The Crossroads of 1859: Zeng Guofan’s Rise and Taiping’s Decline

By late 1859, the Qing Dynasty’s struggle against the Taiping Rebellion reached a pivotal moment. Zeng Guofan, the scholar-general leading the Hunan Army, found himself at a strategic advantage after Emperor Xianfeng ordered him to pacify Anhui—a command accompanied by unprecedented logistical support from provincial governors. This marked a dramatic shift in Zeng’s military career, transforming him from a beleaguered commander into a well-supplied strategist with imperial backing. Meanwhile, the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, fractured by internal divisions and the departure of key leader Shi Dakai, clung to survival through the efforts of young generals like Li Xiucheng and Chen Yucheng.

The Anhui Campaign: A Chessboard of War

Zeng Guofan’s plan to crush the Taiping hinged on capturing Anqing, a fortified city guarding the western approach to Nanjing, the rebel capital. His analysis distinguished between two types of rebels: “bandit usurpers” like Hong Xiuquan, who held fixed territories, and “roving bandits” like Shi Dakai, who relied on mobility. To dismantle the Taiping regime, Zeng argued, the Qing must first sever its “branches”—Anqing and other strategic outposts—before striking the “trunk” at Nanjing.

Emperor Xianfeng endorsed the strategy, but tensions arose with Zeng’s ally Hu Linyi, still traumatized by the Qing’s catastrophic defeat at Sanhe Town (1858). Hu urged caution, fearing Anhui’s entrenched Taiping sympathizers. Undeterred, Zeng divided his forces into four columns:
1. His brother Zeng Guoquan would spearhead the assault on Anqing.
2. Duolong’a and Bao Chao were to advance from Taihu toward Tongcheng.
3. Hu Linyi would attack from Hubei.
4. Li Xuyi (brother of the slain general Li Xubin) would feint northward to divert Taiping forces.

The Battle of Taihu: A Clash of Egos and Tactics

Disaster loomed when Duolong’a, a Manchu commander with little regard for Hunan Army officers, deployed Bao Chao’s troops to Xiaochi Station—a vulnerable position sandwiched between Taiping strongholds. Bao, outnumbered 15-to-1 by Chen Yucheng’s elite forces, faced annihilation. Zeng protested the reckless dispersal of troops but avoided open confrontation, a testament to his refined diplomatic tact.

As Chen’s army besieged Xiaochi, Duolong’a sent piecemeal reinforcements that vanished into the Taiping onslaught. Zeng, risking his own siege of Taihu, diverted troops to aid Bao, only to see them repelled. In desperation, he sent Bao a letter urging steadfastness, hinting at divine favor—a bluff meant to buy time.

The Miracle of 1860: Taiping’s Strategic Blunder

On Lunar New Year’s Day, Chen Yucheng abruptly withdrew. Unknown to Zeng, Hong Xiuquan had recalled Chen to break the Qing’s Jiangnan Barricade encircling Nanjing. This decision saved Bao Chao, allowed Zeng to seize Taihu, and ultimately doomed the Taiping. By prioritizing Nanjing’s immediate defense over Anqing’s long-term hold, Hong handed Zeng a strategic victory.

Legacy: The Making of a Qing Savior

Zeng’s Anhui campaign showcased his blend of Confucian patience and ruthless pragmatism. His ability to navigate court politics, sustain morale, and exploit Taiping missteps cemented his reputation as the dynasty’s savior. The fall of Anqing in 1861 became the prelude to Nanjing’s collapse in 1864, ending the bloodiest civil war of the 19th century.

Modern historians debate whether Zeng’s triumph prolonged the Qing’s decline or averted its premature collapse. Yet his campaign remains a masterclass in turning bureaucratic constraints into military advantage—a lesson echoing through China’s turbulent path to modernity.