The Tang Dynasty’s Risky Fiscal Experiment

The Tang Dynasty inherited and expanded upon the military institutions of the Sui Dynasty and Northern Zhou, establishing a unique self-sustaining military-economic system that would ultimately contribute to one of China’s most devastating rebellions. At the heart of this system lay the fubing (garrison militia) system, where soldiers lived in military colonies, alternating between combat duties and agricultural work to support themselves.

This unusual arrangement stemmed from the Tang’s minimalist approach to public finance. The early Tang emperors deliberately avoided developing robust taxation systems, instead creating what they believed would be self-funding mechanisms for both military and civil administration. Soldiers received land to cultivate for their upkeep, while officials obtained “official land” (zhifentian) whose rental income supposedly covered their salaries. Even government offices relied on specially allocated “public office land” (gongxietian) rather than direct treasury funding.

The Collapse of Self-Sufficiency

The Tang’s self-funding model began unraveling almost immediately. Garrison soldiers proved reluctant farmers, and their plots often failed to generate sufficient military provisions. Officials similarly struggled as landlords, with many failing to collect adequate rents, forcing the government to reintroduce salary payments. The loan-based office funds (gongxieqian) became particularly problematic – poorly managed government lending operations frequently lost money, leading to coercive lending practices where wealthy households were forced to accept loans with exorbitant 100% interest rates.

Meanwhile, the Tang found itself engaged in near-constant military campaigns against surrounding peoples: Turks, Uyghurs, Tuyuhun, Goguryeo, Baekje, Khitans, Tibetans, and even distant Muslim forces in Central Asia. These expanding military commitments placed unbearable strain on the already-failing fiscal system. By Emperor Xuanzong’s reign (712-756), the fubing system had deteriorated beyond repair, leaving the dynasty without reliable military funding.

The Rise of the Jiedushi System

Facing fiscal collapse, the Tang court split between two factions: the “virtuous ministers” advocating austerity and the “extraction faction” pushing for revenue expansion. As financial pressures mounted, the extraction faction gained dominance, leading to radical military reforms. The solution emerged in the form of jiedushi (military commissioners) – regional commanders granted unprecedented civil and military authority.

Originally temporary appointments under Emperor Gaozong, jiedushi became permanent positions starting with Hexi Jiedushi in 711. These regional warlords controlled military recruitment, civil administration, taxation, and official appointments within their territories. Crucially, they abandoned the failing fubing system for professional mercenary armies personally loyal to their commanders rather than the central government.

The Dangerous Delegation of Power

The logic behind empowering jiedushi appeared sound – by making regional commanders responsible for funding their own forces through local taxation, the cash-strapped central government could maintain strong frontier defenses without direct financial burden. Professional soldiers proved more effective than farmer-soldiers against nomadic threats. However, this decentralization created dangerous power centers where military loyalty shifted from the emperor to regional strongmen.

By Xuanzong’s later reign, ten powerful jiedushi commands encircled the empire’s frontiers, collectively controlling most of Tang military forces. Worse still, Chancellor Li Linfu began appointing non-Han generals like An Lushan and Gao Xianzhi to these positions, believing foreign commanders would remain dependent on central approval. This miscalculation removed even the cultural restraints on separatist ambitions.

The Path to Rebellion

The system’s fragility became apparent after Li Linfu’s death in 753. His successor Yang Guozhong lacked both political skill and the trust of frontier commanders. His attempts to curb jiedushi authority – particularly targeting the powerful An Lushan, who controlled three northeastern commands – backfired spectacularly. By 755, An Lushan commanded nearly 200,000 professional troops personally loyal to him, while the central government’s forces had atrophied. The stage was set for catastrophic rebellion.

Cultural and Social Consequences

The An Lushan Rebellion (755-763) devastated Tang society, killing millions and permanently altering China’s demographic and cultural landscape. The cosmopolitan openness of early Tang gave way to suspicion of foreign influences, while the equal-field system and other early Tang institutions never fully recovered. Perhaps most significantly, the rebellion accelerated the shift from aristocratic to bureaucratic governance, as the Tang court grew increasingly reliant on professional administrators rather than noble families.

Legacy of a Fiscal Crisis

The An Lushan Rebellion stands as one of history’s clearest examples of how financial mismanagement can undermine political stability. The Tang’s attempt to maintain imperial ambitions without developing proper fiscal infrastructure created conditions for regional warlordism that would plague China for centuries. Modern parallels can be seen in governments that prioritize short-term financial expediency over sustainable institutional development, often with similarly destabilizing consequences. The rebellion’s ultimate lesson – that decentralized military funding risks creating rival power centers – remains relevant for any large-scale polity balancing security needs with fiscal responsibility.