The Fractured Republic: China’s Warlord Era Begins

The period between 1920 and 1924 marked a critical juncture in China’s turbulent early republican history, when the Zhili Clique emerged as the dominant force in Beijing politics. Following the collapse of Yuan Shikai’s imperial ambitions in 1916, China had descended into regional fragmentation, with powerful militarists controlling different parts of the country. The Zhili faction, named after its base in Zhili Province (modern Hebei), rose to prominence under the leadership of Cao Kun and Wu Peifu after their victory in the 1920 Zhili-Anhui War.

This era represented the peak of warlord dominance in Chinese politics, with military strongmen rather than civilian politicians determining national policy. The Zhili faction’s rule can be divided into two distinct phases: an initial period of joint control with the Fengtian Clique under Zhang Zuolin until the First Zhili-Fengtian War of April 1922, followed by exclusive Zhili domination after defeating their former allies. During these years, northern China in particular suffered under an exceptionally reactionary military regime that brought unprecedented hardship to ordinary citizens.

The Mechanics of Zhili Dominance

The Zhili Clique maintained its grip on power through a combination of military force and political manipulation. At its height in 1924, the faction commanded approximately 250,000 troops stationed across Zhili, Henan, Shandong, Rehe, Chahar, and Suiyuan provinces. Wu Peifu, the faction’s most capable strategist, established his headquarters in Luoyang, which became the real center of power rather than the nominal capital in Beijing.

Financially, the regime survived through systematic plunder of the populace. From 1920 to 1922 alone, Wu Peifu extracted over 6.8 million yuan from the civilian population in addition to official military budgets. By 1923, the Beijing government’s financial situation had become catastrophic, with unpaid administrative expenses reaching 84.1 million yuan and military arrears totaling 134.38 million yuan. Provincial authorities, unable to meet these demands, began withholding tax revenues meant for the central government, including even salt tax income that served as collateral for foreign loans.

Cao Kun’s regime desperately sought foreign financial support to maintain its operations and fund military campaigns. The unresolved Gold Franc Case with France complicated these efforts, as the French government withheld 3 million yuan in salt tax revenues and refused to ratify the Nine-Power Treaty from 1923 until the issue was settled. This financial stranglehold severely constrained the Zhili government’s options and accelerated its eventual collapse.

The Corruption and Excess of Warlord Rule

The Zhili leadership distinguished itself through particularly rapacious governance. Cao Kun and his brothers developed an elaborate system of graft that permeated every level of administration. As commander of 25 divisions, Cao appointed his crony Li Yanqing as chief of military supplies, who systematically skimmed 20,000 yuan from each division’s monthly payroll as “tribute” to the warlord – netting Cao 500,000 yuan monthly.

The family’s corruption extended far beyond military budgets. They seized control of the Northwest Frontier Bank after the 1920 Zhili-Anhui War, appropriating 1 million yuan in shares from defeated Anhui clique leaders. Provincial governors faced extortion demands, with one official required to pay 100,000 yuan monthly for appointment as Tianjin Mint supervisor. During the 1922 military campaigns, counties were assessed crushing levies – up to 50,000 yuan plus 4,000 dan of grain from large counties.

Wu Peifu proved equally predatory in Hubei, where he extracted nearly 10 million yuan through various exactions, including taxes on basic commodities and even licenses for porters. The warlords’ personal business empires flourished through abuse of power – free rail transport for commercial goods, tax exemptions, military supply monopolies, and even opium trafficking. The Cao family accumulated staggering wealth: 20,000 qing (approximately 30,000 acres) of land, salt flats, orchards, and beachfront properties; 18 mansions including the lavish Tianjin Cao Family Garden; investments in utilities, pawnshops, and shipping worth millions; and vast collections of art and jewelry.

The Human Cost: Warfare, Natural Disaster, and Social Collapse

The Zhili years witnessed nearly continuous military conflict across China. Major engagements included:
– 1921: Shaanxi-Zhili War, Hunan-Hubei War
– 1921-1922: Hunan-Zhili War, Sichuan-Zhili War
– 1922: First Zhili-Fengtian War
– 1922-1924: Sichuan warlord conflicts
– 1924: Jiangsu-Zhejiang War, Second Zhili-Fengtian War

These conflicts compounded natural disasters that ravaged much of the country. In 1921, severe drought struck Zhili, Shandong, Henan, Shanxi, and Shaanxi while floods devastated Zhejiang and Hunan. The following year saw catastrophic flooding in Hunan (21 counties affected), Zhejiang, and Anhui. By 1924, floods across 11 provinces killed over 13,000 and caused 125 million yuan in damages – Zhili alone counted 50 flooded counties and 727 submerged villages.

Social order disintegrated under these pressures. Banditry reached epidemic proportions, with warlords often colluding with criminal elements. Notable incidents included:
– 1922: Shandong bandit Sun Anren’s massacre in Linyi
– 1923: Female bandit Zhao’s attack in Dieyi Village (70 casualties)
– 1923: Liu Fulong’s gang terrorizing Jiangsu-Shandong border regions
– 1924: The “White King of Hell” Bai Fengxiang’s 2,000-strong bandit army in Rehe

Resistance and Revolution: The Communist Response

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP), founded in July 1921, emerged as the most organized opposition to warlord rule. In its June 15, 1922 statement on current affairs, the Party denounced both “federalism” and “military unification” as warlord schemes, arguing that “without eliminating feudal-style warlords, centralized government produces emperors like Yuan Shikai while decentralization creates feudal lords.”

The Party’s analysis, articulated by theorist Cai Hesen in The Guide Weekly, exposed the warlords’ cynical manipulation of political rhetoric: “Militarily aggressive warlords advocate ‘unification by force’ (like Cao and Wu); those barely holding on promote ‘federalism’ or provincial constitutions (like Sichuan and Yunnan); the same warlord might call for unification when advancing and federalism when retreating (like Zhang Zuolin).”

This ideological clarity informed the CCP’s leadership of the February 7, 1923 Beijing-Hankou Railway strike, when over 30,000 workers paralyzed the critical rail line to protest Wu Peifu’s suppression of their union. The resulting massacre – 32 killed, 200 wounded, including executed labor leaders Lin Xiangqian and Shi Yang – marked a turning point in labor organizing and anti-warlord resistance.

The Road to Collapse

By 1924, the Zhili regime’s excesses had sown the seeds of its destruction. Cao Kun’s September 1923 bribery of parliament to secure the presidency (at 5,000 yuan per vote) provoked nationwide outrage. Sun Yat-sen’s October 9 declaration denouncing the “usurper” Cao and warning foreign powers against recognition captured the revolutionary mood.

The Second Zhili-Fengtian War (September-November 1924) delivered the final blow when Feng Yuxiang’s surprise defection during the campaign triggered the Beijing Coup. Cao’s brother Cao Rui committed suicide rather than surrender the family’s foreign bank deposits (hidden under pseudonyms), while the warlord’s elaborate corruption network collapsed overnight.

This dramatic fall underscored the fundamental instability of warlord politics. Though the Zhili Clique had briefly unified northern China through military force, its inability to establish legitimate governance, address popular needs, or restrain its predatory instincts ensured its rapid demise – a pattern that would repeat across warlord China until the Nationalist unification of 1928.