The Twilight of an Empire: Liao Dynasty on the Brink
The early 12th century witnessed dramatic upheavals across East Asia as the Jurchen people, originating from the Ashi River basin near modern Harbin, launched a meteoric rise that would topple two mighty empires within three decades. The Liao Dynasty (907-1125), which had dominated northern China with its innovative dual administrative system combining Chinese and Khitan traditions, found itself particularly vulnerable despite its former glory. At its peak, the Liao could mobilize hundreds of thousands of troops and maintained a sophisticated multicultural government. Yet this formidable empire would be the first to crumble before the Jurchen onslaught, with even the valiant efforts of Yelü Dashi to establish the Western Liao in Central Asia failing to restore Khitan power in their homeland.
The collapse of such a significant empire naturally invites scrutiny of its internal weaknesses. While the last Liao emperor, Tianzuo, bears ultimate responsibility as the ruler, history has particularly condemned his chief minister Xiao Fengxian as the archetypal corrupt official who accelerated the dynasty’s demise. This complex figure, bearing both the Chinese name Xiao Fengxian and Khitan name Jiulin Delidi, became so notorious that later historians accidentally created duplicate biographies in the History of Liao, treating him as two separate individuals—a testament to both his significance and the confusion surrounding his legacy.
A Privileged Ascent: Xiao’s Family Background and Early Career
Xiao Fengxian hailed from the prestigious Imperial Brother-in-Law Clan (Guojiu Zhang), an influential network of Khitan nobility who all adopted the Chinese surname Xiao. By the late Liao period, three main branches dominated this clan, with Xiao belonging to the Yilibi Zhang lineage. His family had intermarried with the imperial Yelü clan for generations—his great-grandfather married Emperor Jingzong’s eldest daughter, while his grandfather wed Emperor Shengzong’s first daughter. Such connections virtually guaranteed political prominence.
Contemporary accounts describe Xiao as physically unimpressive—short in stature with a slight hunchback—but psychologically astute, possessing what the History of Liao terms “an outwardly tolerant but inwardly jealous” character. His career began during the Dakang era (1075-1084) with minor palace positions before advancing to more substantial roles like deputy commissioner of the Xing Sheng Palace. His marriage to a granddaughter of Prince Yelü Chun further cemented his status within the imperial circle.
Xiao’s fortunes truly transformed when his sister Duolilan married Emperor Tianzuo (then Prince of Yan) in 1087. As the emperor’s brother-in-law, Xiao and his siblings received rapid promotions. By 1096, he had gained military experience leading campaigns against the Dadeli and Basimu tribes, successes that earned him the governorship of Nanjing (modern Beijing).
The Turning Point: Missteps Against the Rising Jurchen Threat
Xiao’s political acumen faced its ultimate test with the emergence of the Jurchen leader Aguda (Emperor Taizu of Jin). At the infamous 1112 “Head Fish Banquet,” when Aguda defiantly refused to dance for Emperor Tianzuo, Xiao counseled against executing the Jurchen chieftain, arguing it would alienate other tribal leaders. This decision, while perhaps pragmatic at the time, allowed Aguda to strengthen his position during subsequent years of famine.
When Jurchen raids escalated in 1113, Xiao disastrously dismissed them as mere tribal skirmishes. His brother Xiao Sixian’s catastrophic defeat at the Battle of Chuhedian (1114) marked a point of no return. Rather than punish the incompetent general, Xiao persuaded Tianzuo to pardon the defeated troops—a move that destroyed military discipline as soldiers realized they could flee without consequence.
Xiao’s strategic blindness continued as he opposed large-scale mobilization against the Jurchen, relying instead on piecemeal responses. The 1115 defeat at Huanglongfu forced Tianzuo to remove Xiao temporarily, but by 1118 he had regained power through court intrigues, replacing older ministers with his own faction.
Diplomatic Disasters and Information Control
Xiao’s mishandling of negotiations with the Jin reveals much about the Liao’s collapsing prestige. When Aguda demanded recognition as “Great Sage and Bright Emperor” in 1118, Xiao countered with the patronizing title “Most Sage and Most Bright Emperor of the East Cherishing State.” The insulting language hidden in classical allusions (“remote fragrance” for Aguda’s ancestors, “multiple blessings” implying Liao superiority) provoked the Jurchen leader to threaten: “If you won’t accept our terms, I’ll lead troops to take Shangjing myself!”
Thereafter, Xiao adopted a policy of shielding Tianzuo from bad news. Even as Jin troops desecrated Liao ancestral tombs in 1120—burning temples from Zuozhou to Qingzhou—Xiao claimed the invaders showed proper reverence. This information blackout left the court unprepared for the looming catastrophe.
The Final Reckoning: Court Intrigues and Collapse
Xiao’s last destructive act came in 1121, when he accused Prince Jin’s faction (including his sister-in-law Consort Wen and general Yelü Yudu) of plotting rebellion. The ensuing purge saw Consort Wen executed and Yelü Yudu defecting to the Jin—where he became a valuable guide for Jurchen invasions.
By 1122, with the Jin advancing on Zhongdu, even Xiao’s niece Consort Yuan turned against him: “You’ve brought our sovereign to this state—how dare you keep living!” Abandoned by Tianzuo near Datong, Xiao was captured by Jurchen forces but escaped, only to be taken by the breakaway Northern Liao regime. Refusing to serve what he deemed illegitimate rulers, he starved himself to death—a hollow gesture after years of misgovernment.
Legacy: The Architect of Collapse
Xiao Fengxian’s career epitomizes how personal ambition and shortsightedness can undermine empires. His consistent errors—underestimating the Jurchen, protecting incompetent relatives, suppressing dissent, and manipulating information—fatally weakened the Liao at its moment of crisis. While broader forces like Jurchen military prowess and Liao institutional decline contributed to the dynasty’s fall, Xiao’s actions accelerated the process dramatically.
The parallel with later figures like Ye Mingchen (the Qing official during the Second Opium War) is instructive—both held immense power during existential threats but pursued policies of paralysis that doomed their regimes. Xiao’s story serves as a timeless warning about the dangers of placing self-interest and court politics above national survival.