The Shadow War Begins
In the autumn of 1939, as Europe teetered on the brink of total war, an unassuming British officer named Colin Gubbins arrived in Paris under the guise of a military liaison. French authorities quickly grew suspicious—their instincts were correct. Gubbins was no ordinary attaché. His true mission: to establish contact with Polish resistance leaders and lay the groundwork for unconventional warfare against Nazi Germany.
At the luxurious Hôtel Regina near the Louvre, Gubbins reunited with Colonel Stanisław Gano, head of Polish intelligence’s Second Department. Gano’s harrowing escape from Gestapo captivity and his desperate pleas for weapons revealed the brutal reality facing occupied Europe. The Poles needed radios and semi-automatic pistols; Britain could offer only obsolete revolvers and two spare radios—available next spring. This bureaucratic inertia exposed Whitehall’s dangerous underestimation of guerrilla warfare’s potential.
Churchill’s Irregulars
While the British Expeditionary Force dug trenches along France’s eastern border—hunting foxes to pass time during the so-called “Phony War”—Gubbins fought institutional resistance. Secret Intelligence Service traditionalists like Kim Philby dismissed guerrilla fighters as “undisciplined mobs” endangering proper espionage. Undeterred, Gubbins refined his theories in a Parisian flat overlooking Rodin’s gardens, dining on his butler’s cuisine while plotting sabotage campaigns.
The April 1940 German invasion of Norway shattered the illusion of gentlemanly warfare. When opposition leader Clement Attlee requested military files on Norway, he found empty folders marked “SFA”—Sweet Fanny Adams. Britain’s chaotic response—officers who didn’t speak Norwegian, troops without winter gear—highlighted the need for Gubbins’ vision.
The Scissorforce Experiment
Within days of Germany’s blitzkrieg, Gubbins secured approval for Special Operations Executive’s precursor: four Independent Companies dubbed “Scissorforce.” The unit’s composition revealed Britain’s unpreparedness:
– Indian Army officers hauled from Lahore in an overloaded flying boat (three men crammed in the freezing luggage hold)
– Volunteers issued snowshoes none could use
– Rations tasting like “rancid whale blubber” replacing confiscated sheepskin coats
Gubbins’ May 5 landing in Mosjøen became a masterclass in asymmetric warfare. His French Alpine allies abandoned him under orders from Paris, leaving 14 men to ambush 60 German cyclists at a narrow bridge. The execution was merciless—machine guns cut down the exposed column in minutes, with survivors hunted through snowdrifts. This first successful British guerrilla action proved small teams could inflict disproportionate damage.
The Science of Sabotage
Critical to Gubbins’ success was Millis Jefferis, an eccentric inventor whose workshop produced:
– Pressure-switch mines disguised as rocks
– Railway-destroying vibration detonators
– 1,000 pounds of homemade explosives
Jefferis personally tested devices behind enemy lines, nearly getting court-martialed for speeding to his mission (a traffic fine he avoided by claiming wartime exigency). His delayed-action bombs continued exploding weeks after his extraction under naval bombardment—a tactic later perfected in occupied France.
Legacy of the Phony Warriors
Though Norway fell, Gubbins’ lessons transformed special operations:
1. Training Revolution: Established Scotland’s guerrilla warfare school emphasizing survival skills and independent thinking
2. Equipment Standards: Insisted on purpose-built gear after the snowshoe fiasco
3. Elite Selection: Pioneered psychological profiling to identify resilient leaders
Most crucially, the campaign uncovered Germany’s interest in Norway’s heavy water plant at Vemork—intelligence that would spark the famous Telemark sabotage operations. As Gubbins received his Distinguished Service Order, he drafted principles still guiding special forces today: “In total war, we must adopt unprecedented methods with ruthless determination.”
The “Phony War” birthed modern unconventional warfare not in Whitehall’s halls, but through frozen ambushes and midnight explosions—proving that sometimes, the most effective soldiers wear no uniform at all.
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