The Rise of Duan Qirui and the Question of War Against Germany

Following his reappointment as Premier of the State Council in 1917, Duan Qirui, confident in his consolidated power, revived the contentious issue of declaring war against Germany. This matter, which had remained unresolved for four to five months and previously sparked significant political turmoil, now proceeded unimpeded due to President Li Yuanhong’s resignation and the dissolution of the National Assembly.

On August 6, 1917, the State Council resolved to reorganize the International Political Affairs Review Committee into the Post-War International Affairs Committee, specifically tasked with studying necessary measures following the declaration of war against Germany. Eight days later, the Beijing government issued a presidential proclamation announcing that “from 10:00 am on August 14, 1917, China declares itself in a state of war with Germany and Austria.” The proclamation carefully avoided using the term “declaration of war,” instead stating China’s “position of being at war,” a phrasing that invites deeper interpretation.

In reality, while Duan and his faction urgently pushed through the war declaration, they had no intention of sending troops to Europe. For them, resolving domestic issues—particularly the conflicts with southern provinces—took precedence over foreign policy matters.

The Deterioration of North-South Relations

The Beiyang Clique’s rebellion and the subsequent Manchu Restoration attempt by Zhang Xun exacerbated the already strained relationship between northern and southern China into open confrontation. Sun Yat-sen, steadfast in his democratic principles, vehemently opposed both the Beiyang governors’ insurrection and Zhang Xun’s restoration plot.

On June 6, 1917, recognizing the grave situation where northern military governors under Duan’s instigation were rebelling against the central government, Sun telegraphed southern leaders like Lu Rongting and Tang Jiyao, urging them to “join forces to suppress the rebellion and save the nation.” Two days later, he appealed to southwestern military governors, provincial assemblies, and civil administrations, emphasizing that “the National Assembly is the heart of the republic, and the constitution its foundation.” He called for armed resistance against those who had “rendered law powerless,” hoping southern leaders would “uphold righteousness and swiftly raise armies to rescue this crisis.”

When news of Zhang Xun’s restoration reached Shanghai on July 4, Sun immediately convened a meeting with Tang Shaoyi and other prominent figures. They resolved to invite Li Yuanhong to resume presidential duties in the south and issued a stirring declaration: “This resistance is not merely for the people’s survival but represents the Chinese nation’s struggle against militarism.” Recognizing Shanghai’s diplomatic constraints, Sun departed for Guangdong on July 6 with Zhu Zhixin and others to establish a constitutional protection base.

Southern warlords quickly responded to Sun’s call. On June 9, Yunnan’s Tang Jiyao warned against continued military aggression, threatening to “dedicate his pillow and mat” to the cause. By June 11, Guangdong and Guangxi leaders announced plans for a three-pronged northern expedition. When Li Yuanhong dissolved the National Assembly on June 12, Yunnan troops in Guangdong vowed to “protect the Assembly and punish the instigators.”

On June 22, under Lu Rongting’s direction, Guangdong and Guangxi declared “autonomy,” refusing to recognize the “illegal cabinet” while maintaining nominal allegiance to the presidency. After Zhang Xun’s defeat, Tang Jiyao organized a “National Protection Army” to “cleanse the remnants and restore the republic.” Other southwestern leaders followed suit, opposing restoration and advocating northern expeditions. Hunan’s Tan Yankai even ordered troops northward toward Yuezhou, bringing the country to the brink of civil war.

The Constitutional Protection Movement and Divided Governments

The southern warlords’ enthusiasm for “suppressing rebellion” concealed ambitions to expand their territories. Duan anticipated this, issuing orders from Tianjin that no provincial forces should mobilize without authorization while simultaneously recalling Wu Guangxin to defend Yuezhou against potential Hunan incursions.

After Zhang Xun’s failure, rather than reconciliation, north and south clashed over how to reconvene the National Assembly. Sun and his supporters insisted on restoring the original Assembly dissolved illegally during the restoration, while Duan’s faction, supported by the Research Clique, advocated forming a new, more pliable legislature. On September 29, acting president Feng Guozhang announced the formation of a new Senate, initiating constitutional reorganization.

Sun vehemently opposed this. Arriving in Guangzhou on July 17, he denounced Duan’s “false republicanism” in a passionate speech, declaring the conflict a struggle between “true and false republicanism.” Over subsequent days, Sun mobilized former Assembly members to gather in southern provinces and sought naval support. By July 21, the First Fleet under Admiral Cheng Biguang defected to the south, declaring they would “use iron and blood to protect the republic.”

On August 25, about 120 former Assembly members convened in Guangzhou as the Extraordinary Session of the National Assembly, establishing a Military Government on August 31 with the sole purpose of “quelling rebellion and restoring the Provisional Constitution.” Sun was elected Grand Marshal on September 1, with Tang Jiyao and Lu Rongting as Marshals. At his inauguration on September 10, Sun pledged to “lead the charge against those who destroy the republic.” China now had two rival governments.

The Whirlwind of North-South Warfare

The Military Government’s establishment ignited a widespread Constitutional Protection Movement across southern and central China. Duan’s Beijing government, confident in Beiyang military superiority, decided to crush this movement by force.

Secret preparations began in late July 1917, with northern provinces ordered to prepare for potential southern campaigns. After the Military Government’s formation, the “military unification” policy became overt—issuing warrants for Sun’s arrest while deploying troops southward. However, the conflict became characterized by intermittent fighting and negotiations due to divisions within the Beiyang clique between Duan’s pro-war Anhui faction and Feng Guozhang’s peace-seeking Zhili faction.

Major campaigns unfolded in Sichuan and Hunan. In Sichuan, conflicts between local, Yunnan, and Guizhou warlords provided Beijing opportunities to extend influence. By December 1917, Yunnan-Guizhou forces captured Chongqing, foiling northern plans. Hunan, strategically vital as a gateway to the south, became the primary battleground.

Duan appointed fellow Hunanese Fu Liangzuo as military governor in August 1917 while stationing Beiyang troops nearby. When Hunan officers declared autonomy in September, Duan ordered suppression. As fighting escalated, Guangxi’s Lu Rongting, initially hesitant, intervened in October, fearing the conflict might reach his doorstep.

The Beiyang forces initially gained ground but faced setbacks when Zhili commanders Wang Ruxian and Fan Guozhang unilaterally ceased fighting in November, causing northern lines to collapse. Duan resigned in protest but returned days later under pressure. However, continued Zhili resistance and southern advances forced Duan’s resignation again on November 22.

The Illusion of Peace and Return to War

With Duan’s departure, peace advocates temporarily gained ascendancy. Feng appointed the conciliatory Wang Shizhen as premier and reinstated Tan Yankai as Hunan’s military governor while authorizing Li Chun to negotiate with the south.

Southern warlords, lacking genuine commitment to constitutionalism and fearing prolonged conflict, proved receptive. By December 1917, Tang Jiyao and Lu Rongting ordered ceasefires, appearing to abandon Sun’s principles. On December 25, Feng issued a peace proclamation, citing southern willingness to stop fighting.

However, Feng’s peace efforts lacked sincerity—a tactical move against Duan rather than genuine reconciliation. Meanwhile, Duan’s faction, though out of office, conspired to resume war. In December, northern militarists revived the督军团 (Military Governors’ Corps) in Tianjin, demanding southern suppression. Under pressure, Feng authorized two expeditionary armies on December 16 but delayed formal war declarations.

Southern forces, interpreting northern military buildup as bad faith, resumed offensive in early 1918, capturing strategic points like Yuezhou. Simultaneously, uprisings erupted in Hubei, Shaanxi, and Henan. The war faction used these developments to demand full-scale war while plotting against Feng and the “Yangtze Three Governors.”

Feng’s attempted January 1918 journey to Nanjing for consultations was thwarted by Anhui’s Ni Sichong, forcing his humiliating return to Beijing. On January 30, Feng reluctantly issued war orders, appointing Cao Kun and Zhang Huaizhi to lead southern expeditions.

The War’s Unraveling and Political Maneuvering

Beiyang forces initially progressed under a three-pronged attack plan. However, the campaign faltered due to logistical issues, disease, and waning morale. Most critically, Wu Peifu, having advanced to Hengyang, halted operations, frustrated at being denied the Hunan governorship.

By June 1918, Wu secretly negotiated with southern forces and initiated a peace movement, openly criticizing Duan’s policies in August. This unprecedented defiance from a junior officer stunned the Beijing government. Duan’s faction, unable to militarily compel Wu, turned to political solutions—engineering a new National Assembly to replace Feng Guozhang.

The ensuing political struggle resulted in a stalemate. On October 10, 1918, both Feng and Duan resigned, allowing the compromise candidate Xu Shichang to assume the presidency. Xu promoted reconciliation, ordering a ceasefire on October 25 and initiating peace talks in Shanghai. The guns of the north-south war gradually fell silent, replaced by negotiators’ debates.

From the Nishihara Loans to the Sino-Japanese Military Agreements

During his second premiership, Duan Qirui pursued pro-Japanese policies to consolidate his military dictatorship, resulting in numerous agreements that sacrificed Chinese sovereignty.

### Establishing Pro-Japanese Policies

Duan hadn’t always favored Japan—he previously opposed Japanese incursions into Shandong and the Twenty-One Demands. However, after assuming power in 1916, he abandoned China’s traditional “ally with distant states to attack nearby ones” strategy, seeking rapprochement with Japan.

This shift reflected changing international dynamics during WWI, as Western powers focused on Europe, leaving Japan dominant in East Asia. Even Sun Yat-sen’s southern faction and previously anti-Japanese northern elites now saw cooperation with Japan as necessary.

American disengagement further pushed China toward Japan. The 1917 Lansing-Ishii Agreement recognized Japan’s special interests in China, convincing Duan’s government that reliance on Japan was inevitable.

Domestically, Duan’s “military unification” policy required Japanese support—both to neutralize Japan’s historical ties with the Kuomintang and to finance his campaigns. China’s dire financial straits made Japanese loans irresistible.

### The Nishihara Loans: Economic Conquest Disguised as Aid

Between 1917-1918, Japan extended numerous loans totaling approximately 145 million yen through Nishihara Kamezo, a shadowy figure acting as Prime Minister Terauchi Masatake’s personal envoy. These loans, often for industrial projects like railways and mines, actually financed Duan’s wars and political maneuvers.

Key loans included:
– Two communications bank loans (25 million yen total) that placed Chinese financial institutions under Japanese supervision
– Jilin-Heilongjiang forestry and mining loans (30 million yen) that targeted Manchurian resources
– Railway loans like the Jilin-Huichun and Manchurian-Mongolian lines that extended Japanese economic influence

Most egregious was the Shandong railway loan (20 million yen), which effectively recognized Japan’s succession to German privileges in Shandong, later causing China’s diplomatic failure at Versailles.

### The Sino-Japanese Military Agreements: Sovereignty Compromised

Following the 1917 Russian Revolution, Japan proposed joint defense agreements against German-Austrian influence spreading eastward. These agreements, signed in May 1918, allowed Japanese troops to operate in China and use Chinese facilities while ostensibly cooperating against common threats.

In reality, they enabled Japan to station troops in Manchuria and control the Chinese Eastern Railway while paving the way for Japan’s Siberian intervention. The agreements provoked widespread Chinese outrage but proceeded under Duan’s government, further eroding national sovereignty.

Conclusion: The Legacy of Warlord Diplomacy

Duan Qirui’s era exemplified the tragedies of warlord politics—domestic fragmentation exploited by foreign powers. His pro-Japanese policies, while temporarily sustaining his regime, mortgaged China’s future and fueled nationalist backlash. The north-south conflicts and compromised sovereignty during 1917-1918 became pivotal in shaping China’s revolutionary trajectory, demonstrating how internal division invites external domination—a lesson that would resonate through China’s turbulent journey toward unification and independence.