The Cracks in Imperial Foundations
The An Lushan Rebellion (755-763 CE) didn’t erupt overnight. Its roots stretched deep into the structural weaknesses of Tang China’s military and political systems. The collapse of the fubing militia system—a cornerstone of early Tang power—had already loosened the central government’s grip on regional forces. In its place emerged professional frontier armies called changzheng jian’er (long-service veterans), creating a dangerous paradox.
These hardened troops strengthened border defenses but also forged unbreakable bonds with their regional commanders. The military governors (jiedushi) they served accumulated terrifying power—controlling not just armies but also civilian administration through roles like investigative commissioner (caifangshi) and agricultural commissioner (tuntianshi). By 755, of the empire’s 570,000 soldiers, a staggering 490,000 served under regional commands. The balance had tipped dangerously toward provincial strongmen.
Rise of the Borderland Warlords
Enter An Lushan and Shi Siming—the rebellion’s infamous architects. These ethnically mixed generals (part Sogdian, part Turkic) rose through the ranks during a fateful policy shift. Chancellor Li Linfu, seeking to block aristocratic rivals from gaining military experience, convinced Emperor Xuanzong to appoint “barbarian generals” from humble backgrounds.
The strategy backfired spectacularly. An Lushan accumulated command over three critical northeastern circuits—Pinglu, Fanyang, and Hedong—becoming virtual ruler of the northern frontier. His forces, seasoned by constant warfare against the Khitan and Xi tribes, grew fiercely loyal to him personally rather than the distant Tang court. After years of secret preparations, the inevitable occurred in November 755, when An’s troops swept south from Fanyang (modern Beijing).
The Empire Torn Asunder
What followed was a masterclass in imperial collapse. The Tang capital Chang’an fell within months as An declared himself emperor of a new Yan dynasty. Emperor Xuanzong’s panicked flight to Chengdu—memorialized in Bai Juyi’s famous poem “Song of Everlasting Sorrow”—marked a psychological turning point. His successor Suzong organized resistance from Lingwu, employing two key strategies: deploying brilliant generals like Guo Ziyi and Li Guangbi, and securing Uighur cavalry support through Princess Ningguo’s marriage alliance.
Yet the rebellion’s collapse came as much from internal rot as external pressure. The Yan “dynasty” witnessed four bloody successions in eight years—An Lushan murdered by his son Qingxu, who was killed by Shi Siming, who in turn fell to his own son Chaoyi. This Shakespearean cycle of patricide, combined with widespread popular resistance, allowed Tang forces to gradually regain ground. The final victory in 763 came at a terrible price—the empire would never be the same.
The Poisoned Victory: Rise of the Regional Hegemons
Paradoxically, the rebellion’s suppression entrenched the very forces that caused it. Emperor Daizong’s decision to appoint surrendered Yan generals as new military governors—Li Baochen in Chengde, Tian Chengsi in Weibo, Li Huaixian in Youzhou—created the infamous “Three Hebei Provinces” that would plague Tang rulers for a century. These regions operated as virtual kingdoms, passing leadership through hereditary succession while withholding taxes and maintaining private armies.
Three major centralization attempts followed. Emperor Dezong’s 781-786 campaign against the “Two Emperors and Four Kings” rebellion ended in humiliating compromise. His successor Xianzong (805-820) achieved temporary success through brilliant generalship—notably Li Su’s legendary snowstorm assault on Caizhou in 817—but the system remained intact. By Wuzong’s 843 suppression of the Zhaoyi rebellion, the exhausted court could no longer challenge provincial autonomy.
The Eunuch Shadow Government
As provincial warlords carved up the periphery, another cancer grew in the heart of Chang’an—eunuch domination. What began with Gao Lishi’s influence under Xuanzong evolved into full-blown institutional control after 763. Eunuchs like Li Fuguo dared tell emperors: “Your Majesty need only stay indoors; let this old slave handle affairs.”
Their power rested on three pillars: command of the 100,000-strong Shence Army (the capital’s only effective force after 783), control of the new Office of Privy Affairs (shumishi), and the dreaded regional surveillance system where eunuch “army supervisors” spied on provincial governors. By the 9th century, eunuchs routinely appointed chief ministers, decided imperial succession (eight Tang emperors were their puppets), and even murdered uncooperative rulers like Xianzong (820) and Jingzong (826).
Failed Revolts and Flickering Hope
Resistance flared but ultimately failed. The 805 “Yongzhen Reform” led by Wang Shuwen and Wang Pi sought to abolish eunuch military command and corrupt practices like the “palace procurement” racket—only to be crushed within 100 days. The 835 “Sweet Dew Incident” saw literati officials like Li Xun attempt a palace coup by luring eunuchs into a fake “heavenly omen” ceremony. When the plot failed, the Shence Army slaughtered thousands of bureaucrats in the bloodiest purge of the Tang era.
Legacy of a Shattered Order
The rebellion’s aftermath transformed China forever. Economically, the shift from the equitable zu-yong-diao tax system to the exploitative “Double Tax” system reflected declining central control. Socially, the north’s devastation accelerated the economic center’s shift southward—a trend continuing today. Militarily, the Tang’s reliance on Uighur and Tibetan mercenaries previewed the Song dynasty’s preference for paid armies over conscription.
Most crucially, the Tang’s devolution into regionalism previewed the coming Five Dynasties period—proving that in Chinese history, the road from unity to fragmentation often runs through the ambitions of border generals and the corruption of court insiders. As modern China balances regional development with central control, the lessons of An Lushan’s rebellion remain unsettlingly relevant.