The Road to Conquest: Qin’s Expansion Under Ying Zheng

In the late Warring States period (475–221 BCE), the Qin state emerged as a dominant power under the leadership of King Ying Zheng (later First Emperor of Qin). By 225 BCE, Qin had conquered Han, Zhao, Wei, and Yan, leaving only Chu and Qi as major rivals. The wealthy southern state of Chu, with its vast territory stretching across modern Hubei, Hunan, and Anhui, became Qin’s next target.

Young general Li Xin, known for his battlefield successes, confidently proposed conquering Chu with just 200,000 troops—half the number veteran commander Wang Jian deemed necessary. This divergence in military judgment set the stage for a dramatic campaign that would test Qin’s strategic acumen.

Li Xin’s Lightning Campaign: Early Successes and Fatal Overconfidence

Li Xin’s strategy leveraged Qin’s superior battlefield tactics:
– A two-pronged advance along the Ru River, with his mobile force drawing Chu’s main army toward a decisive battle at Chengfu (modern Bozhou, Anhui)
– Rapid victories at Zhumadian, Yanling, and Jiangling that initially panicked Chu’s leadership

The plan unraveled when former Qin official Xiong Qi (a Chu royal descendant governing Yingchen) rebelled, severing Li Xin’s supply lines. As historian Sima Qian recorded, “Armies march on their stomachs”—a lesson Li Xin learned brutally when Chu general Xiang Yan (later uncle to the famed Xiang Yu) exploited this weakness.

The Turning Point: Xiong Qi’s Rebellion and Tactical Collapse

Xiong Qi’s defection proved catastrophic for Li Xin:
1. Supply lines cut: Qin troops faced starvation
2. Strategic paralysis: Forced to abandon the Chengfu trap
3. Encirclement at Yingchen: Xiang Yan’s forces joined Xiong Qi’s troops, crushing Li Xin’s army

The surviving Qin forces retreated in disgrace—a rare failure that humiliated Ying Zheng. The king reportedly told Wang Jian: “I should have listened to you,” acknowledging his misjudgment in backing the younger general.

Wang Jian’s Calculated Approach: The 600,000-Man Solution

The veteran commander imposed strict conditions for leading the next campaign:
– 600,000 troops—virtually Qin’s entire military
– Two-year operational freedom without royal interference
– Continuous requests for estates to demonstrate political loyalty

This “self-corruption” strategy—publicly demanding personal rewards—brilliantly assuaged Ying Zheng’s paranoia about ambitious generals. As Wang Jian told subordinates: “A general who appears greedy for land poses no threat of rebellion.”

Cultural Legacy: Military Psychology and Political Survival

The Chu campaign established enduring patterns in Chinese statecraft:
1. Logistics over valor: Reinforced Sun Tzu’s principle that “the line between order and disorder lies in logistics”
2. Veteran vs. rookie leadership: Demonstrated the value of experience in large-scale operations
3. Political theater: Wang Jian’s estate requests became a template for officials navigating autocratic rulers

Modern military academies still study this campaign for its lessons in supply-line vulnerability and civil-military relations. The psychological duel between Wang Jian and Ying Zheng remains a masterclass in managing authoritarian distrust.

Conclusion: The High Cost of Unification

Wang Jian’s methodical campaign ultimately succeeded where Li Xin failed, eliminating Chu by 223 BCE. Yet the human cost was staggering—historical records suggest over 200,000 casualties combined. This pivotal victory paved the way for Qin’s final conquest of Qi in 221 BCE, completing China’s first unification.

The contrasting fates of Li Xin (career ruin) and Wang Jian (strategic triumph) underscore a timeless truth: in warfare and statecraft, understanding human nature often proves as crucial as battlefield tactics. As the Shiji notes, “Wang Jian knew not only how to defeat enemies abroad, but also how to protect himself at court”—a duality that defined imperial China’s military tradition for millennia.