A Powder Keg Ignites: The Ottoman Entry Into World War I
When the Ottoman Empire formally entered World War I on October 29, 1914, its leadership faced strategic dilemmas that would test the limits of their military capabilities. War Minister Enver Pasha and German Chief of Staff Bronsart von Schellendorf had updated Ottoman war plans earlier that year, yet these preparations still bore the scars of recent conflicts. The empire found itself stretched dangerously thin – with seven of its twelve army corps concentrated in Thrace and along the Sea of Marmara and Aegean coastlines, seemingly preparing for a potential third Balkan War against Greece. Only three corps stood ready along the Russian Caucasus frontier, while two more faced British Egypt from Syria and Palestine.
This precarious deployment reflected the empire’s fragile state following the traumatic losses of 1911-1913. Most units had not recovered their strength, particularly those facing Russia’s Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh Armies which lacked everything from rifles and ammunition to uniforms, transport vehicles, and draft animals. The situation in Mesopotamia (modern Iraq) proved even more dire, as the General Staff withdrew two key corps from the region to fulfill German demands for simultaneous offensives against Russia and Britain.
The Mesopotamian Gamble: Britain Strikes First
Ottoman defenses in Mesopotamia represented a fatal miscalculation. Believing Britain wanted to keep them out of the war, Ottoman commanders left only symbolic forces guarding critical positions: 160 lightly equipped soldiers on Abadan Island, 350 at the al-Fao peninsula telegraph station (with four 87mm cannons), and a 4,700-man strategic reserve at Basra. This negligence ignored Britain’s extensive preparations dating back to September 1914, when First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill began positioning forces against Ottoman territories.
British naval superiority became immediately apparent. On October 31, 1914, Churchill ordered engagements with Turkish forces, leading to early attacks on Smyrna (Izmir) on November 1 and the Dardanelles on November 3 – all before formal declarations of war. In the Persian Gulf, Britain assembled a formidable river fleet and trained Indian Expeditionary Force near Bahrain, revealing strategic priorities shaped by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company’s vital installations on Abadan Island.
The Fall of Basra: A Campaign of Blood and Mud
The Mesopotamian campaign quickly exposed Ottoman vulnerabilities. After withdrawing two corps, Basra’s defenses under Süleyman Askeri Bey comprised fewer than 5,000 men from the Ottoman 38th Infantry Division, supported by small detachments at Abadan and Fao. Their modest river flotilla, including the 420-ton gunboat Marmaris and four British-built Thornycroft patrol boats, faced overwhelming British naval power featuring armored sloops, armed paddle steamers, and the pre-dreadnought HMS Ocean.
Initial clashes in November 1914 set the tone for a brutal campaign. At Fao on November 6, British naval bombardment quickly silenced Ottoman defenses, allowing unopposed landings. Abadan Island saw fiercer resistance, with 160 Ottoman troops fighting fiercely from concealed trenches before being overwhelmed after three days of fighting. Süleyman Askeri Bey’s counterattacks, including a 300-man force sent to attack British rear bases, failed with heavy losses.
The battle for Basra itself unfolded with peculiar dynamics. Ottoman governor Subhi Bey detained British civilians (who were reportedly well-treated) while Arab tribes increasingly sided with the British as Turkish casualties mounted. By November 20, Ottoman forces abandoned Basra, releasing prisoners before fleeing. British forces entered the city on November 22, raising the Union Jack amid ceremonial gun salutes as Basra’s prosperous trade and customs revenues shifted from Ottoman to British Indian control.
Qurna: The Biblical Battlefield
Ottoman forces retreated 40 miles upriver to Qurna, the legendary site of the Garden of Eden at the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates. This strategic position, if held, could secure the entire delta region. However, the December 1914 battle for Qurna proved exceptionally brutal. Shallow waters exposed British ships to Ottoman artillery, while sunken barges obstructed movement. The HMS Odin sustained rudder damage and withdrew, leaving shallower-draft vessels like the aptly named Shaitan (“Devil”) to continue the fight.
After initial failed assaults on December 3-4 that cost dozens of British and Indian lives, a renewed attack on December 7 succeeded through flanking maneuvers. The Shaitan’s bridge took a direct hit, killing its captain, but the ship remained afloat. By December 9, Ottoman forces surrendered, with 45 officers and 989 soldiers captured along with Krupp guns and substantial ammunition. The Union Jack now flew over Qurna, completing Britain’s control of the vital waterway.
The Caucasus Catastrophe: Enver’s Frozen Ambitions
While Mesopotamia collapsed, Enver Pasha pursued disastrous ambitions in the Caucasus. Ignoring warnings from German advisor Liman von Sanders about winter warfare, Enver dismissed cautious commander Hasan İzzet and personally led the Third Army against Russia in December 1914. His plan, inspired by Germany’s Tannenberg victory, aimed to envelop Russian forces at Sarikamış using three corps in a pincer movement.
Conditions proved apocalyptic. At altitudes over 2,000 meters, with temperatures plunging to -40°C, Ottoman troops lacked winter gear – missing 17,000 coats, 17,400 boots, and 23,000 blankets. Enver’s December 20 address to troops proclaimed “victory comes from a brave heart, not from soldiers’ appearance or equipment,” but courage couldn’t overcome physics. The offensive launched on December 22 saw entire units freeze to death, particularly the X Corps which lost most of its men crossing the Allahükbar Mountains.
Despite initial successes at Ardahan and Köprüköy, the campaign collapsed by January 1915. Russian reinforcements and brutal cold decimated Ottoman forces. At Sarikamış on December 29-30, the frozen remnants of the IX Corps launched a desperate night assault across a bridge into the town, only to be annihilated by artillery. By January 4, the IX Corps surrendered en masse while the X Corps was virtually destroyed. Estimates suggest 47,000 Ottoman deaths, mostly from exposure, compared to 28,000 Russian losses.
The Suez Misadventure: A Desert Mirage
Concurrent with these disasters, the Ottoman Fourth Army under Cemal Pasha and German Colonel Kress von Kressenstein attempted an ambitious Suez Canal offensive in early 1915. Through remarkable logistical efforts, they moved 19,000 troops and 13,000 pack animals across the Sinai, reaching the canal on January 31. However, British forces detected their approach, and the February 3 assault failed disastrously against prepared defenses. Ottoman forces suffered 1,300 casualties before retreating in good order, preserving most of their strength.
Legacy of a Military Collapse
These early campaigns revealed the Ottoman Empire’s fundamental weaknesses: overextension, inadequate logistics, and unrealistic strategic objectives. The Mesopotamia losses surrendered vital economic assets, while the Caucasus disaster crippled the Third Army. Though the Suez failure proved less catastrophic, it demonstrated Britain’s regional dominance. Collectively, these defeats shaped the Middle Eastern theater, encouraging Arab revolts and setting conditions for the empire’s eventual dissolution. Enver Pasha’s romantic militarism, epitomized by his belief in moral over material factors, led directly to the unnecessary deaths of tens of thousands in what became one of World War I’s most avoidable tragedies.