on Jiangsu-born Weng Tonghe, this reform-minded group admired Japan’s modernization. Their disciples dominated the civil service exams, sparking Northern jealousy.
The 1880 Ili Crisis exposed these tensions. When Weng advocated war against Russia, Xu Tong’s last-minute betrayal left him isolated. Meanwhile, Weng’s 1880 exposure of Ronglu’s alleged affair with a consort created lasting enmity. By 1894, with both Weng and Li Hongzao joining the Grand Council, the factions polarized further—now dubbed “Empress’s Party” (backing Cixi) and “Emperor’s Party” (supporting Guangxu).
The Death of Prince Gong and Its Consequences
April 1898 witnessed a pivotal moment: the demise of Prince Gong, the last surviving son of Emperor Daoguang. His obituary edicts revealed Cixi’s enduring authority, as she emphasized his deathbed advice urging Guangxu to consult her. As the only figure who could temper both Manchu hardliners and reformists, his absence created a power vacuum.
Weng Tonghe, losing his chief protector, made a fateful recommendation: introducing radical reformer Kang Youwei to Guangxu. Unbeknownst to Weng, Kang would push the emperor toward confronting Cixi directly—a miscalculation that doomed the reform movement.
The Hundred Days’ Reform: High Hopes and Swift Retribution
On June 11, 1898, Guangxu issued his first reform edict after notifying Cixi, who gave conditional approval provided Manchu privileges remained untouched. The decree established Peking University and modernized education, declaring:
“How can we resist foreign powers with superior weapons if we neglect military training and education? All officials must devote themselves to practical studies to cultivate economic talent.”
Yet Cixi sabotaged even symbolic gestures—overruling the top exam candidate from Weng’s Jiangsu hometown in favor of a Guizhou scholar. Days later, she struck decisively:
Edict Dismissing Weng Tonghe:
“The Minister of Revenue Weng Tonghe has recently acted arbitrarily, causing widespread dissatisfaction. During audiences, his erratic temperament renders him unfit for high office. Considering his long service as imperial tutor, he is merely ordered to return to his hometown.”
Simultaneously, Cixi reasserted control by requiring all newly appointed senior officials to thank her personally—a clear demotion of Guangxu’s authority.
The Reform Movement’s Fatal Flaws
Kang Youwei’s secret audiences with Guangxu proved disastrous. His venomous attacks on Cixi—comparing her to the usurping Empress Wu Zetian—pushed the emperor toward confrontation. Kang’s true motives became suspect; contemporaries noted his obsession with power rather than national rejuvenation.
Meanwhile, Ronglu’s appointment as Viceroy of Zhili placed military power near Beijing in conservative hands. When Guangxu proposed training a modern army under reformist Chen Baozhen’s son, Ronglu initially agreed—until realizing the radicals’ true aim: sidelining the Manchu establishment.
Legacy: Why the 1898 Reforms Failed
The movement collapsed within months when Cixi staged her coup on September 21. Several factors sealed its fate:
1. Underestimating Cixi: Guangxu and Kang misread her tolerance, failing to build Manchu support.
2. Factional Myopia: Weng’s desire to defeat Gangyi and Xu blinded him to Kang’s recklessness.
3. Cultural Schisms: Northern conservatives saw reforms as Southern elitism threatening Manchu rule.
The aftermath reshaped China: exiled reformers like Kang turned to revolutionary rhetoric, while Cixi’s subsequent embrace of the Boxers (1900) stemmed partly from this 1898 trauma. Ironically, many 1898 proposals—educational reform, military modernization—were implemented post-1901 under Cixi’s “New Policies,” but the lost chance for gradual change hastened the Qing’s collapse.
The 1898 power struggle remains a cautionary tale about the perils of top-down reform without consensus—a lesson echoing through China’s modern transformations.