The Later Jin’s Strategic Shift After the Ningyuan Defeat
Following their defeats at Jinzhou and Ningyuan in the late 1620s, the Later Jin forces under Hong Taiji faced a critical strategic dilemma. The Ming dynasty had successfully fortified its defenses along the Ningyuan-Jinzhou line, creating an impenetrable barrier north of Shanhaiguan Pass. This military stalemate forced the Later Jin leadership to reconsider their approach to challenging Ming authority.
Recognizing the futility of direct assaults on the fortified Ming positions, Hong Taiji implemented a dual strategy that would shape the next decade of conflict. First, he redirected his main forces westward to subdue the Mongols, securing his northern flank and gaining valuable cavalry allies. Simultaneously, he authorized repeated raids through various passes along the Great Wall west of Shanhaiguan, targeting the vulnerable interior regions of Ming territory.
These raids, beginning with the Jisi Campaign of 1629 and continuing through the Renwu Campaign of 1642, served multiple purposes. They weakened Ming economic resources through systematic plunder, demonstrated Later Jin military prowess, and gradually expanded their sphere of influence. This period witnessed the dramatic transformation of the Later Jin into the Qing dynasty in 1636, with Hong Taiji proclaiming himself emperor, setting the stage for their eventual conquest of China in 1644.
The Pivotal Jisi Campaign (1629)
The Jisi Campaign marked a turning point in Later Jin-Ming relations and demonstrated Hong Taiji’s strategic brilliance. Frustrated by Ming commander Yuan Chonghuan’s defensive successes and his “five-year recovery plan” for Liaodong, Hong Taiji devised an audacious flanking maneuver. He would bypass the heavily defended Ningyuan-Jinzhou corridor entirely, moving through Mongol territory to strike directly at the Ming heartland.
The campaign preparations revealed Hong Taiji’s meticulous planning. He ordered the construction of boats to transport supplies along the Liao River, reducing logistical burdens. More importantly, he secured the cooperation of recently subjugated Mongol tribes – the Khorchin, Khalkha, Barin, Jarud, Aohan and Naiman – who provided both troops and local knowledge. The喀喇沁部’s Taiji Burgadu served as guide, leveraging his familiarity with the route from previous tribute missions to Beijing.
On October 2, 1629, Hong Taiji personally led his combined Manchu-Mongol force from Shenyang. The army followed an unexpected route through the Kharachin’s Qingcheng (Huizhou), reaching the Great Wall after nearly a month’s march. In a coordinated night attack on October 26-27, they breached the defenses at three passes – Da’an, Longjing, and Hongshan – achieving complete strategic surprise.
The rapid advance that followed demonstrated the Later Jin’s growing military sophistication. Within weeks, they captured Zunhua (where Ming governor Wang Yuanya committed suicide) and approached Beijing’s outskirts by November 17. The Ming court, caught unprepared, scrambled to organize defenses while Yuan Chonghuan raced from Ningyuan with his elite Guanning troops.
The subsequent battles around Beijing revealed both strengths and weaknesses of both sides. At Desheng Gate on November 20, Later Jin forces defeated Ming general Man Gui, while at Guangqumen, Yuan Chonghuan’s forces inflicted significant casualties on the invaders, including the death of Ajige’s horse. These engagements proved the Guanning troops remained the Ming’s most effective force against the Later Jin.
Hong Taiji’s most lasting achievement in this campaign wasn’t military but psychological – his successful use of counter-espionage to eliminate Yuan Chonghuan. By allowing captured eunuchs to “overhear” false discussions about Yuan’s supposed collusion with the enemy, Hong Taiji manipulated the paranoid Chongzhen Emperor into executing his most capable general on December 1. This masterstroke removed the greatest obstacle to Later Jin expansion and demoralized the elite Guanning army, whose commander Zu Dashou briefly retreated to Shanhaiguan in protest.
The campaign’s later stages saw mixed results. While the Later Jin achieved notable successes at Yongping, Luanzhou, and Qian’an, they met fierce resistance at Changli where magistrate Zuo Yingxuan organized a heroic five-day defense. The ultimate abandonment of their four captured cities (Yongping, Luanzhou, Qian’an, and Zunhua) in May 1630 after Amin’s panicked retreat marked a tactical setback, but the strategic impact was undeniable. The Later Jin had proven they could strike at the Ming capital almost at will, while the Ming lost both territory and their most capable frontier commander.
The Dalinghe Campaign and the Surrender of Ming Defectors
The period following the Jisi Campaign saw the Later Jin consolidate their gains while preparing for the next phase of expansion. The Dalinghe Campaign (1631) proved particularly significant, not only for its immediate military outcomes but for attracting important Ming defectors who would later facilitate the Qing conquest.
Ming efforts to rebuild defenses at Dalinghe (a crucial link between Ningyuan-Jinzhou and Guangning-Yizhou) presented Hong Taiji with both challenge and opportunity. Recognizing the strategic importance of preventing Ming consolidation, he reacted with unprecedented speed, surrounding the construction site before defenses could be completed. His innovative siege tactics – constructing triple trenches and earthen walls – isolated the fortress completely, while newly developed artillery under Tong Yangxian blocked Ming relief attempts.
The siege revealed the growing professionalism of Later Jin forces. After initial setbacks (including heavy casualties during a failed assault on August 12), Hong Taiji adapted by adopting patient siege warfare, starving the defenders into submission. The fall of Yuzizhang Tower on October 9 proved decisive, capturing sufficient supplies to sustain the besiegers and causing surrounding Ming outposts to surrender.
Zu Dashou’s eventual capitulation on October 28 marked a turning point. While Zu himself escaped to Jinzhou (claiming he would facilitate its surrender – a promise never fulfilled), his remaining officers, including Zhang Cunren and Zu Kefa, defected en masse. Hong Taiji’s treatment of these defectors established a template for later incorporations of Ming personnel: generous rewards (including property, titles, and even marriages to Manchu nobility) that transformed them into loyal Qing supporters.
Simultaneously, the Wuqiao Mutiny (1631-33) delivered three more valuable defectors – Kong Youde, Geng Zhongming, and Shang Kexi. These former Mao Wenlong subordinates brought not only troops but naval expertise and European-style artillery knowledge when they surrendered in 1633-34. Hong Taiji’s establishment of their forces as the “Heavenly Aid” and “Heavenly Assist” armies (distinct from the Eight Banners) demonstrated his pragmatic approach to military reorganization.
The strategic consequences were profound. The Ming lost their last effective forces in Liaodong, while the Qing gained experienced commanders familiar with Ming weaknesses. These defections also enabled the Qing to challenge Ming naval supremacy, as demonstrated in the 1637 capture of Pi Island, eliminating the last Ming stronghold in the Liaodong peninsula.
The Proclamation of the Qing Dynasty and the Second Korean Campaign
On April 11, 1636, Hong Taiji formally proclaimed the Qing dynasty, signaling his imperial ambitions beyond Manchuria. This symbolic act coincided with intensified pressure on Korea, whose continued loyalty to the Ming threatened Qing strategic interests.
Korean resistance to Qing hegemony stemmed from years of exploitative demands – annual tributes increased tenfold since 1627, forced trade at unfavorable terms, and requisitioning of Jurchen populations in Korean territory. When Korean envoys refused to perform the kowtow during Hong Taiji’s coronation, it precipitated the 1636-37 invasion.
The campaign showcased Qing military evolution. Deceptive maneuvers (feigning preparations against the Ming) achieved complete strategic surprise. Multi-pronged attacks – with Dorgon approaching from the east while Hong Taiji advanced from the north – demonstrated improved coordination. The critical capture of Ganghwa Island (through improvised boat transport) neutralized Korea’s traditional defensive refuge, forcing King Injo’s surrender at Namhansanseong on January 30, 1637.
The resulting treaty established Korea as a Qing tributary with severe conditions: abandonment of Ming era names, hostage princes, military obligations against the Ming, and massive annual tributes. This not only secured the Qing rear but provided material and manpower (particularly naval) for future campaigns against the Ming, as seen in the subsequent capture of Pi Island using Korean ships and guides.
The Deep Penetration Campaigns: 1634-1642
The period between 1634 and 1642 saw the Qing launch four major campaigns deep into Ming territory, each demonstrating growing confidence and capability while systematically weakening Ming resistance.
The 1634 (Jiaxu) Campaign, led by Ajige and Abatai, established the pattern: bypassing fortified positions to raid wealthy interior regions. Their forces plundered extensively around Beijing before exiting via Lengkou Pass, boasting captured wealth and leaving mocking “no need to see us out” signs for pursuing Ming forces.
The more ambitious 1638 (Wuyin) Campaign involved two armies under Dorgon and Yue Tuo penetrating as far south as Shandong. While achieving massive plunder (including the capture of Jinan where the De Prince was taken), it also revealed limitations – heavy casualties including Yue Tuo’s death, and failed attempts against Shanhaiguan and Songshan upon withdrawal.
The 1642 (Renwu) Campaign, occurring during the decisive Songjin battles, represented the largest penetration yet. Abatai’s forces ravaged Shandong for seven months, capturing 88 cities including the strategic Grand Canal hub Linqing. While militarily successful, resistance at places like Haizhou (where rebel leader Yuan Shizhong fought Qing forces despite Hong Taiji’s instructions to ally with peasant rebels) hinted at future challenges.
These campaigns served multiple strategic purposes: economic exhaustion of the Ming, military testing of Ming defenses, and intelligence gathering about Ming internal weaknesses. Hong Taiji’s famous analogy – “conquering the Ming is like felling a large tree; we must cut from the sides first” – perfectly captured this graduated approach to conquest.
The Decisive Song-Jin Campaign (1640-1642)
The Songjin Campaign represented the climactic confrontation between Qing and Ming forces, deciding the fate of the critical Liaoxi corridor. Ming commander Hong Chengchou’s initial strategy – methodical reinforcement and supply of Jinzhou – showed promise but fell victim to court impatience.
Hong Taiji’s decision to adopt the “branch-cutting” strategy proposed by defectors proved inspired. The establishment of agricultural colonies at Yizhou in 1640 allowed sustained siege operations, while rotating banner garrisons maintained pressure. The defection of Jinzhou’s Mongol garrison in March 1641 critically weakened Ming defenses.
The campaign’s turning point came with Hong Taiji’s dramatic personal intervention in August 1641. Despite suffering nosebleeds, he rushed to the front, identifying and exploiting the fatal gap in Ming dispositions between Songshan and Xinghua. His encirclement tactics during the Ming retreat (August 21-22) turned orderly withdrawal into catastrophic rout, with tens of thousands drowning or captured.
The subsequent sieges of Songshan and Jinzhou showcased both sides’ determination. Hong Chengchou’s capture at Songshan (February 1642) and Zu Dashou’s surrender at Jinzhou (March 1642) after cannibalism-level deprivation marked the Ming’s final loss of strategic initiative in Liaodong. The Qing now controlled the entire corridor from Shanhaiguan to the Liao River.
Failed Peace Negotiations and the Road to Conquest
The abortive 1642 peace negotiations revealed the fatal dysfunction of the Ming court. While both sides had compelling reasons to seek truce – the Ming needed respite from simultaneous peasant rebellions and Qing attacks, while the Qing sought recognition of their gains – Chongzhen’s inability to openly pursue diplomacy doomed the effort.
Chen Xinjia’s secret negotiations achieved tentative agreement on reasonable terms: mutual repatriation of defectors, defined borders, and annual exchanges of silver for ginseng and furs. However, when news leaked, Chongzhen sacrificed his minister to preserve imperial dignity, missing perhaps the last chance to stabilize the northern front.
Hong Taiji’s death in September 1643 left his successors a nearly completed conquest apparatus. The Qing now possessed: professional artillery forces, naval capability, experienced Han Chinese auxiliary armies, secured flanks in Korea and Mongolia, and control of the critical Liaoxi corridor. All that remained was the right moment to strike, which would come in 1644 when Wu Sangui opened Shanhaiguan amidst Li Zicheng’s rebellion.
The period 1629-1642 thus witnessed the systematic transformation of the Later Jin from regional power to imperial Qing dynasty. Through strategic adaptability, incorporation of diverse military talents, and relentless pressure on Ming weaknesses, Hong Taiji laid the foundation for one of China’s most enduring dynasties.