The Fractured Frontier: Ming Dynasty’s Northeastern Periphery
In the mid-15th century, the northeastern frontier of Ming China became a crucible of conflict and shifting alliances. The Jianzhou Jurchens, a semi-nomadic people inhabiting the rugged terrain between China and Korea, emerged as both partners and problems for the Ming court. This complex relationship would shape regional dynamics for generations, culminating in dramatic confrontations that foreshadowed the later rise of the Manchus.
The Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) maintained a tributary system with frontier groups like the Jurchens, granting titles and trade privileges in exchange for nominal allegiance. However, this system began fraying during the Zhengtong era (1436-1449), particularly after the Tumu Crisis where the Mongols captured Emperor Yingzong. Against this backdrop of weakened Ming authority, ambitious Jurchen leaders like Li Manzhu and Dong Shan would test the limits of imperial patience.
Li Manzhu: The Ambitious Chieftain’s Downfall
Li Manzhu, chieftain of the Jianzhou Guard, initially enjoyed Ming trust. His ancestors had served loyally since the Hongwu era, receiving prestigious titles like “Commander Who Supports Loyalty.” However, in 1450, during the Jingtai reign, Li made a fateful decision that would unravel this legacy.
Under pressure from the Oirat Mongols and lured by promises of wealth, Li attacked Ming frontier cities including Kaiyuan, Shenyang, and Fushun. Though he later surrendered plundered goods and presented tribute horses to apologize, the Ming court’s trust was irrevocably broken. Contemporary records like the Veritable Records of Ming capture imperial frustration: “Li Manzhu and his ilk have long been enemies of Korea. Now they suddenly establish friendly relations—this is undoubtedly a pretense to spy on weaknesses before launching attacks.”
Compounding his errors, Li then courted Korea during its royal succession, despite historical enmity. The Ming explicitly warned Korea against these overtures, seeing them as strategic deception. By 1455, the Ming replaced Li with his son Li Gunaha, issuing a stern rebuke: “Your ancestors never privately contacted Korea—why have you begun this now?” The warning went unheeded, and Li Gunaha instead allied with Dong Shan, another rising Jurchen leader.
The Rise of Dong Shan: From Captive to Chieftain
Dong Shan’s story reflects the turbulent politics of Jianzhou Jurchens. After his father Mengge Temur’s death in 1433 left their clan leaderless, Dong was captured but later ransomed through diplomatic efforts. His return sparked succession disputes with his uncle Fancha, as both claimed leadership of the Jianzhou Left Guard.
The Ming initially favored Fancha, granting him a new seal of authority. But when Dong produced the original seal, the court faced a dilemma. After investigating local sentiments, officials pragmatically split the guard in 1442—creating separate Left and Right Guards under Dong and Fancha respectively. This established the “Three Jianzhou Guards” system that would dominate regional politics.
Dong proved an able leader, regularly paying tribute while consolidating power. By 1458, he became Right Military Commissioner, the highest-ranking Jurchen under Ming suzerainty. His influence grew as older leaders like Li Manzhu declined, allowing Dong to effectively unite the three guards from his stronghold at Fe Ala (Tiger City).
The Fushun Horse Market: Prosperity and Tension
A pivotal moment came in 1464 when Dong secured Ming approval to establish a horse market at Fushun. These markets, first created in 1405, were crucial for Jurchens to obtain agricultural tools, cloth, and salt in exchange for ginseng, furs, and horses. The Fushun location significantly reduced trade distances for Jianzhou tribes compared to earlier markets at Kaiyuan.
Contemporary accounts describe bustling scenes where “countless Jurchens with topknots arrive with loaded carts” exchanging goods. The market’s success boosted Jianzhou’s economy, with Japanese historian Inaba Iwakichi later noting: “Without Fushun Market, Jianzhou could never have developed.” However, prosperity bred ambition. Dong began playing a dangerous game—accepting lavish titles from both Ming and Korea while secretly raiding Ming borders.
The Breaking Point: Raids and Retribution
From 1465, Dong’s forces—allied with other Jurchen groups—launched devastating raids, attacking Ming territory 97 times in one year. The Veritable Records grimly note: “From Kaiyuan to Liaoyang, over 600 li and tens of thousands of households were devastated.” Despite this, the Ming initially followed ancestral injunctions against unnecessary frontier wars, seeking diplomatic solutions.
The final rupture came in 1467 when Dong led a delegation to Beijing. After being reprimanded by Emperor Xianzong, Dong’s party grew belligerent—insulting officials, demanding excessive gifts, and even threatening to “gather Haixi savages to plunder the border.” When escorted to Guangning for repatriation, violence erupted. Dong’s men attacked their guards, leading to a melee where 26 Jurchens died and Dong was captured.
The “Plowing the Court” Campaign and Aftermath
The Ming response was devastating. In autumn 1467, nearly 30,000 troops coordinated with Korean forces to launch a pincer attack on Jianzhou bases. Ming records boast: “The strong were slaughtered, the young captured… their territory became desolate.” Korean troops killed Li Manzhu and his son, while Ming forces destroyed hundreds of villages. Dong Shan was executed, his followers exiled to Fujian.
This “Plowing the Court” campaign (named for its thoroughness) marked a watershed. While temporarily crushing Jianzhou power, it sowed lasting resentment. The Ming had hoped to eliminate threats, but their heavy-handed approach arguably contributed to the anti-Ming sentiment that would later fuel Nurhaci’s unification of Jurchen tribes and the eventual rise of the Qing Dynasty.
Legacy: From Ashes to Empire
The Jianzhou Jurchens’ mid-15th century struggles reveal the complex dynamics of Ming frontier management. The court’s alternating policies of appeasement and aggression, combined with Jurchen leaders’ opportunism, created cycles of conflict. While the 1467 campaign achieved short-term security, it also demonstrated the limits of Ming power in the northeast.
Ironically, the very market system that enriched Dong Shan would later help his descendants. A century after these events, Jianzhou leaders would use economic foundations laid at Fushun to build the military force that toppled the Ming. Thus, the turbulent era of Li Manzhu and Dong Shan represents both an end and a beginning—the last chapter of fragmented Jurchen resistance and the prelude to Manchu ascendancy.
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