The Precarious Political Landscape of Meiji Japan

In the summer of 1892, Japan stood at a critical juncture in its rapid modernization. The Meiji Restoration had transformed the feudal society into a constitutional monarchy just five years earlier, but the political system remained fragile. The Matsukata Masayoshi cabinet found itself collapsing under the weight of electoral interference scandals and factional disputes that threatened to undermine Japan’s nascent constitutional government. Against this backdrop, Itō Hirobumi emerged as the obvious successor to lead the nation forward. As one of the principal architects of the Meiji Constitution, Itō possessed both the vision and political stature necessary to navigate these turbulent waters. However, the path to forming a stable government would prove remarkably challenging even for this seasoned statesman.

The political climate was characterized by intense rivalry between the dominant Satsuma and Chōshū factions that had dominated Japanese politics since the Restoration. These domain-based cliques, known as hambatsu, maintained complex networks of loyalty and competition that often hindered cohesive governance. Itō himself represented the Chōshū faction, while his predecessor Matsukata came from Satsuma. The recent election interference scandal involving Home Minister Shinagawa had further poisoned relations between these powerful groups, creating an atmosphere of mutual suspicion that threatened to paralyze the government entirely.

The Delicate Art of Cabinet Formation

Itō’s approach to forming his second cabinet demonstrated both his political acumen and the constraints of Meiji-era politics. Recognizing the need for a government that could command respect across factional lines, he embarked on what would become an exhaustive two-month negotiation process. Through his trusted aides—Privy Councillor Itō Miyoji and son-in-law Suematsu Kenchō, a member of the House of Representatives—Itō maintained backchannel communications with various power brokers while publicly projecting an image of statesmanlike detachment.

The core challenge lay in convincing the genrō, or elder statesmen, to set aside their differences and serve together. These men, who had played crucial roles in the Meiji Restoration and subsequent reforms, held enormous influence but often prioritized factional interests over national unity. Yamagata Aritomo, another Chōshū leader and Itō’s sometimes rival, initially refused to join the cabinet despite recognizing the necessity of genrō participation. His hesitation reflected the widespread concern among senior statesmen that joining the government might damage their political capital without guaranteeing success.

Itō’s correspondence during this period reveals a leader deeply concerned about the future of constitutional government in Japan. In a letter to Inoue Kaoru dated July 31, 1892, Itō expressed fears that continued factionalism would lead to the collapse of the hambatsu government within two to three years. He observed that political leaders were too focused on defending their “small castles” through mutual suspicion, leaving the government unable to address either external diplomatic challenges or internal unity. This frank assessment underscored the urgency Itō felt in creating a united front among the ruling elite.

Breaking the Political Deadlock

The resignation of War Minister Takashima and Navy Minister Kabayama on July 30 provided the final push needed to break the political impasse. As fellow Satsuma men, their departure from the Matsukata cabinet signaled deepening dissatisfaction within the ruling coalition and made Matsukata’s position untenable. With the prime minister submitting his resignation once more, Emperor Meiji formally commanded Itō to form a new government on August 1.

What followed was a week of intense negotiations that tested Itō’s diplomatic skills to their limits. Yamagata eventually relented to joining the cabinet after delicate mediation by Inoue Kaoru, though he insisted on serving only temporarily. Other genrō proved more amenable: Kuroda Kiyotaka and Ōyama Iwao of Satsuma agreed to participate, creating the cross-factional unity Itō had sought. The only prominent genrō who remained outside the government were former Prime Minister Matsukata and Saigō Tsugumichi, both of Satsuma.

Itō’s cabinet appointments reflected a careful balancing act between factional representation and administrative competence. He awarded key positions to trusted allies while ensuring both major factions received significant representation. Inoue Kaoru received the powerful Home Ministry portfolio in recognition of his crucial role in the cabinet formation process, effectively making him deputy prime minister. The Foreign Ministry went to Mutsu Munemitsu, whose political connections with the Liberal Party and expertise in treaty revision made him ideal for handling Japan’s delicate international position.

The “Elder Statesmen Cabinet” Takes Shape

On August 8, 1892, the Second Itō Cabinet was officially formed with an impressive roster of political heavyweights. The cabinet included Yamagata Aritomo as Justice Minister, Inoue Kaoru as Home Minister, Kuroda Kiyotaka as Communications Minister, and Ōyama Iwao returning as War Minister. This collection of genrō earned the government its nickname of “elder statesmen cabinet,” representing an unprecedented concentration of political experience and prestige.

Beyond the formal cabinet appointments, Itō ensured that his trusted advisors occupied crucial positions behind the scenes. Itō Miyoji became cabinet secretary, while Suematsu Kenchō assumed the role of legislation bureau director. These placements acknowledged their contributions during the formation process while ensuring Itō would have loyalists in key administrative positions. Perhaps most telling was Itō’s handling of Inoue Kowashi, his most talented legal draftsman. Despite being offered the justice portfolio in the previous cabinet, Inoue had declined citing health reasons and philosophical differences with other ministers. Itō, understanding both his value and reservations, allowed him to remain as privy councillor and chief cabinet secretary for education rather than forcing him into a cabinet position.

The correspondence between Itō and Inoue Kowashi reveals the personal dimension of these political calculations. On August 2, Inoue had written to Itō sympathizing that he was “finally having to accept the negative debt of the Meiji government” and would “surely find it troublesome.” Itō’s response on August 8 acknowledged the “extreme confusion” since Matsukata’s resignation but expressed resignation that he had drawn the “unpopular short straw” once again. This exchange illustrates the personal bonds that undergirded the formal political structures of Meiji Japan.

Political Strategy and Party Relations

Itō’s inclusion of politicians with connections to the Liberal Party represented a significant evolution in his approach to governance. By appointing Mutsu as foreign minister and Gotō Shōjirō—a former popular rights activist with influence over the Liberal Party—as agriculture and commerce minister, Itō signaled his recognition that the elected Diet could not be ignored despite its limited powers under the Meiji Constitution.

The response from the political parties proved cautiously optimistic. The Liberal Party, as the largest opposition group, recognized the vulnerability of the hambatsu forces after the election scandals but adopted a wait-and-see approach. Party leader Itagaki Taisuke and influential figure Hoshi Tōru indicated willingness to cooperate with the government if sufficient concessions were offered. Hoshi in particular had become convinced of the virtues of British-style party government during his extended overseas study, returning to Japan in 1889 with renewed determination to move Japanese politics toward a more parliamentary system.

The Improved Party, the other major opposition group, watched these developments with interest but maintained a more skeptical stance toward the hambatsu-dominated government. Their response would be crucial in determining whether Itō could secure stable parliamentary support for his ambitious agenda of constitutional development and treaty revision.

Governing Challenges and Constitutional Development

The Second Itō Cabinet faced immediate challenges on multiple fronts. Externally, the pressing issue of treaty revision remained unresolved, with Western powers still enjoying extraterritorial privileges that undermined Japanese sovereignty. Internally, the government needed to establish productive relations with the Diet while maintaining hambatsu unity against growing public demands for more representative government.

Itō’s vision focused on strengthening Japan’s constitutional order through practical governance rather than theoretical perfection. His inclusion of genrō across factional lines represented an attempt to create a government capable of making difficult decisions that would shape Japan’s future development. The cabinet’s composition signaled that Itō viewed this as a critical transitional government that would need to balance conservative stability with necessary reforms.

The emphasis on legal expertise—through appointments like Mutsu at foreign affairs and the continued involvement of Inoue Kowashi in legislation drafting—reflected Itō’s belief that Japan’s modernization required sophisticated legal frameworks capable of meeting international standards while serving domestic needs. This focus on law and administration rather than purely political considerations distinguished Itō’s approach from that of many contemporaries.

Historical Significance and Lasting Legacy

The formation of the Second Itō Cabinet represents a pivotal moment in Japan’s political development. It demonstrated both the possibilities and limitations of genrō-led governance during the Meiji period. The successful creation of a cross-factional cabinet showed that cooperation between Satsuma and Chōshū was possible when faced with existential threats to their collective rule. However, the difficulty of the formation process and the conditional nature of Yamagata’s participation revealed the fragility of this unity.

Historians have debated whether the “elder statesmen cabinet” represented the peak of genrō influence or the beginning of its decline. The very need to assemble such a concentration of senior figures suggests that normal political processes were insufficient to address the challenges facing Japan. At the same time, the cabinet’s inclusion of officials with party connections acknowledged the growing importance of the Diet and political organizations outside the hambatsu system.

The cabinet’s handling of treaty revision and relations with the political parties would set important precedents for subsequent governments. Itō’s pragmatic approach to working with opposition parties, however limited, established patterns that would eventually lead to the emergence of party cabinets in the Taishō period. The administrative reforms and legal developments undertaken during this period would shape Japanese governance for decades to come.

In the broader context of Meiji Japan’s transformation, the Second Itō Cabinet represents a crucial intermediate stage between the authoritarian early Meiji governments and the more representative systems that would follow. Itō’s attempt to balance hambatsu interests with modern governance requirements reflected the complex transition Japan was undergoing as it sought to establish itself as a modern nation-state while preserving stability and continuity. The successes and failures of this government would influence Japanese politics long after the cabinet itself had passed into history.