The Geopolitical Powder Keg of 19th Century Xinjiang

In the turbulent 1870s, China’s northwestern frontier became the focal point of an international crisis that would test the Qing dynasty’s waning power. Xinjiang, a vast territory twice the size of France, had descended into chaos following the outbreak of the Dungan Revolt (1862-1877). Amid this power vacuum emerged the opportunistic warlord Yaqub Beg, an Uzbek adventurer from the Khanate of Kokand who carved out his so-called “Yettishar” (Seven Cities) kingdom by playing British and Russian interests against each other.

The strategic importance of Xinjiang cannot be overstated. This was the crossroads of the Silk Road, a buffer against Russian expansionism, and a potential backdoor for British influence from India. When Yaqub Beg began receiving modern weapons and military advisors from both London and Constantinople, the situation became untenable for Beijing. The aging Qing statesman Zuo Zongtang, then in his mid-60s, emerged as the unlikely architect of China’s response – a military campaign that would become one of the most remarkable feats of logistics and strategy in imperial Chinese history.

Zuo Zongtang’s Grand Strategy Takes Shape

The pivotal moment came in summer 1875 at a military conference in Lanzhou, where Zuo and his protege Liu Jintang formulated their legendary “North First, South Later; Advance Slowly, Strike Swiftly” strategy. This approach reflected deep geographical wisdom: by securing the fertile northern plains around Ürümqi first, Qing forces could establish supply bases while gaining the tactical advantage of higher ground overlooking southern Xinjiang’s oases.

Zuo’s preparations were meticulous. By February 1876, over 70,000 troops had assembled at Suzhou (modern Jiuquan), including:
– Liu Jintang’s 25 battalions of Hunan Army veterans
– Zhang Yao’s 16-battalion Songwu Corps from Guangdong
– Jin Shun’s 40+ battalions of former frontier garrison troops
– Xu Zhanbiao’s 7 battalions of Sichuanese forces

British attempts to dissuade the campaign through diplomat Thomas Wade’s threats of Russian intervention failed spectacularly. When Wade met Li Hongzhang in April 1876, his bluster about Yaqub Beg’s strength only hardened Qing resolve. The stage was set for what historian James Millward would later call “the last great nomadic conquest in reverse.”

The Northern Campaign: A Masterclass in Military Logistics

On April 26, 1876, Liu Jintang’s vanguard marched through the desolate Xingxing Gorge toward Hami, their progress marked by poetic lines describing “swords gleaming at their waists” and “the familiar accents of home along the road.” The contrast between the two armies couldn’t have been starker:

Qing Forces | Yaqub Beg’s Army
—|—
70,000 disciplined regulars | 35,000 conscripts + 10,000 militia
Modern Krupp artillery | Mixed British/Turkish obsolete guns
Professional officer corps | Forced levies with 5-year terms
Secure supply lines | Soldiers often paid only in naan bread

The campaign’s first major engagement at Gubaidun (August 1876) showcased Liu’s tactical brilliance. Facing Bai Yanhu’s Hui forces who controlled the only water source at Huangtian, Liu feigned movement along the dry route while secretly flanking the enemy. The subsequent victory opened the path to Ürümqi, which fell on August 18 with barely a shot fired – its defenses stripped to reinforce Gubaidun.

The British Interlude and Southern Offensive

As winter 1876-77 halted operations, British mediator Thomas Wade proposed making Yaqub Beg a tributary state. Zuo’s blistering response – “How can thieves be allowed to establish a country?” – underscored Qing determination. When campaigning resumed in April 1877, Liu employed devastating combined arms tactics:

1. Dabancheng Siege (April 16-20, 1877): Artillery barrages destroyed the fortress’s magazine in a catastrophic explosion, with 2,000 enemy dead versus 52 Qing casualties.
2. Toksun Blitz (April 25-26): Cavalry charges covered 50 km in a day, capturing the strategic junction.
3. Turpan Capture: Achieved through coordinated attacks from three columns.

The psychological impact was devastating. As captured Uyghur soldiers spread word of Qing leniency, Yaqub Beg’s regime began collapsing from within. The warlord’s mysterious death on May 29 (possibly poisoned or beaten by his own men) triggered a succession crisis between his sons, leaving the door open for Qing forces.

The Final Campaign: 3,000 km in 60 Days

What followed was one of history’s great pursuit operations. From October to December 1877, Liu’s forces:

– Crossed the flooded Kaidu River (where Bai Yanhu had breached dikes)
– Liberated 100,000 civilians from forced marches
– Covered 300 km in 6 days during the chase to Kucha
– Finally took Kashgar on December 17 after a dramatic rescue of defectors in the old city

The statistics boggle the mind: 4 major cities reclaimed, less than 200 total Qing combat deaths, and enemy forces reduced to fleeing into Russian Turkestan.

Legacy: From Battlefield to Province

The campaign’s aftermath reshaped Central Asia:
– 1881: Treaty of Saint Petersburg regained Ili from Russia
– 1884: Xinjiang became China’s 19th province under Liu Jintang
– The “Three Thousand Mile Willow Corridor” – Zuo’s famed tree-planting along supply routes – symbolized Han-Chinese ecological colonization

British observer Demetrius Boulger acknowledged: “The Chinese reconquest of Eastern Turkestan was…the most remarkable military achievement in Central Asia since the days of Timur.” For a fading Qing dynasty, it proved imperial resilience even as European powers carved up the world.

Today, Zuo’s campaign remains foundational to China’s historical claims in Xinjiang. The military roads became highways, garrison towns became cities, and what began as a punitive expedition evolved into permanent administration – for better or worse, the Xinjiang we know was forged in these three decisive years.