A Fragile Peace Shattered

In the ninth year of the Shaoxing era (1139 AD), the political landscape of the Jin Dynasty underwent violent upheaval. Wanyan Zongbi, a prominent leader of the war faction who harbored extreme dissatisfaction with the peace negotiations, joined forces with Wanyan Zonggan and others to stage a coup. They eliminated key peace faction members including Wanyan Zongpan, Wanyan Zongjuan, and Wanyan Chang, seizing complete control of the Jin government. The fundamental motivation behind this coup stemmed from Wanyan Zongbi’s outrage at what he perceived as excessive concessions to the Southern Song regime by the peace faction officials. Determined to tear up the peace treaty, he prepared to resume armed confrontation with the Southern Song.

This political upheaval received full support from Emperor Xizong of Jin, lending it legal legitimacy. Following the coup’s success, Emperor Xizong granted Wanyan Zongbi substantial military and administrative authority, appointing him as “Commander-in-Chief concurrently overseeing the Branch Department of State Affairs.” All military matters across provinces were to be decided by the commander’s headquarters, while civil lawsuits, financial affairs, and other administrative matters fell under the jurisdiction of the Branch Department of State Affairs. This effectively placed the Jin Dynasty’s administrative power in Wanyan Zongbi’s hands.

The Jin Offensive of 1140

In May of the third year of the Jin Tianjuan era (corresponding to the tenth year of Shaoxing in Song, 1140 AD), the Jin Dynasty renounced the peace treaty and mobilized massive forces to launch a full-scale offensive against the Southern Song from two strategic directions – Shaanxi and Henan – with the declared aim to “raise an army to punish crimes and fully recover lost territories.”

The campaign unfolded across eastern and western theaters. In the eastern theater, Wanyan Zongbi personally commanded the main force, supported by troops under Nie Libojin and Li Cheng forming left and right wings respectively. This army advanced from Kaifeng toward the Huai River defense line. Another contingent, led by Deputy Commander-in-Chief Wanyan Salihai, marched toward Sichuan and Shaanxi. However, compared to previous Jin invasions, this campaign revealed significant weaknesses in leadership quality and capability due to years of internal strife that had claimed many founding generals – some killed in political struggles, others dead from illness or retired. The talent shortage forced Wanyan Zongbi to rely heavily on defectors like Li Cheng, Li Qiong, and Kong Yanzhou to command independently, despite their previous defeats by Song forces.

Initial Jin Victories and Song Weakness

The Jin army achieved considerable early success primarily because the Southern Song had stationed no troops in Henan. On May 11, Jin forces reached the walls of Dongjing Kaifeng Prefecture, and the defending officials surrendered the following day. By May 13, they captured Gongzhou, followed by Nanjing Yingtian Prefecture on the 14th, and Xijing Henan Prefecture on the 16th. A domino effect ensued as numerous counties formerly controlled by the puppet Qi regime surrendered en masse.

A similar situation unfolded in the Guanzhong region, where Wanyan Salihai’s forces crossed the river from Hezhong Prefecture and advanced directly toward Yongxing Army. Many former Qi territories, including Yongxing Army itself, opened their gates to welcome Jin troops, who smoothly occupied Fengxiang Prefecture. These remarkable achievements were accomplished within just one month.

The Southern Song’s Humiliation and Response

These developments dealt a severe blow to Emperor Gaozong of Song and his chancellor Qin Hui, as the coup had nullified the peace treaty they had worked so hard to secure through considerable humiliation and sacrifice. They found themselves unable to explain these events to the nation’s military and civilians.

The Southern Song government under Emperor Gaozong and Qin Hui had neglected defense preparations in the “recovered” Henan region following the peace agreement, resulting in rapid Jin occupation. Former Qi officials either surrendered or fled, creating a critical situation. Facing this crisis, Emperor Gaozong had no choice but to abandon the worthless peace agreement and order his generals to resist.

The Turning Tide: Song Counteroffensives

Liu Qi, then Deputy Garrison Commander of Dongjing, was leading 20,000 soldiers of the “Eight Character Army” to their garrison in Dongjing Kaifeng when he learned of Henan’s fall. Forced to halt at Shunchang Prefecture, he engaged the main Jin force. In the Battle of Shunchang, his Eight Character Army repelled Wanyan Zongbi’s southern offensive, slowing the Jin advance.

Meanwhile, Han Shizhong in Huaidong recovered Haizhou, while Zhang Jun in Huaixi sent his subordinate Wang De to retake Suzhou and Bozhou. In Sichuan, Wu Lin staunchly defended the Shu Pass. Song forces across all fronts mounted determined resistance, severely damaging Jin morale and temporarily forcing the Jin army into a defensive posture.

Yue Fei’s Strategic Response

As the Battle of Shunchang raged, Emperor Gaozong sent six personal edicts to Ezhou, urgently requesting Yue Fei reinforce Liu Qi. The emperor granted Yue Fei full discretionary authority over military operations, stating: “This concerns the grand plan of restoration – you must have already made preparations. We must seize this opportunity!” Yue Fei immediately activated his long-prepared “Connecting with Heshuo” strategy, aiming to recover Henan while supporting Liu Qi.

Yue Fei’s multifaceted strategy included:
1. Sending elite troops under Zhang Xian and Yao Zheng to aid Liu Qi
2. Dispatching respected Hebei veterans like Dong Rong, Niu Xian, and others to organize anti-Jin resistance behind enemy lines
3. Deploying forces from Xiangyang to recover Guozhou and link up with Song holdouts in Shaanzhou and Shangzhou

After completing these preparations, Yue Fei led his main force across the Yangtze toward Henan, coordinating with Hu Shijiang, the military-civilian administrator of Sichuan-Shaanxi, for mutual support.

The Battles of Yancheng and Yingchang

The Jin suffered major defeats at Yancheng (where Yue Fei’s infantry famously defeated the elite “Iron Pagoda” cavalry) and Yingchang. These losses shattered Jin attempts to regain strategic initiative and exposed growing ethnic tensions within Jin ranks. Several Jin commanders, including the prominent Han Chinese general Han Chang, began secret negotiations with Yue Fei.

Meanwhile, anti-Jin uprisings exploded across northern China. Rebel forces coordinated with Yue Fei’s offensive, creating what Liang Xing described in a letter to Yue Fei: “Over 400,000 loyalists in Hebei all fly Yue’s banners, hoping for your early crossing of the Yellow River.”

The Retreat Order and Its Consequences

At this critical juncture, with Yue Fei’s forces approaching Kaifeng and the Jin preparing to retreat north of the Yellow River, Emperor Gaozong and Qin Hui issued twelve urgent golden tablet edicts (the famous “Twelve Gold Medallions”) recalling Yue Fei’s army. Despite possessing full battlefield authority, Yue Fei could not ignore these direct imperial commands without risking rebellion. With great reluctance, he withdrew his forces in late July, protecting civilians who chose to migrate south during a five-day grace period.

The retreat order had devastating consequences:
1. Yue Fei’s hard-won territorial gains were abandoned
2. Anti-Jin resistance forces behind enemy lines were left vulnerable
3. The strategic opportunity to recover central China was lost

Aftermath and Historical Significance

In 1141, Wanyan Zongbi launched another southern campaign to avenge his defeats, deliberately avoiding Yue Fei’s region. Although initially successful, Jin forces were ultimately checked at the Battle of Zhegao. This marked the end of major hostilities following the 1140 campaign.

The 1140 Henan campaign represented the pinnacle of Yue Fei’s military career, showcasing his strategic brilliance. His “Connecting with Heshuo” strategy successfully coordinated:
1. Main force operations along the Xiangyang-Luoyang axis
2. People’s militia activities in Hebei and Hedong
3. Pressure along the Huai River front

This comprehensive approach nearly achieved the strategic goal of recovering the Central Plains. However, the abrupt recall order exposed the fundamental contradiction between patriotic generals and an autocratic regime prioritizing political survival over national restoration.

Yue Fei’s subsequent execution in 1141 and the persecution of his associates represented one of imperial China’s greatest political tragedies. Yet his legacy endured in popular memory and military tradition, influencing generations of later commanders. The 1140 campaign remains a poignant case study of how strategic opportunity, military talent, and popular support could be thwarted by political calculations at the highest levels of power.