The Strategic Decision to Enter Sichuan

In the eleventh month of 1643, as the Ming dynasty teetered on collapse, rebel leader Zhang Xianzhong faced a critical crossroads. His Great Western Army had established firm control over Hunan and key prefectures in Jiangxi, setting up local administrations that appeared poised for lasting governance. Yet in a surprising strategic pivot, Zhang abandoned these hard-won territories to lead his main forces westward into Sichuan, leaving only token garrisons behind in central China.

Contemporary Ming records attributed this move to Zhang’s fear of imperial commander Zuo Liangyu’s forces, while modern scholars have debated whether it reflected inherent weaknesses in peasant rebel mobility. However, the decision stemmed primarily from Zhang’s complex relationship with rival rebel leader Li Zicheng. As Li’s forces annihilated Ming general Sun Chuanting’s army and consolidated control over northwest China, Zhang recognized the impending unification under Li’s Shun regime. Unwilling to submit to Li’s authority yet unable to compete directly, Zhang sought a viable alternative.

Sichuan’s Strategic Advantages and Social Conditions

Zhang’s choice of Sichuan reflected careful strategic calculation. The province’s natural defenses – the Qinling Mountains to the north and the Three Gorges to the east – created formidable barriers against invasion. Sichuan’s abundant resources and historical precedent as a durable base during times of national upheaval made it ideal for establishing an independent regime. The local saying “Sichuan rebels first when the empire falters, and submits last when order returns” encapsulated this geographical advantage.

Beneath this strategic calculus lay a province ripe for rebellion. Late Ming Sichuan exhibited extreme social stratification, with contemporary accounts describing shocking contrasts between aristocratic excess and peasant deprivation. The provincial elite indulged in lavish banquets, extravagant estates, and cruel exploitation while commoners faced landlessness and starvation. Official corruption had reached epidemic proportions, with gentry, scholars, and government runners forming predatory networks that “destroyed families, seized property, and violated wives and daughters.”

Rising Unrest in Late Ming Sichuan

By the 1640s, two major rebel movements had emerged in Sichuan, severely weakening Ming authority. The Yao-Huang Thirteen Bands, originating from peasant leaders Yao Tiandong and Huang Long, controlled vast areas of northern and eastern Sichuan. Though initially popular among the poor, their lack of coherent ideology led to predatory behavior that alienated local support. Nevertheless, their continued resistance drained Ming military resources, with one official lamenting that “Sichuan’s defenses were exhausted by Yao-Huang.”

More significantly, the “Strike the Corrupt Runners” movement reflected popular fury against Ming administration. Beginning in Peng County in 1641, this grassroots uprising targeted abusive clerks, gentry, and their enforcers, eventually expanding into the broader “Eliminate Five Vermin” campaign against all oppressive elements. By 1643, these uprisings had evolved into full-scale attacks on wealthy households, with rebels plundering even the estates of prominent officials like Yang Tianguan before authorities could respond.

The Great Western Army’s Advance Into Sichuan

Zhang Xianzhong’s march westward began with consolidation in Hubei, where he absorbed the forces of aging rebel leader Ma Shouying. By spring 1644, his strengthened army moved up the Yangtze in both land and naval formations, facing minimal resistance as they navigated the supposedly impregnable Three Gorges. After occupying Wanzhou in February, logistical challenges forced a three-month pause before continuing toward Chongqing.

The siege of Chongqing in June demonstrated Zhang’s military acumen. After rejecting surrender demands, Ming defenders found their mountain fortress vulnerable when Zhang’s forces captured the strategic Fotu Pass and breached walls with gunpowder. The execution of Ming princes and officials sent shockwaves through Sichuan, with mutilated survivors spreading terror as they fled westward.

The Fall of Chengdu and Establishment of Great Western Rule

As Zhang advanced toward Chengdu, the provincial capital descended into chaos. The extravagant Shu Prince Zhu Zhishu, who had dreamed of imperial pretensions, proved incapable of organizing defense. When finally pressured to fund recruitment, his belated offer of fifty taels per soldier attracted only opportunists who promptly deserted with their pay.

Meanwhile, Li Zicheng’s concurrent invasion from the north complicated the situation. Despite Li’s own retreat from Beijing against Manchu forces, his commanders pressed into northern Sichuan, creating potential conflict between rebel factions that might have been better united against the emerging Qing threat.

Chengdu fell in August 1644 after minimal resistance. The Shu Prince’s suicide marked the end of two centuries of Ming rule, while Zhang’s swift consolidation of power saw most regional centers and indigenous chieftains submitting peacefully. In a telling sign of popular sentiment, scholars in Qiongzhou spontaneously gathered to demand surrender and welcome the new regime.

Legacy of the Great Western Kingdom

Zhang Xianzhong’s Sichuan campaign represented both the culmination of late Ming peasant rebellion and a tragic missed opportunity for unified resistance against the Manchu conquest. His strategic choice to establish an independent base reflected the complex dynamics of rebel politics during the Ming-Qing transition, while the rapid conquest demonstrated both Ming institutional collapse and popular disillusionment with the old order. The subsequent history of Zhang’s regime – including its controversial violence and ultimate failure against Qing forces – would cement his complex legacy in Chinese historiography as both rebel hero and brutal warlord.