A Crucible of Competing Political Myths

The early 1920s marked a transformative era for the Caucasus region, where powerful yet contradictory political narratives took shape simultaneously. As Mustafa Kemal’s nationalists fought the Allied powers in Anatolia to establish the Turkish Republic, and Reza Khan ascended to power in Iran (crowning himself Shah in 1925), the Bolsheviks completed their military conquest of the South Caucasus. Between April 1920 and March 1921, Soviet forces absorbed Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia into the revolutionary fold. The First Congress of the Peoples of the East, held in Baku in September 1920, symbolized Moscow’s ambition to transform the Caucasus into a revolutionary platform for exporting communism to the Middle East.

Contemporary historiography in the South Caucasus often portrays Sovietization as a national tragedy – a violent re-subjugation to Russian dominance that reduced the region’s population from 7.5 million to 5.8 million between 1916-1926. Institutions like Tbilisi’s Museum of Soviet Occupation (opened 2006) highlight Bolshevik atrocities, particularly the brutal suppression of Georgia’s August 1924 anti-Soviet uprising. Yet paradoxically, these repressions were orchestrated by Caucasian Bolshevik elites like Sergo Ordzhonikidze, Stalin’s confidant and Red Army commander, who had originally championed local control during the 1920-21 conquests.

The Revolutionary Architects of Sovietization

Lenin appointed Ordzhonikidze to lead the Caucasus Bureau of the Russian Communist Party in March 1920, granting this Georgian-born former veterinarian extraordinary autonomy. By 1921, Iran’s consul in Baku would sarcastically dub him “the heir apparent to the Viceroy.” Until mid-1926, Ordzhonikidze ruled the South Caucasus with an iron fist from Abkhazia to northern Iran, creating a unique system where local Bolsheviks enjoyed significant political freedom in regional administration and cross-border diplomacy with Turkey and Iran – often causing friction with Moscow.

This autonomy helped establish a new border order reflecting both postwar realities and the ideological nature of neighboring regimes. Bolsheviks and Kemalists found common cause against European influence in the Caucasus, though Moscow’s revolutionary export ambitions through organizations like the Comintern alarmed regional powers. As revolutionary fervor waned, economic and cultural cooperation emerged as alternative bridges between these ideologically divergent states.

Azerbaijan: Springboard for Soviet Expansion

The Sovietization of Azerbaijan in April 1920 demonstrated Bolshevik strategies combining nationalist rhetoric with military force. After defeating White Army forces in the North Caucasus by late 1919, Ordzhonikidze’s 11th Army pressed Moscow to authorize intervention. The Caucasus Bureau staged a “popular uprising” in Baku (where Bolshevik cells had operated since February 1920), then orchestrated a ceremonial power transfer to a revolutionary committee led by Azerbaijani Bolshevik Nariman Narimanov.

Azerbaijan became the launchpad for further expansion. When advances into Georgia and Armenia stalled, Bolshevik attention turned to Iran’s Caspian coast. On May 18, 1920, Soviet forces invaded Bandar-e Anzali under pretext of pursuing White Army general Denikin’s fleet. Moscow disingenuously claimed this was an independent action by Azerbaijan’s Soviet Republic. By June 4, a Soviet Republic of Persia emerged in Gilan province with local Jangali rebels, though Soviet advisors quickly dominated the movement. The establishment of the Communist Party of Iran (Adalat Party) on June 22 aimed to maintain ideological control.

Forging the Transcaucasian Federation

The conquest of Armenia in December 1920 and Georgia in February-March 1921 completed Soviet control. In Armenia, Bolsheviks positioned themselves as saviors against Kemalist forces after the Treaty of Alexandropol reduced Armenia to a rump state. In Georgia, despite a May 1920 peace treaty, Bolsheviks supported insurrection plots before invading under pretext of aiding a “proletarian uprising.”

These rapid conquests alarmed Kemalist Turkey, leading to the March 16, 1921 Treaty of Moscow that ceded Adjara to Soviet Georgia in exchange for Kars and Ardahan remaining Turkish. This two-stage border settlement sparked further disputes during the October 1921 Kars conference, where Georgian representative Shalva Eliava raised contradictions between treaty text and maps.

On March 12, 1922, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan formed the Transcaucasian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic (ZSFSR), centralizing administration in Tbilisi’s former Viceroy’s Palace. Ordzhonikidze forced this union despite reservations from leaders like Narimanov, who warned Lenin the pace was too fast. When Georgia’s Central Committee resigned en masse in October 1922 protesting the federation, Stalin dispatched Felix Dzerzhinsky to investigate. The subsequent purge of Georgian “national deviationists” cemented the federation, which lasted until Stalin’s 1936 constitution dissolved it.

Commerce as Revolutionary Tool

With territorial expansion blocked, Caucasian Bolsheviks turned to economic influence. The 1921 Soviet-Iranian treaty reopened trade despite Bolshevik monopolization decrees. In May 1922, Baku established a trade fair promoting Lenin’s New Economic Policy (NEP), competing with Russia’s Nizhny Novgorod fair for Persian merchants. Transcaucasian leaders like Narimanov and trade commissar Mammadhasan Hajinski secured special “Asian tariff rates” to position Baku as a anti-capitalist alternative for Eastern trade.

By 1927, the Baku fair hosted over 100 Iranian firms, with trade volume growing from 4.8 million to 31.2 million rubles (1923-27). The fair became a propaganda showcase, featured in early Azerbaijani films as a conduit for modern commerce. Cultural diplomacy peaked in 1926 with a grand new fair building blending Persian and Byzantine styles, and a Turkology congress debating alphabet reform – where Azerbaijani Latinization advocates gained Soviet approval over Tatar proposals to modify Arabic script.

Borderlands as Development Laboratories

Soviet modernization projects in agriculture and pest control (particularly locust eradication) became tools for regional influence. Cross-border locust swarms from Iran necessitated technical cooperation, allowing Soviet experts into neighboring territories. Similarly, the 1925 Arpacay River dam project on the Turkish border combined irrigation and hydropower development, with most funding from Moscow but joint management.

These technical collaborations coexisted with unresolved ethnic tensions. The 1924 border demarcation commission faced impassioned petitions from divided villages, like Orkhchioly where only 15 hectares remained in Soviet territory. Armenian refugees resettled near Turkish borders under Fridtjof Nansen’s League of Nations plan caused friction with Kemalist Turkey. Meanwhile, some Muslim communities in Akhaltsikhe and Akhalkalaki petitioned to join Turkey, prompting Soviet authorities to clarify that demarcation wouldn’t alter existing borders.

Tbilisi: Diplomatic Crossroads

As the ZSFSR capital, Tbilisi regained its pre-revolutionary role as regional diplomatic hub. Consulates from Italy, Germany, Poland, Turkey and Iran ringed the former Viceroy’s Palace, with consuls cultivating informal relationships through Georgia’s vibrant social scene. German consul Otto Günther von Wesendonk noted the Caucasian elite’s “mythomania” in diplomatic reporting, while Italian diplomat Pietro Quaroni recalled Tbilisi’s unique atmosphere compared to Moscow’s formality.

These connections allowed Caucasian leaders to maintain international engagement despite Soviet isolation. ZSFSR chairman Mamia Orakhelashvili even taught international relations at Tbilisi University while compiling archives for the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. Wireless bulletins on Middle Eastern affairs kept the Caucasian leadership informed, reflecting their enduring regional perspective within Soviet foreign policy.

Legacy of a Contradictory Decade

The 1920s represented both rupture and continuity for the Caucasus. Sovietization brought violence and repression, particularly in crushing the 1924 Georgian uprising, but also created new frameworks for regional interaction. The NEP facilitated cross-border commerce while technical cooperation offered alternatives to revolutionary export. Yet beneath surface normalization, wartime trauma and unresolved territorial disputes persisted, demonstrating the incomplete nature of the Caucasus’ Soviet transformation. The decade established patterns of centralized control and local initiative that would characterize the region’s complex position within the USSR until its dissolution.