The Warlord Landscape of Early Republican China

The turbulent years following China’s 1911 Revolution created a fractured political landscape where military power became the ultimate currency. As the Qing dynasty collapsed, regional military leaders emerged as the new power brokers, creating a patchwork of competing factions across the nation. This era, known as the Warlord Period (1916-1928), saw the fragmentation of central authority and the rise of militarized politics.

Duan Qirui stood as a central figure in this chaotic transition. As a leading member of the powerful Beiyang clique that had dominated late Qing military reforms, Duan represented the institutional continuity between imperial and republican military structures. His political fortunes would rise and fall with his ability to command loyal troops, illustrating Mao Zedong’s later observation that in China’s divided landscape, “those with guns have power, and those with more guns have more power.”

Duan’s Political Awakening Through Military Crisis

Duan’s path to building personal military forces emerged from painful political lessons. His abrupt dismissal during the 1917 President-Premier conflict revealed the fragility of power without direct military control. When ordered removed by President Li Yuanhong, Duan found himself powerless – nearby troops offered no support, leaving him dependent on provincial warlords like Ni Sichong for backing.

The 1917 Manchu Restoration crisis drove the lesson home more painfully. Though Duan positioned himself as leader of the anti-restoration forces, he initially commanded no troops directly. Key potential allies like Zhili governor Zhu Jiabao and police chief Yang Yide ignored his calls, leaving him what U.S. Minister Paul Reinsch called “a commoner without political or military power.” Only through Japanese-funded bribes could Duan mobilize Zhili clique units under Li Changtai and Feng Yuxiang to suppress the restoration.

These humiliations convinced Duan that personal military power was essential for political survival. As he later reflected, the experiences made him “deeply understand that without real military power, one cannot achieve anything.” This realization would shape his subsequent political maneuvers.

The Birth of the War Participation Army

Duan’s opportunity came through China’s symbolic entry into World War I in August 1917. Appointed Director of War Participation in December 1917, Duan transformed this ostensibly foreign-focused position into a vehicle for domestic military buildup. The War Participation Office, established in March 1918, became his institutional base for creating new forces.

Key to this effort was Japanese support. Through the May 1918 Sino-Japanese Joint Defense Agreements, Duan secured Japanese advisors, equipment, and funding. The September 1918 War Participation Loan of 20 million yen specifically financed troop training. Japanese influence permeated the new forces – from weapons (mostly Type 38 rifles and mountain guns) to training methods replicated from Japanese military schools.

By January 1919, Duan had created three elite divisions:
– 1st Division (Qu Tongfeng) based in Beijing’s Nanyuan
– 2nd Division (Ma Liang) in Jinan, Shandong
– 3rd Division (Chen Wenyun) in Beijing’s Beiyuan

These units represented China’s best-equipped forces, with Japanese-trained officers and modern artillery. As the war ended, Duan rebranded them as “National Defense Forces” and later “Frontier Defense Forces” to maintain their existence.

Xu Shuzheng and the Northwest Frontier Army

Parallel to Duan’s efforts, his protege Xu Shuzheng built complementary forces in China’s northwest. Beginning with five reorganized Fengtien Army brigades in 1918, Xu expanded his power through Mongolia’s 1919 cancellation of autonomy.

Appointed Northwest Frontier Commissioner in June 1919, Xu commanded four mixed brigades:
– 1st Brigade (Song Banghan) in Yanzhou
– 2nd Brigade (Song Ziyang) in Tianjin
– 3rd Brigade (Chu Qixiang) in Urga (Ulaanbaatar)
– 4th Brigade (Zhang Dingxun) in Luoyang

Xu’s forces projected Anhui clique influence into Mongolia while securing a strategic hinterland. His aggressive policies temporarily reasserted Chinese control over Outer Mongolia until the Anhui clique’s 1920 collapse.

The Political Impact of Duan’s Military Machine

These parallel military buildups allowed Duan to dominate Beijing politics even without the premiership after 1918. The War Participation/Northwest armies served multiple functions:

1. Political Leverage: With loyal troops near the capital, Duan could intimidate presidents and cabinets. His forces balanced against the Zhili clique’s military strength.

2. Unification Campaigns: The new armies became the vanguard of Duan’s “military unification” campaigns against southern separatists.

3. Institutional Power: Military control complemented Duan’s political machine (the Anfu Club) and rubber-stamp parliament (Anfu Congress).

4. Foreign Backing: Japanese support through loans and arms sales gave Duan resources unavailable to rivals.

However, this military buildup also intensified factional conflicts. The Zhili clique, led by Cao Kun and Wu Peifu, grew increasingly resentful of Anhui dominance. Duan’s reliance on Japanese support made him vulnerable to nationalist criticism following the unpopular Versailles decisions.

The Downfall and Historical Legacy

The inevitable clash came in July 1920’s Zhili-Anhui War. Despite their elite training and equipment, Duan’s forces proved no match for the battle-hardened Zhili armies. Within weeks, the War Participation and Northwest armies disintegrated, marking the Anhui clique’s political demise.

Historians assess Duan’s military experiment as emblematic of warlord-era dynamics:

1. Personalization of Military Power: Troops owed loyalty to Duan personally rather than the state, reflecting the privatization of violence.

2. Foreign Interference: Japanese involvement demonstrated how external powers manipulated China’s internal divisions.

3. Institutional Weakness: Despite modern equipment, the armies lacked national legitimacy, collapsing quickly when challenged.

4. Cycle of Militarism: Duan’s buildup provoked counter-mobilization by rivals, accelerating China’s descent into warlordism.

The rapid dissolution of Duan’s painstakingly built forces underscored the instability of militarized politics. While temporarily effective, such personal armies ultimately contributed to China’s prolonged fragmentation until the Northern Expedition’s nationalist reunification in 1928. Duan’s experience remains a cautionary tale about military power divorced from institutional constraints and popular legitimacy.