The Fall of Beijing and the Shun Dynasty’s Dilemma

In May 1644, the Shun Dynasty faced a crisis that would determine its survival. After the dramatic fall of Beijing to combined Manchu-Ming forces on April 25, Emperor Li Zicheng and his leadership cadre initiated a westward retreat through Shanxi province. This withdrawal marked a pivotal moment in China’s tumultuous mid-17th century, when three competing powers—the Shun rebels, the crumbling Ming Dynasty, and the rising Qing forces—vied for control of the empire.

The Shun military, though formidable in its rapid northern campaign, now found itself overextended. With limited manpower to defend both the capital region (Jifu) and Shandong simultaneously, Li made the strategic decision to concentrate his defenses along the Shanxi-Henan corridor. This mountainous terrain offered natural defensive advantages against the pursuing Qing cavalry.

Fortifying the Western Frontier: Li Zicheng’s Defensive Deployment

Between mid-May and June 1644, Li Zicheng implemented a comprehensive defense plan for Shanxi:

– Northern Shanxi Command: General Zhang Tianlin garrisoned Datong with 10,000 troops to guard against attacks from Mongolia and the northeast.
– Central Shanxi Command: Marquis Chen Yongfu stationed another 10,000 soldiers in Taiyuan, the provincial capital.
– Southeastern Shanxi Command: General Liu Zhong established defenses in Changzhi (Shangdang), though historical records don’t specify his troop numbers.

Before departing Taiyuan, Li personally instructed Chen Yongfu on scorched earth tactics—a desperate measure to slow the advancing Qing forces. Additional reinforcements under General Yuan Zongdi (10,000 troops) were positioned at Linfen’s Guajiazhuang, creating a layered defense across the province.

Suppressing Counter-Revolution: The Shun’s Campaign Against Ming Loyalists

As the Shun forces withdrew, Ming loyalists across northern China seized the opportunity to revolt. The Shun response was swift and brutal:

– In Pingding Prefecture, rebels who blocked city gates and poisoned wells faced mass executions after Shun troops stormed the defenses.
– When Dingxiang County officials stole military payrolls and murdered tax collectors, 3,000 Shun soldiers crushed the rebellion within days.
– The most systematic countermeasure came in June 1644—a forced relocation program targeting Ming gentry. Thousands of scholars, officials, and their families from Henan and Shanxi were marched to Shaanxi under armed guard. This mass deportation aimed to neutralize potential rebel leadership in vulnerable regions.

Contemporary Qing records describe heartbreaking scenes of displaced elites “unable to live or die properly,” reflecting both the policy’s effectiveness and its human cost.

The Strategic Debate: Why Xi’an Instead of Shanxi?

Historians have long debated Li Zicheng’s decision to retreat all the way to Xi’an rather than making a stand in Shanxi. Several factors likely influenced this choice:

1. Dual Capital System: Xi’an (Western Capital) remained the Shun’s administrative heartland even after taking Beijing. Empress Gao and central government organs had never left Shaanxi.
2. Military Reserves: Northwest China housed the Shun’s best-restored troops under generals like Tian Jianxiu and Gao Yigong.
3. Symbolic Value: As Li’s original power base, Shaanxi offered recruitment advantages and loyal populations.

However, the failure to leave sufficient elite troops in Shanxi or appoint a supreme commander for the theater proved disastrous. By abandoning the mountainous defenses too quickly, Li surrendered the strategic initiative to the Qing.

Preparations for Counterattack: The Unfulfilled Shun Offensive

By July 1644, the Shun regime announced ambitious plans to retake lost territories:

– A three-pronged offensive totaling (likely exaggerated) 390,000 troops
– Production campaigns for armor (Changzhi), arrows (Huaiqing), and other materiel
– Probing attacks into Hebei, including a temporary capture of Jingxing County

Surviving military dispatches reveal these preparations alarmed both Qing and Ming remnants. Yet the grand counteroffensive never materialized due to:

1. Internal Instability: Defections like the Yongning Rebellion (August 1644) diverted critical resources.
2. Leadership Doubts: Even key advisor Niu Jinxing privately expressed despair, telling associates to “save their heads” while they could.
3. Policy Shifts: The controversial “confiscation campaigns” against elites were replaced with conventional taxation—a concession that came too late.

The Legacy of the 1644 Withdrawal

The Shun Dynasty’s six-month consolidation in Shaanxi represents a fascinating “what if” in Chinese history. While ultimately unsuccessful, Li Zicheng’s adaptations—from military reorganization to policy moderation—demonstrated surprising flexibility for a peasant rebellion turned national regime.

Modern scholars note how this period foreshadowed later Qing challenges in governing China: the difficulty of balancing elite cooperation with popular reform, the strategic importance of Shanxi’s geography, and the persistent regionalism that would trouble Chinese administrations for centuries.

The Shun’s final stand in Xi’an (abandoned February 1645) marked not just the end of a rebel kingdom, but the closing of one possible path for China’s transition between imperial dynasties—a transition that instead brought Manchu rule for the next 267 years.