The Collapse of Diplomacy and Korea’s Desperate Plea

When diplomatic negotiations between Ming China and Japan collapsed in early 1597, the stage was set for renewed conflict. King Seonjo of Joseon Korea, recognizing the imminent threat of another Japanese invasion, dispatched envoy Jeong Gi-won to Beijing with an urgent plea for military assistance. After a grueling journey, Jeong arrived in the Ming capital on the eighteenth day of the first lunar month, bearing dire warnings about Japan’s military preparations.

The Ming Ministry of War initially responded with skepticism, dismissing the Korean envoy’s concerns as outdated information. Their dismissive reply reflected the lingering influence of pro-peace factions within the Ming court: “This report concerns matters from last November when our imperial envoys had not yet returned from Japan. The Japanese refused to accept the Korean officials sent to them because their rank was too low and their gifts too meager, still demanding Korean princes as hostages.” This bureaucratic indifference left Jeong in tears as he desperately sought to convince the Ming officials of the looming crisis.

The Turning Point: Japan’s Renewed Aggression

The situation changed dramatically when military reports from Liaodong confirmed Jeong’s warnings. Japanese general Katō Kiyomasa had landed in Korea with over 200 warships on the fourteenth day of the first lunar month, establishing a base at Gijang Camp. Soon after, additional reports confirmed Japanese forces had captured Yangsan in Gyeongsang Province, expelling its governor.

These developments forced the Ming court to confront reality. Censor Xu Chengchu analyzed that each Japanese ship likely carried at least 100 soldiers, meaning over 20,000 troops had already landed – a force too substantial to ignore. The Ming court convened emergency discussions on the fifth day of the second month, marking a decisive shift in policy.

The Fall of Hawkish Officials and Military Preparations

As evidence of Japan’s bad faith mounted, hawkish officials at the Ming court launched scathing attacks on those responsible for the failed peace negotiations. Censor Zhou Kongjiao submitted a memorial accusing Minister of War Shi Xing of “eight counts of deceiving the emperor” and “five errors in state affairs.” These included falsely reporting Japanese withdrawals, fabricating enemy commander deaths, and misleading the emperor about Japan’s true intentions.

The political fallout was swift. Emperor Wanli recognized the complete failure of negotiations and the direct threat to Ming interests. Korea served as Ming’s strategic buffer, and its fall would expose China’s vulnerable northeastern frontier. By the third month, the emperor had appointed a new military leadership:

– Ma Gui as Anti-Japanese Commander-in-Chief
– Yang Hao as Military Commissioner for Korean Affairs
– Xing Jie as Minister of War and Supreme Commander

This trio would coordinate the Ming response, with Xing Jie holding supreme authority over military operations.

The First Ming Troops Enter Korea

In the third lunar month, Ming deputy general Yang Yuan crossed into Korea with 3,000 Liaodong troops, becoming the first Ming commander to enter the peninsula. King Seonjo personally welcomed Yang at Mohwagwan, where the Korean monarch requested Ming forces garrison the strategically vital Namwon in Jeolla Province – a region of flat terrain favorable for cavalry operations.

By the fifth month, additional Ming forces had arrived:
– Wu Weizhong with 4,000 southern troops
– Ma Gui with 3,000 soldiers
– Yang Yuan’s original 3,000

This brought total Ming strength in Korea to just over 10,000 – a modest force facing what intelligence suggested was a 20,000-strong Japanese invasion force.

Strategic Disputes and the Arrest of Shen Weijing

A significant disagreement emerged over defensive strategy at Namwon. Korean officials advocated defending both the main city and the nearby Gyoryongsanseong mountain fortress, creating mutual support. Yang Yuan rejected this, insisting on concentrating defenses in Namwon alone. The dispute grew so heated that Korean officials secretly complained to their government about Yang’s unilateral decision-making.

Another critical development was Yang Yuan’s arrest of Shen Weijing, the controversial Ming negotiator who had shuttled between Chinese and Japanese camps. With peace efforts collapsed, the new Ming leadership feared Shen might defect and reveal military secrets. His capture marked the end of an extraordinary diplomatic career that would ultimately cost him his life.

Japanese Defectors Reveal Invasion Plans

Interestingly, not all Japanese military leaders supported renewed war. Some, like Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s commander Hōjō Ujinao, actively leaked intelligence to Korean forces. In the fifth month, a Japanese veteran secretly advised Korean scouts:

“The generals often worry about Korea implementing scorched-earth tactics – clearing houses, trees, and removing supplies near battle areas. If you fortify mountain castles with accessible waterways for supply, even ten years wouldn’t be enough to capture them. If you do this, we’ll be in serious trouble.”

Another Japanese officer, Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s commander Nagamori, revealed detailed invasion plans to Korean operative Jeong Seung-heon in the sixth month, including:
1. Hideyoshi’s strategy of gradual conquest through agricultural settlements
2. Plans to focus attacks on strategic locations like Uiryeong and Gyeongju
3. Japanese siege tactics using shielded approaches and heavy artillery

These revelations demonstrated significant dissent within Japanese ranks and provided invaluable intelligence – though Korean forces failed to capitalize adequately on these warnings.

The Naval Disaster at Chilcheollyang

Korean naval forces suffered a catastrophic defeat in the seventh month at the Battle of Chilcheollyang. Admiral Won Gyun, despite warnings, engaged superior Japanese forces near Busan. The resulting battle saw:
– Korean ships scattered by winds and fatigue
– Japanese ambushes at Yeongdeungpo
– Final destruction at Chilcheollyang Strait
– Death of Won Gyun and most senior Korean naval officers

This disaster left Korea virtually defenseless at sea, forcing King Seonjo to reinstate the previously disgraced admiral Yi Sun-sin – a decision that would prove crucial in subsequent campaigns.

Japan’s Two-Pronged Invasion Strategy

By late seventh month, Japanese forces had consolidated into two massive armies:
Left Army (50,000 troops):
– Commander: Ukita Hideie
– Vanguard: Konishi Yukinaga
– Route: Gyeongsang → Jeolla (targeting Namwon)

Right Army (50,000 troops):
– Commander: Mōri Hidemoto
– Vanguard: Katō Kiyomasa
– Route: Gyeongju → Chungcheong

This pincer movement aimed to overwhelm Korean defenses and isolate Ming forces. Japanese records boasted of 600,000 troops (a clear exaggeration) and intentions to “directly attack Ming China” – psychological warfare designed to demoralize defenders.

The Siege of Namwon and Its Aftermath

The critical Battle of Namwon began in earnest on the thirteenth day of the eighth month. Japanese forces surrounded the city with overwhelming numbers against the 3,117 Ming and 700 Korean defenders. Despite heroic resistance, including innovative use of “shock thunder” mines and fire arrows, the garrison was doomed. Key moments included:
– Initial skirmishes on the 13th
– Japanese siege preparations on the 14th
– Failed sortie by Yang Yuan
– Final assault and fall on the 16th

The defeat sent shockwaves through Korea. King Seonjo lamented, “The survival of our nation and the security of the realm depend on Namwon. If Namwon falls, everything will collapse like tiles.” His fears proved prescient as Japanese forces advanced northward, though strategic disagreements among Japanese commanders and the eventual arrival of Ming reinforcements would prevent total disaster.

Historical Significance and Lasting Legacy

This second Ming intervention in Korea represented a critical juncture in East Asian history. The conflict:
1. Demonstrated Ming China’s commitment to the tributary system
2. Revealed deep fractures in Japanese command
3. Showcased Korean resilience despite devastating losses
4. Presaged Japan’s eventual withdrawal and Hideyoshi’s death

The war’s brutality – particularly Japanese atrocities against Korean civilians – left lasting scars. Hideyoshi’s orders for indiscriminate killing, recorded in Japanese chronicles like “Honzan Bungo no Kami父子戦功覚書,” resulted in horrific violence that still affects historical memory today.

Strategically, the conflict exhausted all participants:
– Ming China drained precious resources
– Japan failed to achieve its objectives
– Korea suffered devastating damage

Yet it also produced enduring symbols of resistance like Admiral Yi Sun-sin and highlighted the complex interplay of diplomacy, warfare, and cultural exchange in early modern East Asia. The lessons of this conflict – about the limits of power, the importance of intelligence, and the human cost of war – continue to resonate centuries later.