A Drunken Diversion and Political Maneuvering

In the waning years of the Qing dynasty, a curious incident unfolded between Ke Fengshi, a high-ranking official, and his subordinate Wang Ruiwei. After a night of apparent drunkenness that caused embarrassment, Wang revealed his actions were a calculated strategy. He explained that the powerful Viceroy Cen Chunxuan sought to dispatch him to suppress bandits, a mission that would remove Wang’s troops from protecting Ke. Were Wang to return without orders to rescue Ke in an emergency, he would face charges of insubordination—a capital offense. By feigning intoxication, Wang preempted this political trap, making himself temporarily unusable for Cen’s plans.

This revelation transformed Ke’s anger into appreciation, exposing the dangerous political games within the Qing bureaucracy. Ke decided to confront Cen Chunxuan, a man known for his reformist ambitions but also his political ruthlessness. Ke submitted a memorial accusing Cen of military misconduct related to the drinking incident. The court, following procedure, demanded Cen provide an explanation. In his response, Cen counterattacked fiercely, ultimately resulting in Ke’s dismissal from office.

Yet this personal clash reflected broader tensions. Unbeknownst to others at the time, Ke’s stand against Cen—though costing him his position—earned him the quiet respect of powerful figures like Prince Qing and Yuan Shikai, who valued loyalty and shrewdness in the treacherous political landscape.

The Geopolitical Chessboard: Foreign Powers Circle China

The personal intrigues of Qing officials played out against a backdrop of escalating foreign imperialism. The late 1890s witnessed what historians would later term the “Scramble for Concessions,” when imperial powers carved spheres of influence throughout China with breathtaking speed.

This process had formal beginnings with the Sino-Russian Secret Treaty of 1896, which established the Chinese Eastern Railway. This 2,800-li railway connecting Chita to Vladivostok via Harbin served Russian interests in linking its eastern territories while penetrating deep into Manchuria. Russia called it the “Middle East Railway,” while Chinese officials referred to it variously as the “Eastern Province Railway” or “Eastern Qing Railway.”

The railway project represented more than mere transportation infrastructure—it symbolized the beginning of systematic foreign economic and political penetration that would characterize this turbulent period.

The German Gambit and Russian Complicity

In 1897, Germany and Russia orchestrated what one might characterize as an elaborate scheme against China. Using the murder of two German missionaries in Shandong’s曹州 Prefecture as pretext, Germany demanded compensation and seized Jiaozhou Bay. Russian diplomats then approached Li Hongzhang, China’s veteran statesman, offering to help recover the territory based on treaty obligations.

This was a carefully coordinated deception. Earlier that year, Kaiser Wilhelm II and Tsar Nicholas II had met and reached understanding about their respective spheres of influence. Li Hongzhang, despite his extensive experience, failed to recognize the trap. He saw Russian intervention as potential salvation rather than coordinated aggression.

Meanwhile, Weng Tonghe, the emperor’s tutor and a leading official, recognized the danger. With assistance from Zhang Yinheng, Weng attempted diplomatic countermeasures. They instructed China’s minister to Russia to politely decline military assistance to avoid straining Russo-German relations, while simultaneously negotiating with Germany to offer alternative compensation for the missionary incident.

The Unraveling: Loss of Territory and Sovereignty

Despite these efforts, Germany refused to compromise in over ten negotiation sessions. Russia, meanwhile, deployed ships to Lushun and Dalian under the pretense of assistance, then demanded China supply their needs. On Li Hongzhang’s insistence, General Song Qing was ordered to provide all necessary supplies to the Russian navy, along with two million silver taels to fortify Lushun’s defenses.

Soon, the “temporary docking” became a formal demand for lease of Lushun and Dalian. Li Hongzhang realized his error but found escape impossible. China had lost both Jiaozhou Bay to Germany and Lushun/Dalian to Russia through what amounted to coordinated imperialist extortion.

This triggered a cascade of further demands. Britain, observing these developments and already considering alliance with Japan, demanded lease of Weihaiwei—still under Japanese occupation—while recognizing Japan’s sphere of influence in Fujian. France demanded Guangzhou Bay, and even Italy attempted to claim Sanmen Bay. The partition of China suddenly appeared imminent.

The Proposed Solution: Open Door and Collective Security

Facing this crisis, the Grand Council convened emergency meetings. Weng Tonghe advocated a radical approach: open all ports to all nations, then establish a “general treaty” whereby foreign powers would agree not to occupy Chinese territory or infringe on Chinese sovereignty, while China would protect foreign commercial interests.

This vision of collective security through multilateral agreement remarkably anticipated the “Open Door Policy” that American Secretary of State John Hay would propose just months later. Weng’s approach represented perhaps the last best chance for China to maintain territorial integrity through diplomatic means.

Tragically, his colleagues remained silent. Historical evidence suggests that even Zhang Yinheng, Weng’s trusted assistant, had allegedly accepted Russian bribes along with Li Hongzhang—promised 500,000 silver taels each for facilitating the Russian lease of Lushun and Dalian.

The Aftermath: Formalized Humiliation and National Trauma

In the spring of 1898, the concessions became formalized through unequal treaties. On February 4, Li Hongzhang and Weng Tonghe signed the Jiaozhou Bay Convention with German minister Edmund Heyking, granting Germany a 99-year lease with rights to build the Shandong Railway and mine resources within 30 li on either side.

On March 6, Li Hongzhang and Zhang Yinheng signed the Lushun and Dalian Convention with Russian acting minister Alexander Pavlov, leasing the territories for 25 years and granting Russia rights to build the South Manchuria Railway.

The next day, Kaiser Wilhelm II cabled congratulations to Tsar Nicholas II on acquiring Lushun and Dalian. Meanwhile, Prince Gong, a respected senior statesman who had long advocated cautious modernization, saw his health deteriorate rapidly following these humiliations—symbolizing the decline of the Qing court itself.

Cultural and Social Impacts: National Consciousness Awakens

The concession crisis profoundly impacted Chinese society and intellectual development. The blatant territorial losses generated widespread anger and humiliation among officials, scholars, and eventually the general populace.

This period catalyzed the development of modern Chinese nationalism. The term “gua fen” entered political discourse as a metaphor for imperialist partition. Cartographers produced maps showing China divided into colored segments representing foreign spheres of influence—powerful visual propaganda that fueled reform and revolutionary movements.

The crisis also discredited conservative officials while strengthening reformist and revolutionary factions. The Hundred Days’ Reform later in 1898 drew directly from the sense of emergency created by the concession crisis. Even when those reforms failed, they established intellectual groundwork for the eventual revolution of 1911.

Legacy and Modern Relevance

The events of 1897-1898 established patterns that would influence Chinese foreign policy for generations. The trauma of the “Scramble for Concessions” created a lasting Chinese sensitivity toward territorial integrity and sovereignty that remains powerful today.

The failed diplomacy of this period also demonstrated the limitations of China’s traditional tributary system when confronting modern imperialist powers. This realization would eventually drive comprehensive reforms in China’s foreign affairs apparatus and military modernization efforts.

Historians debate whether alternative approaches might have yielded better results. Weng Tonghe’s proposed multilateral solution, though rejected by his contemporaries, arguably represented a more sophisticated understanding of international relations than Li Hongzhang’s bilateral approach. The American Open Door Policy that followed similar principles did temporarily slow the partition of China, suggesting Weng’s vision had merit.

The personal stories intertwined with these geopolitical events—the calculated deception of Wang Ruiwei, the political maneuvering between Ke Fengshi and Cen Chunxuan, the alleged corruption of Li Hongzhang and Zhang Yinheng—reveal how individual actions shaped national destiny during this critical juncture.

Ultimately, the concession crisis marked China’s definitive entry into the modern international system, albeit on unequal terms. The lessons learned from this humiliation would fuel China’s century-long quest for wealth and power, establishing patterns of engagement with the outside world that continue to evolve today.