The Road to Byeokjegwan: Prelude to Battle

The winter of 1593 found the Ming expeditionary force at a critical juncture in their campaign to repel the Japanese invasion of Korea. Following their decisive victory at Pyongyang in January, the Ming army under General Li Rusong had pushed southward, recapturing Kaesong and establishing forward positions near the Korean capital of Hanseong (modern-day Seoul). The Japanese forces, commanded by veteran daimyo Kobayakawa Takakage, had withdrawn to defensive positions around the capital after their defeat at Pyongyang.

As the Ming vanguard advanced toward Hanseong, their reconnaissance units encountered increasing Japanese resistance. The rugged terrain around Yeokseok Ridge became a focal point for skirmishes between the opposing forces. On January 26, 1593, Ming scout commander Zha Dashou led a 500-strong cavalry detachment that clashed with Japanese forces under Tachibana Muneshige at Yeokseok Ridge. Though initially successful in driving back the Japanese, the Ming scouts soon found themselves facing overwhelming numbers as additional Japanese contingents arrived.

The Japanese Trap: Kobayakawa’s Tactical Deployment

Kobayakawa Takakage, recognizing an opportunity to strike at the isolated Ming reconnaissance force, organized his troops into a sophisticated battle formation. According to the “Mōri Family Records,” he deployed his forces in six echelons:

1. First Line: Inoue Gozaemon and Awaya Shirōzaemon
2. Second Line: Mogakari Yasauemon
3. Third Line: Kobayakawa’s main force
4. Fourth Line: Katsura no Miya
5. Fifth Line: Kobayakawa Hideaki
6. Sixth Line: Mōri Motoyasu

As the Ming forces withdrew from Yeokseok Ridge toward Byeokjegwan, Kobayakawa adjusted his deployment, dividing his army into three main groups. The center force positioned at Manggyeongnyeong Pass between Yeokseok Ridge and Byeokjegwan included Inoue, Awaya, Mogakari, and Kobayakawa’s main troops. The right wing under Kobayakawa Hideaki and Mōri Motoyasu occupied the eastern hills, while the left wing under Tachibana Muneshige and Takahashi Muneshige held the western hills (Komaru Mountain).

Japanese scholar Kitajima Manji interpreted this as a deliberate feigned weakness in the center to lure the Ming forces into a trap. However, contemporary analysis suggests this was simply an overwhelming encirclement tactic, as the Ming were already retreating and unlikely to be deceived by such maneuvers. The Japanese advantage in numbers was further bolstered by reserve forces stationed at Yeokseok Ridge, including contingents from Kikkawa Hiroie, Kuroda Nagamasa, Ishida Mitsunari, and Ukita Hideie.

Li Rusong’s Fateful Decision

Meanwhile, Li Rusong was advancing south from Paju when he encountered fleeing Korean officers who reported the massive Japanese mobilization. Without hesitation, Li immediately rode toward Byeokjegwan with 1,000 elite cavalry to rescue his surrounded scouts. En route, Li suffered an embarrassing fall from his horse that left him with minor facial injuries – the second such incident since the Pyongyang campaign.

By mid-morning on January 27, Li arrived at Byeokjegwan to find his 3,000 scouts paralyzed by fear of the overwhelming Japanese numbers. The Ming commander rallied his troops with characteristic boldness, threatening to execute any who showed cowardice. With this, the 4,000 Ming soldiers prepared to engage the encircling Japanese forces in what would become known as the Battle of Byeokjegwan.

Clash of Arms: The Battle Unfolds

Initial engagements saw the Ming vanguard under Awaya Shirōzaemon’s command face Li Rusong’s main force. Contrary to later Korean accounts that claimed the Ming lacked firearms, contemporary records from both sides confirm the Ming employed a variety of gunpowder weapons:

– Shenji rocket arrows (from Korean records)
– Three-eyed guns (from Japanese accounts)
– “Great tubes” (likely referring to artillery pieces)
– Tianzi “Great General” cannons (three of which were later captured)

The Ming volleys initially overwhelmed the Japanese forward units. Japanese records describe how Ming cannon fire created black smoke as they attacked, forcing the Mōri vanguard to retreat. About 200 Ming cavalry then launched rotating attacks against Awaya’s right flank, alternating between arrows and gunfire.

As Awaya’s unit collapsed, Inoue Gozaemon’s second line entered the fray. Despite being praised in Japanese records as “the bravest in the army,” Inoue’s forces also began to falter under sustained Ming pressure. At this critical moment, Kobayakawa activated his reserve tactics – ordering Tachibana’s left wing and Kobayakawa Hideaki’s right wing to flank the Ming while he led the center force in a frontal assault.

Desperate Struggle and Ming Breakout

The battle reached its climax as the Ming found themselves completely surrounded by Japanese forces numbering approximately 30,000 against their 4,500. Japanese reserves including Kikkawa Hiroie, Ishida Mitsunari, and Ōtani Yoshitsugu joined the encirclement. Even Konishi Yukinaga, still recovering from Pyongyang, emerged from Hanseong to participate.

Despite being vastly outnumbered, the Ming troops fought with remarkable tenacity. Japanese records note the effectiveness of Ming armor – their chainmail-covered brigandines and polished iron helmets proved resistant to Japanese swords and arrows. One account describes a powerful Japanese warrior striking a Ming soldier’s armor three times with a three-foot blade without effect, only to be overpowered in hand-to-hand combat.

Li Rusong personally led dozens of his best cavalry in repeated charges, but the numerical disparity proved insurmountable. As the Ming position became untenable, Li organized a fighting retreat, personally covering the withdrawal. During this desperate action, a golden-armored Japanese commander (possibly Inoue Gozaemon) nearly killed Li before being shot dead by Li Rumei’s arrow.

By noon, the battered Ming forces had broken through the encirclement and retreated toward Paju, abandoning equipment and three Tianzi cannons in their haste. The Japanese pursuit was only checked when Ming reinforcements under Yang Yuan appeared at Hwiim Ridge, causing the Japanese to withdraw to Hanseong.

Aftermath and Historical Significance

Casualty figures remain disputed, with Japanese sources claiming thousands of Ming dead while Ming records admit to 264 killed and 49 wounded. Japanese losses were likely between 500-600 killed with 743 wounded. While tactically a Japanese victory, the battle demonstrated the resilience of Ming forces against overwhelming odds.

The psychological impact proved more significant than material losses. Li Rusong, previously confident after Pyongyang, became cautious and withdrawn. The Ming advance stalled as supply lines stretched thin and disease spread through their ranks. Conversely, the Japanese gained confidence in their ability to withstand Ming forces, though they remained wary of Ming cavalry.

The battle’s legacy endures as a case study in asymmetrical warfare and the limitations of tactical victories without strategic follow-through. While Kobayakawa succeeded in checking the Ming advance, his failure to destroy Li’s force allowed the Ming to regroup and continue the war, which would ultimately end in stalemate and Japanese withdrawal. The captured Tianzi cannons became prized trophies in Japan, with detailed records of their specifications preserved in documents like the “Great General Cannon Illustrations.”