The Unimaginable Dream: Ukraine in the Soviet Crucible

When Mikhail Gorbachev assumed leadership of the Soviet Union in March 1985, the concept of an independent Ukraine existed only in the realm of fantasy for most observers. The Soviet system appeared monolithic and permanent, a geopolitical constant that had weathered decades of Cold War tensions. Ukraine, as the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, stood as the second-most important republic in the USSR—a vital agricultural and industrial hub with deep historical and cultural connections to Russia. The notion that this cornerstone of the Soviet empire might break away seemed preposterous.

Yet beneath the surface of Soviet conformity, dreams of sovereignty persisted. Ukrainian dissidents and diaspora communities maintained the flame of independence through decades of suppression. The Soviet authorities, confident in their ideological control, had declared the “nationalities question” solved through the creation of a unified Soviet people. Few anticipated that the seemingly stable multinational state would fracture along the very national lines that Moscow claimed to have transcended. The stage was set for one of the most dramatic geopolitical transformations of the twentieth century, though none could foresee it at Gorbachev’s ascension.

The Accidental Revolutionary: Gorbachev’s Background and Vision

Mikhail Gorbachev represented a new generation of Soviet leadership. At 54, he was considerably younger than his predecessors, bringing energy and a reformist mindset to a stagnant political system. His background set him apart from typical Soviet apparatchiks. Unlike most Soviet leaders who trained as engineers, Gorbachev studied law at Moscow State University, where he encountered figures from the “reform communism” movement. Perhaps more significantly, his family had been victims of Stalin’s collectivization policies, giving him personal experience with the oppressive nature of the Soviet system.

Gorbachev saw himself continuing the work of his mentor Yuri Andropov, the former KGB chief who had briefly led the Soviet Union from 1982 to 1984. Andropov had emphasized labor discipline and anti-corruption measures, and Gorbachev’s initial “acceleration” policy built upon this foundation. By 1986, however, Gorbachev recognized that incremental changes would not suffice. The Soviet economy was faltering, technology lagged significantly behind the West, and military spending strained national resources. The Brezhnev era, which Gorbachev termed the “period of stagnation,” had left the superpower facing a crisis that threatened its global standing.

The Three Pillars of Reform: Glasnost, Perestroika, and Demokratizatsiia

Between 1986 and 1988, Gorbachev launched three transformative policies that would ultimately unravel the Soviet system he sought to reform. Glasnost, or openness, aimed to reduce media censorship and encourage public discussion of new ideas. Gorbachev envisioned this as a tool to build support for reform, generate new ideas from society, and combat conservative elements within the Communist Party. Perestroika, or restructuring, sought to revitalize the economy by decentralizing economic decision-making and giving managers and workers greater autonomy. Demokratizatsiia, or democratization, began by allowing citizens to choose among multiple Communist Party candidates in elections, eventually permitting non-communist organizations to field candidates by 1989-1990.

These reforms were not intended to create Western-style democracy or capitalism but to establish a more modern, less oppressive communist system that enjoyed genuine popular support. Gorbachev believed he could harness these forces to renew Soviet socialism. Instead, he unleashed dynamics that quickly escaped his control. Glasnost opened the door to criticism of the entire Soviet system, perestroika created economic chaos, and democratization established mechanisms that would ultimately challenge Soviet authority itself.

The Baltic Catalyst: Nationalism Ignites on the Periphery

The first cracks in the Soviet empire appeared not in Ukraine but in the Baltic republics of Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia. These nations had enjoyed independence between the world wars before being forcibly incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1940 as part of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact with Nazi Germany. Like Western Ukrainians, Baltic peoples had resisted Soviet rule and suffered brutal reprisals. After World War II, Moscow encouraged Russian migration to the Baltics, where Russians assumed dominant positions in political and economic life while local languages were marginalized.

Gorbachev’s glasnost policy allowed Baltic peoples to openly discuss Stalin’s crimes and express long-suppressed grievances. What began as cultural preservation movements quickly evolved into campaigns for sovereignty and eventually independence. Economic reforms found receptive audiences in the relatively prosperous Baltic republics, where many believed decentralization would benefit them. Democratization provided nationalist groups with organizational tools and electoral opportunities. By 1990, nationalist movements had triumphed in republican elections across the Baltics. Local communist officials, seeking to maintain relevance, increasingly embraced nationalist causes. The Baltic example demonstrated that challenge to Moscow’s authority was possible, inspiring similar movements across the Soviet Union, including Ukraine.

Chernobyl: Environmental Catastrophe Becomes Political Catalyst

While nationalism initially gained momentum outside Ukraine, a catastrophic event on Ukrainian territory would profoundly impact the independence movement. On April 26, 1986, Reactor Number Four at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, located just 60 miles north of Kyiv, exploded during a safety test. The accident released approximately 120 million curies of radioactivity into the atmosphere—about 100 times the radiation of the atomic bombs dropped on Japan. The immediate death toll included two workers in the initial explosion and more than twenty firefighters and plant personnel in the subsequent week. Ultimately, an estimated 6,000-8,000 people would die from radiation exposure, with thousands more developing cancers and birth defects.

The Soviet response transformed an environmental disaster into a political crisis. Authorities failed to evacuate nearby populations promptly, allowed May Day celebrations to proceed in Kyiv despite elevated radiation levels, and delayed issuing public warnings for days—only doing so after Swedish authorities detected radiation clouds and demanded explanations. Ukrainian Communist Party leader Volodymyr Shcherbytsky consulted with Gorbachev about canceling Kyiv’s celebrations but was reportedly threatened with expulsion from the party if he did so. Senior party officials secretly evacuated their own families while publicly downplaying the danger.

Chernobyl exposed the fatal flaws of the Soviet system: secrecy, incompetence, and disregard for human welfare. The disaster inspired environmental activism, galvanized journalists to push glasnost further, and reinforced nationalist arguments that Ukraine suffered under colonial exploitation. As physician Yurii Shcherbak, who later became Ukraine’s ambassador to the United States, remarked: “Chernobyl was not like the communist system. They were one and the same.” The catastrophe became a powerful symbol of Soviet failure and a rallying point for those seeking change.

The Cultural Awakening: Writers, Intellectuals and National Rebirth

The first organized expressions of Ukrainian nationalism emerged from cultural circles in the aftermath of Chernobyl. At the June 1986 Congress of the Ukrainian Writers’ Union, delegates discussed national rights and implicitly criticized authorities, particularly Shcherbytsky. Senior writer Oles Honchar endorsed Gorbachev’s reform agenda while emphasizing the importance of preserving Ukrainian language and culture. Poet and Communist Party member Ivan Drach connected Chernobyl to other historical traumas: the Holodomor (the man-made famine of 1932-1933), the suppression of Ukrainian language education and publishing, and the dominance of Russian in public life.

Drach’s speech, which would have earned him imprisonment during the Brezhnev era, signaled a new boldness among Ukrainian intellectuals. This cultural renaissance found organizational expression in informal groups operating outside Communist Party control. The Ukrainian Helsinki Union, established in March 1988, positioned itself as heir to 1970s human rights activists. Its first chairman, Levko Lukianenko, had spent 26 years as a political prisoner. Though many members desired independence, the group initially focused on human rights, democratization, and protection of the Ukrainian language to avoid appearing too radical.

Students established their own organizations, including the Lion Society in Lviv (1987) and the Hromada student group in Kyiv. These groups engaged in cultural activities like restoring churches and cemeteries, teaching traditional crafts, and organizing concerts while also pushing political boundaries through samizdat (self-published) journals and protests. Religious groups also embraced nationalist causes, particularly around the millennium of Kyiv Rus’ conversion to Christianity, which Moscow framed as a Russian rather than Ukrainian celebration. In Western Ukraine, the banned Greek Catholic Church campaigned for legalization, while the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church experienced a revival.

From Cultural Movement to Political Force: Rukh and Popular Mobilization

By 1988, activists sought to emulate Baltic successes by creating a broad popular front movement. The Ukrainian Movement for Perestroika—known as Rukh (meaning “movement”)—drafted its founding program in February 1989. Though officially presented as supporting Gorbachev’s reforms, Rukh advocated for redefining Ukraine’s relationship with Moscow and transforming Ukraine into a sovereign republic. While not explicitly calling for immediate independence, Rukh demanded Ukrainian control over resources and enterprises and the right of Ukrainians to determine their own destiny. The movement announced it would participate in elections and field its own candidates, directly challenging Communist Party monopoly on power.

Rukh demonstrated its growing influence during March 1989 elections to the Congress of People’s Deputies. Though the Communist Party manipulated the process, several Rukh candidates won seats in Kyiv and Western Ukraine. Some Communist officials failed to receive the required 50% of votes as voters crossed their names off ballots. The elections revealed declining party authority and growing public support for alternatives.

In September 1989, Rukh held its founding congress in Kyiv with over 1,100 delegates representing 280,000 members. The gathering featured Ukrainian national symbols and folk music, creating a festival-like atmosphere. While some speakers called for outright independence, most focused on cultural revival, political and economic sovereignty, and transforming the Soviet Union into a confederation. The congress revealed regional divisions within the movement: 50% of delegates came from Western Ukraine, with only 2.5% representing collective farm workers. A delegate from Kharkiv resigned in protest against what he considered extremist agendas, highlighting the challenge of building a nationwide movement.

Regional Divisions: The West-East Divide in Ukrainian Politics

The Ukrainian national movement exhibited distinct regional characteristics that would shape the path to independence and continue to influence post-Soviet Ukrainian politics. Western Ukraine, particularly historical Galicia and Volhynia, had been incorporated into the Soviet Union only in 1939 as part of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact with Nazi Germany. Unlike territories that had been part of the Russian Empire, Western Ukraine had developed separate political traditions with a predominantly Ukrainian population and strong influence from the Greek Catholic Church. Western Ukrainians tended to view Soviet rule as foreign occupation and maintained armed resistance into the 1950s.

Eastern and Southern Ukraine, in contrast, had longer histories within the Russian Empire and Soviet Union. These regions featured larger Russian populations, higher levels of Russification, and economies centered on heavy industry with close ties to other Soviet republics. While Western Ukraine embraced nationalism enthusiastically, Eastern regions responded more to economic concerns. This division led scholar Andrew Wilson to characterize Ukrainian nationalism as a “minority faith” during the late Soviet period, with independence enjoying limited support outside Western Ukraine until 1991.

The regional divide manifested clearly in political mobilization. Rukh found strong support in Western cities like Lviv but struggled to gain traction in Eastern industrial centers. This geographical limitation initially constrained the movement’s national influence and made achieving broad consensus on independence challenging.

Economic Grievances: The Unlikely Engine of Separation

While cultural nationalism animated Western Ukraine, economic concerns drove discontent in Eastern industrial regions. In July 1989, a wave of miners’ strikes swept through the Donbas region spanning Eastern Ukraine and Russia. Workers demanded higher wages, better conditions, and improved availability of consumer goods—particularly soap. These strikes resulted from economic decline following perestroika’s disruptions, and participants generally identified as supporters of Gorbachev’s reforms rather than nationalists.

The strikes revealed crumbling confidence in the Soviet system. Workers organized independent committees to challenge the state that claimed to represent their interests. When Moscow conceded to their demands—including granting mines greater autonomy—workers returned to work, but the precedent of successful collective action against authorities had been established. Subsequent strikes in 1990 would take on more political character, with some participants calling for Ukrainian sovereignty.

Economic issues gradually became what historian Roman Szporluk termed an “engine of independence.” Critics argued that Moscow’s control over the Ukrainian economy disadvantaged the republic. The central government controlled most economic assets, collected taxes, and appropriated hard currency earnings while investing less in Ukrainian infrastructure, culture, and science than in Russia. Environmental problems—polluted air and water in industrial regions—contributed to public health crises including reduced life expectancy and high miscarriage rates. Even Ukrainian Prime Minister Vitold Fokin, a target of nationalist criticism, acknowledged in 1990 that “our only hope and chance to improve the situation is economic independence.”

The Communist Response: Accommodation and Resistance

The Communist Party leadership responded to growing challenges with a mixture of repression and accommodation. Conservative elements around Shcherbytsky attacked Rukh as “essentially separatist,” “destructive,” and “extremist.” Party ideologist Leonid Kravchuk denounced Ukrainian national symbols as “dirty and bloody” and warned that Rukh could be hijacked by anti-Soviet forces. Authorities harassed opposition groups, arrested activists, and limited media access.

Yet within the party, divisions emerged. Gorbachev, recognizing that Shcherbytsky’s conservatism hindered reform, engineered his removal in September 1989. His replacement, Volodymyr Ivashko, represented a more flexible approach but struggled to consolidate authority. The party split between reformers and conservatives, removing a significant obstacle to nationalist development. In October 1989, the Supreme Soviet passed a language law elevating Ukrainian to official status while protecting Russian as an important means of communication. Most significantly, some party officials began embracing nationalist themes to maintain political relevance, becoming what historians term “national communists.”

The most prominent national communist was Leonid Kravchuk, who transformed from critic of nationalism to champion of sovereignty. As chairman of the Supreme Soviet, Kravchuk began functioning as de facto head of state. He publicly embraced Ukrainian sovereignty while maintaining ambiguous positions that allowed him to appeal to both reformers and conservatives. In November 1990, he hosted Russian leader Boris Yeltsin in Kyiv and signed a bilateral treaty that essentially bypassed the Soviet government. Kravchuk opposed using force against Lithuanian independence activists and criticized Gorbachev’s plans for a new union treaty.

The Road to Sovereignty: Political Breakthroughs in 1990

The year 1990 proved decisive for the Ukrainian independence movement. Nationalist victories in Baltic elections inspired similar efforts across the Soviet Union. On January 22, 1990—the anniversary of the 1918 declaration of Ukrainian independence—Rukh organized a human chain linking Lviv and Kyiv, echoing a similar Baltic protest from 1989. Approximately 450,000 Ukrainians participated, demonstrating growing support for national causes.

March 1990 elections to the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet represented a critical breakthrough. Opposition groups united in the Democratic Bloc, which called for political and economic sovereignty, a new constitution, democratization, and nuclear disarmament. Though elections remained manipulated, the Democratic Bloc won approximately 25% of seats, capturing overwhelming majorities in Galicia and solid victories in Kyiv. While the Communist Party maintained control, many party deputies recognized the need to accommodate popular demands.

In local elections, the Democratic Bloc won control of regional councils in Western Ukraine. In Lviv, former political dissident Viacheslav Chornovil became council chairman, declaring the region a “free island” determined to “end the totalitarian system” and “fight for the future independent, democratic Ukrainian state.” The Lviv council replaced Soviet symbols with Ukrainian ones, legalized the Greek Catholic Church, registered independent organizations, and closed Communist Party cells in factories and institutions. These actions effectively ended the party’s monopoly on power in Western Ukraine.

On July 16, 1990, the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet passed the Declaration of State Sovereignty by a vote of 355 to 4. The document—passed just weeks after a similar Russian declaration—asserted Ukrainian law’s supremacy over federal law, claimed economic autonomy including the right to issue currency and establish an independent banking system, and asserted the right to maintain separate armed forces. Importantly, it was not an independence declaration but envisioned a reformed Soviet Union through a new union treaty. Both nationalists and communists claimed victory: the former seeing it as a step toward independence, the latter as a step toward renewed federation.

The Final Act: The August Coup and Independence Declaration

By 1991, the Soviet Union teetered on collapse. Baltic republics had declared independence, other republics issued sovereignty declarations, the economy deteriorated, and the country fractured along nationalist lines. Gorbachev proposed a reformed federation to preserve the union. In March 1991, Soviet citizens voted in a referendum on preserving a “renewed federation of equal sovereign republics.” In Ukraine, 70.5% supported maintaining the union, but 80.2% endorsed a additional question inserted by Kravchuk asking whether Ukraine should belong to a union of sovereign states on the principles of the Declaration of State Sovereignty. This ambiguous formulation allowed multiple interpretations.

The final crisis began in Moscow. On August 19, 1991, hardline communists and security officials launched a coup against Gorbachev, detaining him at his Crimean vacation home. The plotters established a State Committee on the State of Emergency and attempted to seize control. In Ukraine, Communist Party leader Stanislav Hurenko supported the coup, but Kravchuk adopted a cautious position, urging calm while avoiding endorsement of either side. When the coup collapsed after three days due to public resistance led by Yeltsin, the Communist Party’s authority evaporated.

On August 24, 1991, just three days after the coup’s failure, the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet voted 346 to 1 to declare independence. Subsequent measures placed all military forces on Ukrainian territory under Kyiv’s control and announced the introduction of a Ukrainian currency. Communist deputies, recognizing their dramatically weakened position, supported these measures. The Communist Party of Ukraine was banned on August 30, though many former communists retained seats in parliament, later forming the Socialist Party. As deputy chairman Volodymyr Hrynov warned during the debate, “I am not against Ukraine’s independence, but I can see the harm we are causing by passing this resolution today… We are creating a totalitarian communist society in Ukraine.” His concerns about incomplete decommunization would prove prescient.

The Final Validation: The December 1991 Referendum

Two crucial questions remained following the independence declaration: Did independence truly enjoy popular support? And on what basis would Ukraine relate to other post-Soviet states? The first question was answered on December 1, 1991, when Ukrainians voted in a referendum on independence and elected their first president.

The results demonstrated overwhelming support for independence across all regions of Ukraine. Overall, 90.3% of voters endorsed independence, with majority support even in traditionally skeptical regions: