The Rise of Guerrilla Warfare in Nazi-Occupied Europe

In the shadowy world of World War II resistance movements, few figures loom as large as Colin Gubbins, the British mastermind behind unconventional warfare. Following the assassination of Reinhard Heydrich in 1942, Gubbins recognized an unexpected advantage against the Nazi war machine. While Germany dominated conventional battlefields, the Allies could excel in secrecy, deception, and surprise attacks. “If we can surpass them in planning, cunning, unexpectedness and boldness,” Gubbins observed, “our work will eventually take effect and influence the war.” This philosophy would soon be tested in the mountains of Greece, where a single railway bridge became the unlikely linchpin of North African supply lines.

The stage was set when Mussolini invaded Greece in autumn 1940. As underground resistance networks sprouted across the country, British operatives like Peter Fleming began organizing sabotage operations against Axis forces. Fleming’s reports back to Baker Street headquarters described thrilling hit-and-run attacks that sowed chaos among Italian troops. Meanwhile, another agent codenamed “Prometheus” established a critical intelligence pipeline from Athens, using fishing boats to smuggle Welsh-assembled explosives from Palestine through Turkey into Greek hands.

Operation Harling: A Mission Against Impossible Odds

By 1942, the strategic picture had crystallized. Field Marshal Rommel’s Afrika Korps relied on a vulnerable supply chain – 48 daily trains carrying war materiel from Germany through Greece’s mountainous terrain to North African ports. The single-track railway snaked through the treacherous Pindus Mountains, crossing three massive viaducts including the engineering marvel at Gorgopotamos. Destroy any one bridge, and Rommel’s lifeline would be severed.

Thus was born Operation Harling, an audacious plan to parachute saboteurs into enemy territory. The mission would be led by Eddie Myers, a 36-year-old Jewish engineer with experience in irregular warfare. His twelve-man team included New Zealand demolitions expert Tom Barnes, Greek officer Themistocles Marinos, and Oxford classicist Chris “Monty” Woodhouse, whose fluency in ancient Greek proved unexpectedly useful.

The challenges were daunting: navigating unfamiliar terrain, evading Italian patrols, coordinating with local guerrillas, and placing explosives on a heavily guarded structure. As Woodhouse later recalled, their briefing consisted of little more than a postcard of the Simplon Orient Express crossing the Gorgopotamos viaduct. When Myers first saw reconnaissance photos of the 280-meter bridge spanning a dizzying chasm, he realized the true scale of their task.

Night Drop into Enemy Territory

On September 29, 1942, the first insertion attempt failed when no reception lights appeared in the drop zone. The next night, Myers gambled on a blind jump through cloud cover. His descent became a nightmare as mountain winds slammed him into a fir tree, leaving him dangling above a sheer drop. Other team members fared better – Woodhouse landed “as easily as stepping off a table” – but their explosives were nearly lost when village children mistook plastic explosives for candy.

The scattered team gradually regrouped with help from Greek resistance fighters. A local villager named Barba Niko guided them to hidden caves, explaining: “I heard God sent us Englishmen from the sky, so it’s my duty to help them.” Their sanctuary became a base for planning the attack, though political tensions between communist and republican guerrilla bands threatened to derail cooperation.

The Assault on Gorgopotamos Bridge

After weeks of preparation, Myers finalized an intricate attack plan for November 25. The operation required perfect synchronization: simultaneous assaults on both bridge guard posts would allow Barnes’ demolition team to descend the gorge and plant explosives on the steel supports. Local guerrillas under commanders Napoleon Zervas and Aris Velouchiotis would provide crucial manpower.

Weather nearly thwarted the mission as snow and fog obscured the mountains. When conditions finally cleared, the teams moved into position. At precisely 11:00 PM, the attack commenced with grenades raining down on Italian positions. Fierce fighting erupted at both ends of the bridge, with Myers committing his reserve force at a critical moment. As gunfire echoed through the canyon, Barnes’ team navigated the treacherous descent with pack mules carrying 400 pounds of explosives.

The demolition work proved painstaking. Using specially crafted wooden molds, the team shaped plastic explosives to fit the bridge’s L-shaped steel girders. After hours of meticulous preparation, Barnes ignited the fuses. The resulting explosion sent a 20-meter section of steel decking cartwheeling into the abyss, followed by a secondary blast that completed the destruction. Against all odds, the mission had succeeded without a single Allied fatality.

Strategic Impact and Lasting Legacy

The destruction of Gorgopotamos Bridge had immediate consequences. German commanders, furious at the sabotage, executed sixteen local villagers in retaliation. More significantly, the bridge’s six-week repair period coincided with the Allied North Africa offensive, depriving Rommel of 2,000 trainloads of supplies during a critical phase. As Woodhouse noted, the operation proved “that guerrillas could carry out major tactical operations in support of Allied strategic plans.”

For Myers’ team, the mission was only the beginning. Ordered to remain in Greece, they helped build a 5,000-strong guerrilla army that continued harassing Axis forces. Subsequent operations sank supply ships, derailed trains, and destroyed coal mines – culminating in the demolition of a second critical viaduct at Asopos. When Churchill saw photographs of the wreckage, he reportedly beamed with satisfaction.

The Gorgopotamos operation became a blueprint for resistance warfare, demonstrating how small, well-trained teams could achieve disproportionate strategic effects. Gubbins’ vision of combining local knowledge with specialized military skills had proven devastatingly effective. As Myers radioed to headquarters: “Give me the weapons, and we will win the country.” In the shadow war against Nazi occupation, audacity and ingenuity had triumphed over brute force.