The Pivotal Year of 1597 in East Asian Warfare

The autumn of 1597 marked a critical turning point in the Second Japanese Invasion of Korea (1597-1598), known as the Jeongyu Jaeran in Korean or the Keichō Campaign in Japanese historiography. Following the devastating Battle of Chilcheollyang where the Korean navy suffered catastrophic losses, Japanese forces under Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s command had pushed deep into Korean territory, reaching as far north as Chungcheong Province. However, a combination of Ming military intervention, logistical challenges, and shifting Japanese strategic priorities would dramatically alter the course of the war during these pivotal months.

Historical records from all three belligerents – Korean court annals like the Veritable Records of King Seonjo, Ming military reports, and Japanese clan documents – reveal a complex series of engagements that have been largely overshadowed by more famous battles like Myeongnyang (the “Miracle at Myeongnyang”) or the Siege of Ulsan. This article reconstructs these forgotten military operations through multi-archival research, examining how the Ming-Korean alliance capitalized on Japan’s strategic withdrawal to regain lost territory.

The Strategic Withdrawal of Japanese Right Army

By mid-September 1597, the Japanese Right Army under Mōri Hidemoto began executing a phased withdrawal from Chungcheong Province following orders from Hideyoshi to consolidate forces along Korea’s southern coast. The Veritable Records of King Seonjo document how Ming commanders like Ma Gui seized this opportunity, dispatching cavalry units under officers such as Bai Sai, Peng Youde, and Chai Dengke to harass the retreating forces.

The Battle of Geumgang (September 16) represents one such engagement where Ming forces intercepted Japanese troops attempting to cross the Geum River. While scarcely mentioned in Ming records, this action finds corroboration in the Mōri Family Chronicles, which describe how Hidemoto’s forces faced persistent attacks during their southward march. The Japanese account notably exaggerates the pursuing forces as “40-50,000 Ming-Korean troops,” highlighting the psychological impact of these attacks on retreating samurai.

Simultaneously, other Right Army contingents under commanders like Kuroda Nagamasa and Katō Kiyomasa conducted their own withdrawals, often marked by brutal scorched-earth tactics. The Black Clan Documents record disturbing instances of nose-collection (a traditional samurai practice for recording kills) along retreat routes, with one particularly gruesome account describing 457 noses taken at Cheong’an. These atrocities, while militarily unnecessary, reflected both the punitive nature of the withdrawal and the Japanese practice of war trophy collection.

The Controversial “Battles” of Mungye and Cheong Mountain

Historical analysis becomes particularly challenging regarding reported clashes at Mungye (September 18) and Cheong Mountain (late September). The Dongchun Tangji and Veritable Records describe Ming successes at these locations, while Japanese accounts like the Mōri Family Chronicles acknowledge combat in the region but claim decisive victories.

The Battle of Cheong Mountain presents special historiographical problems. While Ming sources like Xu Xizhen’s Records of the Eastern Campaign describe Peng Youde’s victory over Katō Kiyomasa, neither Korean nor Japanese primary sources corroborate this engagement. The discrepancy suggests possible Ming exaggeration of operational successes, a common practice in military reporting across cultures. The Ming Shenzong Shilu’s vague reference to “repeated victories at Cheong Mountain” lacks the specificity found in reports of verified battles.

Equally problematic is the legendary encounter at Bonghwa Hyangam, where Korean commander Jeong Gi-ryong allegedly repelled Katō’s forces with just 400 men. While romanticized in later Joseon texts like the Seonyo Jungheungji, contemporary analysis suggests this was likely a minor skirmish where both sides disengaged due to poor visibility – a far cry from the heroic stand described in nationalist historiography.

Naval Confrontation at Myeongnyang

While land forces maneuvered across Chungcheong, the naval theater witnessed the famous Battle of Myeongnyang (September 17). Admiral Yi Sun-sin’s remarkable victory with just 13 ships against 130 Japanese vessels has been extensively studied, but less examined are its strategic consequences.

Contrary to popular belief, Yi’s victory didn’t immediately reverse Japanese naval dominance. The Kanyangnok records how Japanese forces continued advancing, forcing Yi to abandon his base at Jindo. Only Hideyoshi’s strategic decision to consolidate forces prevented further exploitation of this advantage. The battle’s true significance lay in its psychological impact – proving Japanese naval forces could be defeated and buying time for Ming-Korean reinforcements.

The Left Army’s Withdrawal and Ming Counteroffensive

As the Right Army retreated, the Japanese Left Army under Ukita Hideie conducted its own withdrawal from Jeolla Province. The Shimazu Clan Documents reveal detailed plans for coastal fortification, indicating Hideyoshi’s shift to defensive posture. Ming commanders misinterpreted this as general collapse, launching aggressive pursuits.

The Battles of Damyang (October) saw Ming cavalry under Li Rumei achieve tactical successes against rearguard units. However, the failed assault on Gurye Castle (October 7) exposed the limitations of Ming expeditionary forces in Korea’s mountainous terrain. The subsequent Battle of Jeongjin (October 23) ended inconclusively, with both Shimazu and Ming forces claiming victory – a pattern reflecting the chaotic nature of pursuit operations.

Legacy and Historical Reassessment

These 1597 operations profoundly impacted the war’s final phase. Militarily, they demonstrated:

1. The effectiveness of combined Ming-Korean mobile warfare against overextended Japanese supply lines
2. The limitations of samurai armies in sustained defensive operations
3. The critical role of naval interdiction (despite Myeongnyang’s limited immediate impact)

Culturally, the period spawned enduring legends like Jeong Gi-ryong’s stand, reflecting Joseon’s need for heroic narratives after devastating losses. The Ming’s exaggerated reports also reveal the political pressures facing expeditionary commanders.

Modern scholarship continues reassessing this phase through multi-perspective analysis. Japanese historian Watanabe Daimon’s 2018 study of the Mōri and Kuroda documents provides valuable corrections to Korean and Ming-centric narratives, while archaeological work at sites like Gurye Castle offers material evidence to balance textual accounts.

Ultimately, these forgotten battles of autumn 1597 represent a microcosm of the entire Imjin War – a conflict where perceptions often diverged from realities, where logistics proved as decisive as tactics, and where all three cultures constructed competing narratives that continue shaping historical understanding today.