The Fractured Foundations of Zhili Dominance

The early 1920s marked a pivotal period in China’s warlord era, as the Zhili Clique emerged victorious from successive military conflicts to establish its dominance over Beijing. This faction, led by the powerful triumvirate of Cao Kun, Wu Peifu, and Feng Guozhang, had risen to prominence through a combination of military prowess and political maneuvering. However, beneath the surface of their apparent unity lay deep fissures that would ultimately lead to one of the most notorious political scandals in modern Chinese history.

At the heart of the Zhili Clique’s internal tensions stood the contrasting ambitions of its two principal leaders. Wu Peifu, the brilliant strategist known as the “Jade Marshal,” envisioned a China reunified under Zhili control through military conquest of southern warlords, followed by the establishment of a constitutional government with Cao Kun as figurehead president. His vision involved maintaining the facade of legal continuity while consolidating real power behind the scenes. Meanwhile, Cao Kun, the senior military leader based in Baoding, harbored simpler ambitions – to occupy the presidential palace as quickly as possible, with little concern for the complexities of national unification.

These divergent priorities created what contemporaries called the “Baoding-Tianjin faction” (aligned with Cao Kun) and the “Luoyang faction” (loyal to Wu Peifu). The geographical labels reflected their respective power bases – Cao’s operations centered around his Zhili Governor headquarters in Baoding and his brother Cao Rui’s administration in Tianjin, while Wu commanded from his Luoyang headquarters as Deputy Inspector General of Zhili, Shandong, and Henan.

The “Cabinet of Good Men” and Its Dramatic Downfall

The tensions between these factions came to a head during the brief but significant tenure of the so-called “Cabinet of Good Men” (好人内阁) in late 1922. On September 19, under pressure from Wu Peifu, President Li Yuanhong appointed Wang Chonghui as acting Premier, forming a cabinet that would become famous both for its Western-educated technocrats and its rapid collapse.

Wang’s cabinet represented an unusual experiment in Chinese governance. Foreign Minister Wellington Koo (Gu Weijun), Finance Minister Luo Wengan, and Education Minister Tang Erhe all held advanced degrees from prestigious foreign universities. The administration earned its nickname from the perception that these were “good men” – competent, professional, and ostensibly above factional politics. In reality, the cabinet leaned heavily toward Wu Peifu’s Luoyang faction, with key positions controlled by Wu’s protégés like Gao Enhong (Communications) and Sun Danlin (Interior).

The cabinet’s composition immediately drew Cao Kun’s ire. Only one minister, Agriculture and Commerce chief Gao Lingwei, represented Cao’s interests, and even he held a relatively minor portfolio. This imbalance set the stage for confrontation, with Cao’s allies in Parliament, particularly House Speaker Wu Jinglian, launching relentless attacks on the administration.

The crisis came to a head with the infamous “Luo Wengan Case” in November. Luo, the Oxford-educated Finance Minister, was accused by Wu Jinglian of taking bribes related to Austrian loan negotiations. In a stunning breach of protocol, President Li ordered Luo’s arrest without consulting the cabinet, leading to a constitutional crisis. Wu Peifu initially defended Luo and condemned Li’s actions, but when Cao Kun publicly denounced Luo and mobilized Zhili-affiliated governors to echo his position, Wu backed down, abandoning his cabinet allies.

The “Good Men” government collapsed on November 25, just over a month after its formation, marking the first clear victory of Cao’s Baoding-Tianjin faction over Wu’s Luoyang faction in their struggle for control of Beijing’s political machinery.

Constitutional Crises and the Erosion of Governance

The fall of Wang Chonghui’s cabinet ushered in a period of unprecedented governmental instability. Between November 1922 and June 1923, Beijing witnessed a rapid succession of short-lived administrations:

– Wang Chonghui Cabinet (September-November 1922)
– Wang Zhengting’s caretaker administration (December 1922)
– Zhang Shaozeng Cabinet (January-June 1923)

Each transition revealed deepening fractures within the Zhili leadership and the progressive erosion of constitutional norms. Zhang Shaozeng’s appointment in January 1923 represented an attempt at compromise – as both Cao Kun’s sworn brother and Wu Peifu’s relative by marriage, he theoretically could bridge the factional divide. In reality, his administration became a battleground.

Zhang’s advocacy for “peaceful unification” through negotiation with southern warlords directly contradicted Wu Peifu’s “forceful unification” strategy. When Cao and Wu pressured Zhang to appoint their allies as military governors in Guangdong and Fujian against his principles, the premier’s credibility collapsed. Meanwhile, Cao’s faction grew increasingly impatient with any obstacles to his presidential ambitions.

The constitutional crisis reached its peak in May 1923 over the issue of legislative funding. Parliament, seeking to complete China’s long-delayed constitution, proposed payments to ensure quorums for crucial votes. Cao’s supporters saw this as a ploy by Li Yuanhong to extend his presidency by delaying elections. The resulting conflict between President Li and Cao’s cabinet allies paralyzed governance, with ministers resigning en masse on June 6.

The Forced Ouster of President Li Yuanhong

With Zhang Shaozeng’s resignation, Cao Kun and his Baoding-Tianjin faction moved decisively to remove their final obstacle – President Li Yuanhong. What followed was a textbook example of warlord coercion:

June 7-9: Military and police officials staged mass protests at the presidential palace demanding back pay, while “citizen groups” (actually paid demonstrators) called for Li’s resignation.

June 10: Police went on strike across Beijing, and military officers surrounded Li’s residence, cutting telephone lines and water supplies.

June 12: Beijing garrison commanders Wang Huaiqing and Feng Yuxiang resigned, declaring they could no longer guarantee order.

Facing this coordinated pressure, Li made a final attempt to preserve constitutional government on June 13. Before fleeing to Tianjin, he issued seven presidential decrees that included:
– Abolishing all provincial military titles (a direct challenge to warlord power)
– Denouncing the coercion as illegal
– Appointing Li Genyuan as acting Premier

These measures proved futile. At Tianjin station, Li was intercepted by Zhili governor Wang Chengbin, who detained the presidential train overnight to extort the seal of state. Only after Li signed pre-written resignation documents was he allowed to proceed.

The Infamous 1923 Presidential Election

With Li removed, Cao’s path to the presidency seemed clear. However, the constitutional requirement of a parliamentary quorum (583 of 870 members) presented challenges, as many legislators had fled Beijing to avoid participating in what they saw as an illegitimate process.

The Zhili solution was simple: bribery on an unprecedented scale. Under the direction of House Speaker Wu Jinglian, Cao’s operatives established a vote-buying operation at the Gan Shi Bridge Club, offering payments ranging from 5,000 to 10,000 silver dollars per vote. The funds were raised through various coercive measures:
– Special taxes imposed across Zhili province
– Forced “loans” from businesses
– Advance collection of land taxes
– Mortgaging government properties

On October 1, over 500 legislators received checks drawn on designated banks, with special codes identifying payment sources. Not all accepted quietly – legislator Shao Ruipeng publicly exposed the scheme by releasing his bribe check to newspapers and filing legal complaints.

Despite these revelations, the election proceeded on October 5 under heavy military guard. After hours of delays to gather enough paid participants (including ill legislators carried in on stretchers), the session finally achieved a quorum of 593 members. Cao received 480 votes – more than enough under constitutional requirements.

Consequences and Historical Legacy

The immediate aftermath of Cao’s October 10 inauguration demonstrated how thoroughly the election had discredited China’s political institutions:

National Outrage: Cities across China saw protests denouncing the “piglet legislators” (猪仔议员). Students in Anhui attacked their home province’s participating lawmakers.

International Reaction: While the U.S. minister offered quick recognition, most Western powers hesitated to endorse the blatantly corrupt process.

Constitutional Farce: The hurried passage of China’s first permanent constitution in three days (October 5-8) only underscored its illegitimacy. This “Cao Kun Constitution” would be ignored within a year.

The 1923 scandal marked a turning point in China’s warlord era. It demonstrated the complete subversion of republican institutions by military strongmen and discredited the parliamentary system in the eyes of many Chinese. Within a year, Cao’s regime would collapse during the Second Zhili-Fengtian War, but the damage to China’s constitutional development proved lasting. The episode stands as a cautionary tale about the vulnerability of democratic processes to corruption and coercion in the absence of genuine institutional safeguards.