A Prestigious Vacancy in Frankfurt

In the early 1960s, the University of Frankfurt faced a momentous academic transition. Max Horkheimer, one of the founding figures of the influential Frankfurt School of critical theory, was preparing to retire from his prestigious chair in sociology and philosophy. His departure would leave not merely an empty office but a profound intellectual void at the heart of one of Europe’s most important centers of social thought. The university administration, recognizing the significance of this transition, established a special appointment committee in 1961 to oversee the selection of Horkheimer’s successor.

This was no ordinary academic appointment. The Frankfurt School had emerged as a beacon of intellectual resistance during the Nazi era, with many of its key figures—including Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno—having spent the war years in American exile. Their return to Germany represented not just a personal homecoming but a symbolic rebuilding of German intellectual life after the devastation of National Socialism. The successor to Horkheimer would need to embody both the philosophical depth and sociological rigor that had made the Frankfurt School internationally renowned, while also navigating the complex political landscape of postwar Germany.

The appointment committee reflected the interdisciplinary nature of the position itself. Alongside Horkheimer and Adorno, it included philosopher Bruno Liebrucks, theologian Johannes Hirschberg, educator Martin Rang, and linguist Alfred Rammelmeyer. This diverse composition signaled the recognition that the new professor would need to bridge multiple disciplines while maintaining the distinctive critical tradition that had made Frankfurt unique.

The Search for a Worthy Successor

The committee faced immediate challenges in their search. Finding a candidate with equal expertise in both sociology and philosophy—the dual qualifications essential for continuing the Frankfurt tradition—proved exceptionally difficult. The pool of scholars who could genuinely bridge these disciplines while meeting the exacting standards of the Frankfurt School was remarkably small in early 1960s Germany.

Frustrated by the slow progress and under pressure from the department chair, the committee devised an innovative solution: they would create two separate candidate lists. One list would feature philosophers who might develop the necessary sociological expertise, while the other would focus on those rare individuals who already possessed both qualifications. This pragmatic approach reflected the tension between ideal qualifications and practical realities in academic appointments.

It was during this search that Adorno reached out to a young scholar who would ultimately transform the process: Jürgen Habermas. Though not initially on either list, Habermas’s name emerged as Adorno sought recommendations for suitable candidates. In a revealing letter dated May 8, 1963, Habermas responded to Adorno’s inquiry with characteristic intellectual honesty and political awareness. He suggested several names while offering candid assessments of their strengths and limitations, demonstrating both his extensive knowledge of the German academic landscape and his sharp political sensibilities.

Habermas mentioned jurist von Kempski as a potential first choice, followed by Hermann Lübbe, whom he described as possessing considerable philosophical ability despite what Habermas tactfully characterized as “political influences from Gehlen and Carl Schmitt”—a significant consideration in postwar Germany where intellectual associations with certain conservative thinkers carried particular weight. He also noted with regret that his friend Karl-Otto Apel had recently accepted a position at the University of Kiel, removing another potential candidate from consideration.

The Emergence of a Controversial Candidate

As the committee deliberations continued through multiple meetings, the candidate lists gradually took shape. The dual-qualification list contained only two names: Hermann Lübbe and Jürgen Habermas. The philosophy-only list featured three less prominent figures: Eugen Fink, Gerhart Schmidt, and Joachim Kopper. Committee records also noted a suggestion to consider Karl Heinz Haag, Horkheimer’s former assistant and a lecturer at Frankfurt, though this recommendation gained little traction.

During the decisive departmental meetings, Adorno and Horkheimer found themselves at odds with philosopher Bruno Liebrucks regarding the preferred candidate. Both founding figures of the Frankfurt School threw their considerable influence behind Habermas, whom they viewed as uniquely qualified to continue their intellectual project. Adorno praised Habermas as the ideal candidate to unite “theoretical sociology and philosophy,” while Horkheimer described him as the only “figure of reputation” among the philosophical candidates.

Their advocacy went beyond mere endorsement. Adorno and Horkheimer actively worked to secure support for Habermas, emphasizing his dual expertise and growing international reputation. They addressed concerns about Habermas’s reluctance to assume directorship of the Institute for Social Research by proposing the immediate appointment of an additional sociology professor who could handle administrative responsibilities. This strategic compromise helped alleviate worries about dividing the substantial responsibilities that came with the position.

The committee’s decision-making process reached its climax when linguist Alfred Rammelmeyer proposed listing Habermas as the sole candidate , a unusual departure from the standard practice of providing three ranked candidates. This proposal passed with two abstentions, reflecting both the strength of support for Habermas and the lingering reservations among some committee members. In July 1963, the philosophy department submitted to the ministry a single-name list—a bold move that demonstrated their conviction that Habermas was uniquely qualified for the position.

Negotiating an Academic Appointment

The department’s urgency became evident in their July 26, 1963 letter to the Hessian Minister of Culture. The department chair emphasized the exceptional nature of the situation, arguing that Habermas was “without equal” and that the appointment was “extremely urgent” because the Free University of Berlin was “vigorously pursuing Mr. Habermas.” This sense of competitive pressure reflected Habermas’s growing reputation as one of Germany’s most promising young intellectuals.

Horkheimer had already signaled his personal investment in Habermas’s appointment months earlier. In a February 26, 1963 letter to Habermas himself, Horkheimer had written that only “if Adorno’s and my wishes—you know our wishes—cannot be fulfilled” should Habermas consider the Berlin offer. This personal appeal from one of Germany’s most esteemed philosophers demonstrated the depth of commitment to bringing Habermas to Frankfurt.

The negotiation process between Habermas and the Hessian Ministry of Culture proved complex. Habermas drove a hard bargain, securing commitments for special allowances, teaching supplements, and adequate staffing for the professorship. These negotiations reflected not merely personal ambition but Habermas’s understanding of the resources necessary to maintain Frankfurt’s intellectual tradition. He formally accepted the appointment in January 1964 and began teaching in the philosophy department during the summer semester of that year.

In his communications with Horkheimer, Habermas displayed appropriate deference to his predecessor while acknowledging the significance of the transition. He described succeeding Horkheimer as “a great honor” and “a powerful motivation” to work in Horkheimer’s spirit—a gracious acknowledgment of the intellectual legacy he was inheriting.

Establishing a New Intellectual Direction

Habermas’s arrival in Frankfurt marked more than a simple changing of the guard. It represented a generational shift in German critical theory and the beginning of what would become known as the second generation of the Frankfurt School. His September 29, 1964 letter to Helene von Bila, an administrative counselor in the Hessian Ministry of Culture, revealed his ambitious vision for Frankfurt’s future and his understanding of the institutional requirements necessary to achieve it.

Habermas pointedly noted that since Horkheimer and Adorno’s return from exile, Frankfurt sociology had developed into “the representative of postwar German sociology, highly respected internationally.” Yet despite this prestige, the school could not “adequately staff itself through self-sufficiency,” a situation that violated academic norms and required urgent addressing. Habermas used his leverage as a newly appointed professor to argue for additional resources, including a new chair in the philosophy department.

His letter contained a revealing political dimension as well. Habermas framed the resource question as “a test case” to determine whether organizational decisions about Frankfurt’s sociological staffing would “serve objective needs completely or might possibly discriminate against certain teachers’ opinions.” This statement reflected Habermas’s awareness of the political dimensions of academic appointments and his commitment to ensuring that Frankfurt remained a place where diverse intellectual traditions could flourish.

The Evolving Frankfurt Tradition

Habermas’s early years in Frankfurt would see him develop his distinctive approach to critical theory, moving beyond the more pessimistic analysis of Horkheimer and Adorno toward what would become his theory of communicative action. His 1965 letter to Ludwig von Friedeburg, then a sociology professor at the Free University of Berlin who had received an appointment offer from Frankfurt, provides insight into how Habermas envisioned his role within the institution.

What emerges from these early communications is the picture of a scholar who respected the Frankfurt tradition while recognizing the need for its evolution. Habermas understood that maintaining Frankfurt’s intellectual prominence required not merely preserving existing approaches but adapting them to new social and political realities. His negotiations for resources reflected his understanding that intellectual innovation requires institutional support—a practical recognition that often eludes purely theoretical thinkers.

The appointment process itself revealed much about the state of German academia in the early 1960s. The careful political calculations regarding various candidates, the awareness of intellectual lineages and associations, and the competitive dynamics between institutions all reflected a university system still negotiating its relationship to Germany’s recent past while building toward its future.

Legacy of a Philosophical Transition

The succession from Horkheimer to Habermas represents one of the most significant transitions in twentieth-century intellectual history. It marked the passing of critical theory from its founding generation to its most influential subsequent practitioner. Habermas would go on to develop the Frankfurt School tradition in new directions, engaging with analytical philosophy, linguistic theory, and democratic theory in ways that expanded critical theory’s reach and relevance.

This academic appointment process, with its detailed negotiations, political considerations, and intellectual judgments, reminds us that even the most abstract philosophical traditions exist within concrete institutional contexts. The future of critical theory depended not only on brilliant ideas but on adequate staffing, sufficient resources, and thoughtful institutional planning.

The Frankfurt succession story illustrates how academic appointments can shape intellectual history, how institutional decisions influence theoretical development, and how the seemingly mundane processes of university administration can have profound consequences for the world of ideas. What began as a search for a qualified professor became a decisive moment in the history of critical theory—one that would influence not only German intellectual life but international social thought for decades to come.

Habermas’s tenure at Frankfurt would prove enormously productive, yielding major works that engaged with questions of knowledge, human interests, communication, and democracy. His ability to bridge philosophy and sociology, theory and practice, would make him one of the most influential thinkers of the late twentieth century—a development that began with that contentious but ultimately successful appointment process in the early 1960s.

The story of this academic succession reminds us that intellectual traditions are living things that require both preservation and renewal, that institutional contexts shape theoretical possibilities, and that even the most abstract philosophical positions emerge from concrete historical circumstances. The Frankfurt School’s continued relevance owes much to that careful, contentious, but ultimately successful transition from its founding generation to its most influential successor.