The Collapse of the Ming and the Rise of the Southern Ming

The year 1644 marked a pivotal moment in Chinese history. The once-mighty Ming Dynasty, which had ruled China for nearly three centuries, collapsed under the combined pressures of internal rebellion and external threat. In April, the rebel leader Li Zicheng captured Beijing, prompting the last Ming emperor, Chongzhen, to take his own life on Coal Hill. Just weeks later, the Manchu-led Qing forces, invited by Ming general Wu Sangui, swept into the capital and established their rule.

In the wake of this catastrophe, remnants of the Ming court fled south and established the Hongguang regime in Nanjing, known to history as the Southern Ming. This government, nominally headed by the Prince of Fu (Zhu Yousong), faced impossible odds from its inception. The new regime’s survival depended on navigating treacherous political waters between the advancing Qing armies to the north and the still-powerful rebel forces of Li Zicheng and Zhang Xianzhong.

Shi Kefa’s Controversial Strategy: “Ally with the Barbarians to Suppress the Bandits”

As the Southern Ming’s Minister of War and Grand Secretary, Shi Kefa emerged as the primary architect of what became known as the “lianlu pingkou” strategy – “ally with the barbarians to suppress the bandits.” This controversial approach proposed cooperating with the Qing to eliminate the peasant rebels first, particularly Li Zicheng’s forces, before addressing the Manchu threat.

In December 1644, Shi dispatched a high-level delegation led by Zuo Maodi to Beijing, bearing gifts and proposing an alliance against the rebels. The Qing response was unequivocal rejection. The envoys were detained (except for the turncoat Chen Hongfan), and the Southern Ming’s hopes for cooperation were dashed. Shi Kefa’s subsequent memorial to the Hongguang Emperor revealed his conflicted position: “Our original hope was that peace negotiations would succeed… Now that the envoys have returned with troops following close behind, the peace talks have utterly failed.”

Despite this setback, Shi Kefa clung to his strategy. In early 1645, he organized the only significant Northern Expedition attempted by the Southern Ming, led by the formidable general Gao Jie. This campaign, however, was not aimed at the Qing but intended to coordinate with Manchu forces against Li Zicheng’s rebels in Shaanxi.

The Gao Jie Expedition and the Tragedy at Suizhou

Gao Jie’s northern campaign represented the Southern Ming’s last serious military initiative. A former rebel himself who had defected to the Ming, Gao commanded one of the four major armies defending the Yangtze. His force of 20,000 men advanced toward Kaifeng, with plans to continue west toward Luoyang and the strategic Hulao Pass.

Before departing, Gao Jie wrote to the Qing prince Haoge, expressing the Southern Ming’s position: “The eastern armies have recovered our divine land, buried our late emperor, avenged our deep grievances, and saved our common people… Our sole desire is to join forces to exterminate the rebel Li and fulfill your country’s name for comforting neighbors.” The letter perfectly encapsulated Shi Kefa’s strategy – emphasizing shared opposition to Li Zicheng while carefully asserting Ming legitimacy.

The campaign ended in disaster. On January 12, 1645, Gao Jie entered Suizhou to meet with the local Ming commander Xu Dingguo, unaware that Xu had secretly allied with the Qing. After a banquet where Gao became intoxicated, Xu’s men ambushed and killed him along with his 300 guards. The subsequent massacre by Gao’s vengeful troops left Suizhou in ruins, while Xu fled across the Yellow River to join the Qing.

Strategic Consequences and Missed Opportunities

The death of Gao Jie created chaos in the Southern Ming defenses. Rival generals like Huang Degong sought to divide Gao’s territory and troops, while Gao’s widow Lady Xing struggled to maintain control of his forces. Shi Kefa’s attempt to stabilize the situation by having Gao’s son recognized as heir and appointing trusted officers ultimately failed due to his own prejudices – he refused Lady Xing’s request to adopt the boy, unwilling to associate too closely with former rebels.

Historians have debated whether this period represented a missed opportunity for the Southern Ming. With Qing forces concentrated against Li Zicheng in Shaanxi, their presence in Henan and Shandong remained limited. As Haoge’s reports to Beijing indicated, Qing commanders were under orders not to advance without explicit instructions. The scholar Yan Ermei, then serving on Shi Kefa’s staff, later criticized the minister’s timidity, urging bold action to recover territory north of the Yellow River. Instead, Shi retreated to Yangzhou, abandoning any initiative.

Cultural Legacy and Historical Reassessment

Shi Kefa’s legacy remains deeply contested. Traditional Chinese historiography often portrays him as a loyal martyr, emphasizing his eventual heroic defense of Yangzhou against the Qing. However, archival documents reveal a more complex figure – a man whose strategic miscalculations and political prejudices significantly weakened the Southern Ming’s position.

The “ally with the barbarians” strategy reflected both the desperate circumstances of 1644-45 and deeper ideological biases within the Ming elite. For officials like Shi Kefa, the peasant rebels represented a more immediate threat than the Manchus, whom they viewed as potentially civilized allies. This mindset blinded them to the Qing’s imperial ambitions until it was too late.

Modern scholarship has also reevaluated figures like Gao Jie and other former rebels who proved more committed to Ming resistance than many orthodox officials. The Suizhou incident demonstrates how personal rivalries and lack of coordination doomed Southern Ming efforts, while Qing leaders skillfully exploited these divisions.

Conclusion: Lessons from a Failed Strategy

The collapse of Shi Kefa’s northern strategy marked the beginning of the end for the Hongguang regime. Within months, Qing forces would sweep south, capturing Nanjing in June 1645. Shi himself died defending Yangzhou, his reputation secured more by his final martyrdom than his earlier political decisions.

This episode offers enduring lessons about the perils of wishful thinking in diplomacy and the dangers of ideological blinders in times of crisis. The Southern Ming’s failure to recognize the Qing as their primary threat, combined with internal divisions and strategic indecision, sealed the fate of China’s last native imperial dynasty. The documents surrounding these events – from Shi Kefa’s memorials to Gao Jie’s correspondence – provide a fascinating window into the tragic final act of the Ming Dynasty.