The Fragile Peace of the Early 18th Century

The treaties signed in the second decade of the 18th century—Utrecht, Rastatt, and Nystad—promised lasting peace, yet proved as fragile as the 1919 Versailles settlement. Even before the Great Northern War concluded, Western European powers resumed hostilities, though now with an unprecedented twist: Britain and France found themselves on the same side. This dramatic realignment, nearly as shocking as the 1756 Diplomatic Revolution, revealed how dynastic rather than national interests continued to shape foreign policy.

Louis XIV had famously blended Bourbon family ambitions with French state interests, declaring in his 1679 treatise On the Art of Government that “the interest of the state must come first… When the state prospers, the ruler shares in its glory.” His Spanish counterparts pursued a starkly different course under the influence of Elisabeth Farnese, Philip V’s formidable second wife. Determined to secure Italian territories for her sons Don Carlos and Don Felipe—both unlikely to inherit Spain—she launched audacious Mediterranean campaigns that violated recent peace agreements and united former enemies against her.

The Mediterranean Chessboard: Spain’s Gamble and the Great Power Response

In 1717, Spain dispatched its largest fleet since Lepanto—300 ships carrying 33,000 troops—to seize Sardinia from Austria. The following year saw an equally successful invasion of Sicily. These brazen violations of the peace settlement provoked Britain and France into an unlikely alliance. The Duke of Orléans, France’s regent, sought British support to secure his claim against Philip V, while George I of Britain hoped the alliance would neutralize Jacobite threats and protect Hanover. The decisive moment came on August 11, 1718, when Admiral Byng’s British fleet annihilated the Spanish navy off Cape Passaro, capturing seven ships of the line and destroying seven more.

The subsequent peace settlement, imposed by the victorious allies in 1720, reshaped Southern Europe: Philip V renounced claims to Italy and the Southern Netherlands, while Don Carlos gained succession rights to Parma and Tuscany. Austria received Sicily in exchange for abandoning Spanish claims, and Savoy traded Sicily for Sardinia while retaining its royal title. This complex arrangement took years to implement fully, marking Britain’s brief but dominant position in the European state system.

The Shifting Sands of Alliance Politics

By the 1730s, France had recovered sufficiently to reassert its European primacy. Cardinal Fleury, Louis XV’s de facto prime minister, skillfully navigated foreign affairs, wary of both British dominance and the growing Austro-Russian axis. Meanwhile, succession crises destabilized multiple thrones—most critically in Poland (1733) and Austria (1740)—creating opportunities for French intervention.

The War of Polish Succession (1733-1738) demonstrated the continued importance of dynastic considerations. France supported Stanisław Leszczyński, whose daughter had married Louis XV, while Austria and Russia backed Augustus III. French victories in Germany and Italy led to the 1738 Treaty of Vienna, which compensated Stanisław with Lorraine (eventually to pass to France) and gave Don Carlos the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies.

The Diplomatic Revolution and Seven Years’ War

The mid-century witnessed the most dramatic alliance reversal in European history. Austria, humiliated by Prussia’s seizure of Silesia in 1740, sought revenge through an unprecedented partnership with France. Chancellor Kaunitz’s visionary plan aimed to isolate Prussia by aligning with its traditional enemies. The 1756 Treaty of Versailles marked this “Diplomatic Revolution,” though it initially remained defensive in nature.

Frederick II of Prussia, facing encirclement by France, Austria, Russia, Sweden, and most German states, launched a preemptive strike into Saxony in August 1756. The ensuing Seven Years’ War (1756-1763) became Prussia’s struggle for survival. Despite catastrophic defeats like Kunersdorf (1759), Frederick’s tactical brilliance and the fortuitous death of Empress Elizabeth (“the Miracle of the House of Brandenburg”) allowed Prussia to retain Silesia in the 1763 Peace of Hubertusburg.

The Eastern Question and First Partition of Poland

The postwar years saw Russia’s star rise dramatically in Eastern Europe. Catherine the Great’s victories against the Ottomans (1768-1774) and her subsequent annexation of Crimea (1783) alarmed Austria, leading to an unlikely Austro-Russian alliance. This partnership facilitated the First Partition of Poland (1772), where Prussia gained West Prussia, Russia took eastern territories, and Austria acquired Galicia—a strategic liability that Joseph II later lamented as “not worth the money spent on it.”

France’s inability to prevent these eastern realignments signaled its declining influence. The American Revolutionary War (1778-1783) further drained French resources without commensurate gains, despite helping secure American independence. By 1786, France faced financial collapse, its antiquated fiscal system unable to support great power ambitions.

Military Innovations and the Rise of Prussia

The period’s military developments proved transformative. Prussia, with just 2.24 million inhabitants, fielded an army of 81,000 by 1740 through its innovative “canton system” of regional conscription. Frederick William I’s military reforms created Europe’s most disciplined force, which his son Frederick II wielded with strategic brilliance. Prussia’s victories demonstrated that quality and leadership could overcome numerical inferiority—lessons not lost on future revolutionaries in France.

The era’s wars also saw increasing army sizes and battle frequency. Between 1648-1659 and 1756-1763, average battle sizes grew from 24,500 to 47,000 men, while monthly battle frequency doubled. Prussia’s success against overwhelming odds in the Seven Years’ War (facing enemies with 3-4 times its population) marked a watershed in military history.

The Financial Foundations of Power

Britain’s financial revolution proved decisive in its global struggles with France. Parliamentary control of taxation and the establishment of the Bank of England (1694) created a system where public credit could fund prolonged warfare. By contrast, France’s antiquated fiscal system—reliant on tax farming and venal offices—proved incapable of sustained military effort. By 1786, debt servicing consumed half of French revenues, precipitating the crisis that would lead to revolution.

As the era closed, Europe stood on the brink of transformation. The alliance systems that had maintained the balance of power since Utrecht were fracturing, while military and financial innovations had created new paradigms of state power. The stage was set for the revolutionary upheavals that would redefine European politics in the coming decades.