The Collapse of the Ming and the Rise of New Powers

The year 1644 marked one of the most dramatic turning points in Chinese history. As the Ming dynasty crumbled under peasant rebellions, two new powers emerged to fill the vacuum – the Manchu-led Qing forces from the northeast and the rebel Shun dynasty under Li Zicheng. When Li’s forces captured Beijing in April 1644, the last Ming emperor committed suicide, creating a power struggle that would determine China’s future.

The Qing dynasty, having consolidated their power in Manchuria, saw an opportunity to expand southward. Under the leadership of Prince Dorgon, they allied with Ming general Wu Sangui and defeated Li Zicheng at the Battle of Shanhai Pass in May 1644. This victory opened the path for the Qing to enter Beijing and establish their rule over northern China.

The Qing Southern Campaign Unfolds

By October 1644, Qing forces had secured the capital region and Shandong province. On October 3rd, General Ye Chen captured Taiyuan, the provincial capital of Shanxi, forcing Shun commander Chen Yongfu to flee. This victory brought most of Shanxi under Qing control. Meanwhile, Henan province descended into chaos as Shun forces retreated westward, leaving the region divided among warlords and bandits.

The Southern Ming court, established in Nanjing under the Hongguang Emperor, failed to assert control over these contested territories. Their reluctance to engage militarily, hoping instead for peaceful coexistence with the Qing, proved disastrous. Seizing this advantage, Prince Dorgon made the strategic decision in October to divide his forces for a two-pronged conquest.

The Two-Pronged Qing Offensive

Dorgon’s ambitious plan called for simultaneous campaigns against both remaining rivals. The western campaign, led by Prince Ajige with Wu Sangui and Shang Kexi, would strike through northern Shanxi and Inner Mongolia to attack Shaanxi and destroy the Shun regime centered in Xi’an. The southern campaign under Prince Dodo, Kong Youde, and Geng Zhongming would target the Southern Ming court in Nanjing.

On October 24, the Qing issued a proclamation condemning the Southern Ming for three “crimes”: failing to aid the fallen Ming, improperly installing the Hongguang Emperor, and not pursuing the peasant rebels. This document served as both justification for war and a psychological weapon against Southern Ming legitimacy.

The Strategic Turning Point at Huaiqing

Just as this grand strategy was being implemented, a surprising development altered the course of events. Shun forces launched a successful counteroffensive in the Huaiqing region of Henan in early October. By mid-month, they had defeated Qing forces at Boxiang Town, killing commander Jin Yuhe and several other officers. The Shun army then besieged Qinyang county, forcing Qing general Zu Kefa to fortify the city and await reinforcements.

This unexpected reversal shocked Dorgon into reconsidering his strategy. Recognizing the vulnerability of Qing positions in north China, he made the crucial decision to redirect Prince Dodo’s southern campaign westward to relieve Qinyang and then attack Tong Pass, the gateway to Shaanxi. This change would allow both Qing armies to concentrate against the Shun forces.

Li Zicheng’s Dilemma and Strategic Paralysis

Meanwhile, Li Zicheng had been moving north from Xi’an with his main force, reaching Luochuan by December. Historical records show he paused there for ten days, likely awaiting news of Qing movements. With both Ajige advancing from the north and Dodo now threatening from the east, Li found himself caught in a strategic dilemma. The Shun leader’s hesitation proved costly, as it allowed the Qing to seize the initiative.

While the Huaiqing campaign had achieved tactical success, it ultimately drew both Qing armies against the Shun forces, altering the strategic balance. The Southern Ming gained temporary respite from invasion, but failed to capitalize on the Qing preoccupation with the Shun threat.

The Southern Ming’s Missed Opportunity

As the Qing concentrated their forces against the Shun, their defenses in north China became stretched thin. Southern Ming officials like Wang Yongji and Yuan Jixian recognized this vulnerability and urged military action to reclaim lost territory. Wang’s memorial particularly highlighted the Qing’s overextension and proposed bold counteroffensives in Shandong and Henan.

However, the Southern Ming leadership under Ma Shiying and Shi Kefa, fearful of provoking the Qing, rejected these proposals. Their policy of “using the barbarians to suppress the bandits” reflected both class prejudice against peasant rebels and a dangerous underestimation of the Qing threat. This inaction allowed the Qing to defeat their enemies sequentially rather than facing a united opposition.

The Consequences of Strategic Choices

The Qing decision to redirect Dodo’s forces westward proved decisive. By early 1645, they had defeated the Shun at Tong Pass and captured Xi’an, forcing Li Zicheng to retreat. With the Shun threat neutralized, the Qing could then turn their full attention to the Southern Ming. The Hongguang regime, having squandered its opportunity when the Qing were vulnerable, fell quickly when Dodo’s army finally marched south in April 1645.

Dorgon’s flexibility in adjusting strategy based on the Huaiqing campaign demonstrated Qing military adaptability. In contrast, both the Shun and Southern Ming leadership showed critical failures in strategic vision – the former by overextending their forces, the latter by excessive caution.

The Legacy of 1644-1645

These events of late 1644 established the pattern for the Qing conquest of China. Their ability to exploit divisions among Chinese factions, adapt to changing circumstances, and maintain strategic initiative proved decisive. The Southern Ming’s passive strategy and internal conflicts condemned their regime to quick extinction, while the Shun’s failure to consolidate their early gains left them vulnerable to Qing military might.

The year’s events also revealed the importance of strategic flexibility and the dangers of ideological rigidity in warfare. The Qing success in this critical period laid the foundation for their nearly three-century rule over China, while the mistakes of their opponents provided enduring lessons about the perils of strategic miscalculation during times of dynastic transition.