A Nation at a Crossroads

In the late 1880s, Japan stood at a critical juncture in its modernization journey. Having emerged from centuries of isolation, the Meiji government faced the daunting task of revising the unequal treaties imposed by Western powers decades earlier. These treaties, signed under duress in the 1850s and 1860s, had granted foreign nations extraterritorial rights and limited Japan’s control over its own tariffs, representing a humiliating infringement on national sovereignty. The quest for treaty revision became not just a diplomatic imperative but a symbol of Japan’s transformation into a modern, equal member of the international community.

Prime Minister Itō Hirobumi, having recently returned from his constitutional study mission in Europe, understood that Japan’s legal and political systems needed fundamental reform before Western nations would consider renegotiating these lopsided agreements. His government faced pressure from both international powers demanding modernization and domestic factions pushing for rapid change. The stage was set for a complex political drama that would test the leadership of Japan’s emerging constitutional government.

The Collapse of Inoue’s Treaty Initiative

The treaty revision effort initially fell to Itō’s close associate, Inoue Kaoru, who served as Foreign Minister. Inoue developed a comprehensive plan that involved creating Western-style legal codes and judicial systems to demonstrate Japan’s readiness for equal status. However, his proposal encountered fierce opposition over its provision allowing foreign judges to serve in Japanese courts—a concession many saw as continuing rather than ending foreign interference in Japan’s legal affairs.

Facing mounting criticism from both political opponents and public opinion, Inoue found his position increasingly untenable. The foreign judges provision proved particularly controversial, with critics arguing it violated Japan’s judicial sovereignty just as much as the original extraterritoriality clauses. By September 1887, the political pressure had become unbearable, forcing Inoue to resign from his post as Foreign Minister, leaving the treaty revision process in disarray and creating a leadership vacuum at a critical moment in Japan’s diplomatic efforts.

Itō’s Dual Challenge

With Inoue’s resignation, Prime Minister Itō assumed the additional role of Foreign Minister on September 17, 1887. This dual responsibility came at an extraordinarily demanding time, as Itō was simultaneously leading the monumental task of drafting Japan’s first modern constitution. The Meiji leadership recognized that creating a constitutional government would demonstrate Japan’s political maturity to Western powers, thereby strengthening their position in treaty negotiations.

Itō’s European studies had exposed him to various constitutional models and political philosophies. He understood that Japan needed to balance Western institutional forms with traditional values to create a stable system acceptable to both progressive and conservative elements within Japanese society. His approach to both constitution-making and treaty revision reflected this pragmatic balancing act—seeking modernization while preserving national identity and sovereignty.

The Rise of Popular Opposition

In October 1887, various opposition forces coalesced into what became known as the Great Unity Movement . This broad coalition brought together diverse groups united by their dissatisfaction with the government’s approach to treaty revision and other issues. The movement articulated three principal demands: reduction of land taxes, freedom of speech and assembly, and reform of foreign policy—specifically opposing treaty revisions that they perceived as unfavorable to Japan.

By December, representatives from across the nation descended upon Tokyo, bearing petitions that incorporated these three demands. This gathering represented one of the first significant popular political movements in modern Japan, demonstrating growing public engagement with national policy issues. The movement’s ability to organize across regional lines indicated the emergence of a national political consciousness beyond the elite circles of government.

The State Strikes Back

Faced with growing popular mobilization, the Itō government responded with decisive force. On December 25, 1887, under the direction of Home Minister Yamagata Aritomo, the cabinet promulgated and immediately implemented the Peace Preservation Ordinance. This emergency legislation granted authorities sweeping powers to maintain public order, including the ability to remove “undesirable” persons from Tokyo.

Police and military police units were deployed to suppress the Great Unity Movement, forcibly dispersing gatherings and expelling activists from the capital. This heavy-handed response demonstrated the government’s determination to maintain control and its willingness to use state power against political opposition. The crackdown temporarily suppressed open dissent but also deepened political divisions and created lingering resentment against the ruling elite.

An Unexpected Alliance

Just two days after suppressing the popular movement, on December 27, Itō embarked on a surprising political maneuver. He approached Ōkuma Shigenobu, the de facto leader of the Progressive Party , accompanied by Kuroda Kiyotaka, a leading figure from the Satsuma faction. Between this meeting and mid-January 1888, the three men engaged in several rounds of discussion.

Itō proposed that Ōkuma join the cabinet, revealing his intention to eventually transfer power to Kuroda. This overture to a political opponent represented a significant strategic shift. Itō’s European studies had convinced him that democratic movements were inevitable in modernizing societies and that continued suppression would prove counterproductive. By co-opting Ōkuma and his Progressive Party, Itō hoped to divide the opposition while gaining a capable leader to restart stalled treaty negotiations.

Political Resistance and Determination

Itō’s approach encountered immediate resistance from within government circles. Home Minister Yamagata, who learned of the negotiations only on January 25, 1888, voiced strong objections to bringing Ōkuma into the government. Yamagata distrusted political parties and preferred maintaining exclusive control through the domain-based clique system.

Despite these objections, Itō proceeded with his plan, demonstrating his growing authority within the Meiji leadership. His determination reflected both practical considerations—Ōkuma’s recognized ability in foreign affairs—and philosophical convictions about the need to accommodate political opposition within the constitutional system he was creating.

A New Government Takes Shape

On February 1, 1888, Ōkuma Shigenobu formally joined the Itō cabinet as Foreign Minister, marking a significant political realignment. Just three months later, on April 30, Itō resigned as Prime Minister, transferring power to Kuroda Kiyotaka as planned. The cabinet remained largely unchanged otherwise, providing continuity during this political transition.

Itō assumed the presidency of the Privy Council, where he could focus exclusively on reviewing the draft constitution and other fundamental laws, including the Imperial Household Law. This move placed Japan’s foundational legal documents under his direct supervision while freeing him from day-to-day governance responsibilities. The treaty revision effort now rested primarily with Ōkuma, who brought fresh energy and ideas to the challenging diplomatic task.

Crafting a New Approach

Foreign Minister Ōkuma began developing his treaty revision proposal, building upon earlier work by Itō and Inoue while incorporating his own perspectives. His approach involved extensive consultation with key figures including Itō, Inoue, and Prime Minister Kuroda. By autumn 1888, the Ōkuma Draft had taken shape, representing Japan’s most comprehensive effort yet to achieve equal treaty status.

The proposal contained several key elements: Japan would complete its legal codes to enable both increased tariff autonomy and abolition of extraterritoriality; foreign judges would be employed in the Great Court of Cassation when foreigners were defendants; and various commercial provisions would be updated to reflect Japan’s economic development. On November 26, 1888, Ōkuma personally presented this proposal to the German charge d’affaires, beginning negotiations with what Japan considered the most amenable Western power.

Early Diplomatic Successes

The Ōkuma approach yielded rapid results. In 1889, the Kuroda cabinet successfully signed revised commercial navigation treaties with the United States on February 20 and with Germany on June 11. These agreements represented significant breakthroughs, marking the first concrete progress toward ending the unequal treaty system that had constrained Japan’s sovereignty for decades.

To encourage other powers to sign similar agreements, Ōkuma developed a strategy of differential treatment. Nations that signed revised treaties would gain access to Japan’s interior for trade and residence, while those maintaining old treaties would be restricted to designated foreign settlements. Additionally, Japan offered to delay implementation of higher new tariffs until all nations had abandoned the old system, creating economic incentives for holdouts to agree to revised terms.

The Foreign Judge Controversy Erupts

Despite these diplomatic achievements, the Ōkuma Draft soon faced intense criticism, particularly regarding its provision for foreign judges in Japan’s highest court. The controversy began on June 6, 1889, when Inoue Kowashi, director of the Legislative Bureau, raised constitutional objections. He argued that employing foreign judges violated the Meiji Constitution’s requirement that government officials be Japanese citizens.

This constitutional challenge gained traction when Justice Minister Yamada Akiyoshi identified additional problems with the proposal. On July 19, at a cabinet meeting, Yamada suggested enacting a Naturalization Law that would require foreign judges to obtain Japanese citizenship before serving on the bench. This solution attracted support from influential figures including Itō , Inoue Kaoru, and imperial advisor Motoda Nagazane.

A Divided Government Response

The growing controversy forced a reconsideration of the treaty approach. On August 2, 1889, the cabinet convened to address the constitutional issues raised by the foreign judge provisions. Itō attended this meeting in his capacity as a minister without portfolio, where he urged postponement or cancellation of the treaty implementation.

The cabinet reached a compromise solution: consider abolishing existing treaties with nations that refused to sign new agreements within six months of their implementation.

Ōkuma’s Determined Stand

Foreign Minister Ōkuma accepted the Naturalization Law solution but refused to delay treaty negotiations. With Prime Minister Kuroda’s support, he maintained his aggressive approach toward achieving treaty revision. Ōkuma believed that demonstrating resolve, including threatening to abrogate existing treaties with reluctant powers, would ultimately prove more effective than cautious diplomacy.

This position created tension within the government, particularly with Itō and other leaders who had initially supported Ōkuma’s approach but now favored greater caution. The disagreement reflected deeper divisions about how aggressively Japan should pursue treaty revision and what concessions represented acceptable compromises in this delicate diplomatic process.

Broader Implications and Criticism

The cabinet discussions revealed broader concerns about the treaty approach. Participants raised numerous questions: Would the United States and Germany accept the modified terms requiring naturalization of foreign judges? How would other Western powers respond to Japan’s more assertive stance? Was the government risking international isolation by threatening treaty abrogation?

These concerns reflected anxiety about Japan’s position in the international system and uncertainty about how Western nations would respond to Japanese assertiveness. The debate also revealed tension between legal principles .

The Legacy of the Treaty Revision Struggle

The tumultuous events of 1887-1889 represented a critical phase in Japan’s emergence as a modern nation. The treaty revision effort, though ultimately unsuccessful in immediate terms, established important precedents for Japanese diplomacy and constitutional government. The controversy over foreign judges demonstrated growing commitment to constitutional principles, even when they complicated foreign policy objectives.

The political maneuvering—from suppression of popular movements to co-option of opposition figures—revealed the complex dynamics of Meiji politics. Itō’s pragmatic approach to political opposition, influenced by his European studies, represented an early attempt to manage political conflict within emerging constitutional structures rather than through simple suppression.

Most importantly, this period established treaty revision as Japan’s primary foreign policy objective, one that would eventually be achieved in 1894 through more careful diplomacy. The failed efforts of the late 1880s provided valuable lessons about the balance between national sovereignty and international engagement that would guide Japanese diplomacy for decades to come.

The story of Japan’s treaty revision struggle remains relevant today as nations continue to navigate the tension between international integration and domestic sovereignty. Japan’s experience demonstrates both the challenges of unequal international relationships and the complex process of establishing equal status in the global community—a process requiring not just diplomatic skill but also internal development and political consensus-building.