A Retirement That Wasn’t

The feeling of freedom first means the possibility of new beginnings. On September 22, 1994, nearly three months after his 65th birthday, Jürgen Habermas found himself at the official residence of Hans Eichel, then Prime Minister of Hesse, for what was ostensibly his retirement celebration. The late summer heat lingered in Wiesbaden as the philosopher delivered brief remarks before Science and Arts Minister Evelies Mayer and several colleagues. With characteristic directness, Habermas declared that retirement was no reason to stop working. Everything would continue as usual—he would still lecture at Frankfurt University, though now on alternating semesters rather than every term. At least that was his plan.

The media had seized upon both his birthday and retirement as opportunities to assess his legacy. On June 18, 1994, philosopher Walther Ch. Zimmerli had published an evaluation in Süddeutsche Zeitung, while Thomas Assheuer contributed another in Frankfurter Rundschau. Both traced Habermas’s intellectual journey, with Assheuer concluding: “With admirable persistence and tenacity, Jürgen Habermas has spent decades outlining a hope that ‘humanity is the last brave thing we have left.’ For him, democracy and law, reflexive morality and linguistic rationality constitute the answer to those who would use class myths or the latest concepts to express state myths, nationalize society, and violently halt modernity.”

The Unfinished Debates of a Public Intellectual

In September 1993, well before his retirement festivities, Habermas had engaged in a significant debate with Adam Michnik, editor-in-chief of Poland’s largest newspaper Gazeta Wyborcza. Moderated by Adam Krzemiński, their discussion focused on “United Germany” and appeared in Die Zeit in mid-December before being published weeks later in New Left Review. By early 1994, the exchange had generated substantial反响.

Michnik, who had joined the anti-communist opposition in the 1960s and served as an advisor to Solidarity in the 1980s, posed a challenging question: Why had Habermas never published critical views on Stalinism? The philosopher responded succinctly that he had never felt compelled to write on the subject. Moreover, the left had no interest in risking becoming a mouthpiece for the vehement anti-communist movement then gaining momentum in Germany.

Wolfgang Kraushaar of the Hamburg Institute for Social Research seized upon this explanation, publishing a critique in Die Zeit in March 1994 that used Habermas as an example to criticize left-wing intellectuals for their “blindness toward communist systems, particularly the SED regime.” Kraushaar argued that while Habermas might not have held illusions about political conditions in the Soviet Union or East Germany, he had deliberately avoided theoretically analyzing the Stalinist system to avoid providing theoretical ammunition for what he perceived as the real danger.

Habermas responded swiftly with a letter to the editor published in Die Zeit on March 25, 1994. He pointed to his early philosophical works containing “explicit and thorough critical analyses of orthodox Stalinism.” However, given West Germany’s restorative tendencies after the war, he believed democratic development required focusing on the latent fascist dangers within German society. Simultaneously, he openly expressed sympathy for dissidents in actually existing socialist states. Having always maintained distance from Stalinism, he saw no personal reason to settle political scores with the system spectacularly.

Kraushaar responded on April 26 with a multi-page letter featuring sharp critiques, focusing primarily on differing interpretations of West Germany’s anti-communist movement. These interpretive differences concerned both the significance of the 1968 protest movement—positioned between established democratic consciousness and left-wing totalitarianism—and the role of Eastern European dissidents and left-wing intellectual responsibility. Habermas offered a brief rebuttal on May 9, rejecting “the implication of being born from a ‘guilty Stalinist background’ as an unorthodox leftist.” He added: “Forgive my saying so, but this seems like sensationalism. If the anti-authoritarian left… had actually turned toward the radical reformist line I advocated , it would have saved me a decade of unpleasant defamation and insult.”

The Persistent Professor in Germany’s Public Sphere

The newly retired professor had barely begun relocating from Frankfurt when he found himself standing at the podium of St. Paul’s Church on May 8, 1995, delivering an address commemorating the 50th anniversary of World War II’s end. He expressed his personal view that Germany’s democratization process had succeeded precisely because the nation had engaged in prolonged critical discussion about its past.

Weeks later, he traveled to Tel Aviv, where on May 21 the university awarded him an honorary professorship recognizing his active involvement in the Historians’ Dispute of the 1980s. The citation praised Habermas for “confronting trends in 1980s German historiography that sought to exonerate the Third Reich’s policies.”

On September 26, Heidelberg University and the city of Heidelberg awarded him the Karl Jaspers Prize. His acceptance speech, titled “On the Struggle Between Faith Powers: Karl Jaspers on Cultural Conflict,” addressed contemporary cultural tensions. Philosopher Reiner Wiehl, who had served as Hans-Georg Gadamer’s assistant and taught at Heidelberg since 1969, delivered the award address, tracing what he called the “philosophical friendship” between Habermas and Jaspers despite their methodological differences.

Historical Context: Postwar Germany’s Intellectual Landscape

To understand these events fully, we must situate Habermas within the broader context of postwar German intellectual history. Born in 1929, Habermas belonged to what Germans call the “Flakhelfer generation”—those too young to have served as soldiers but old enough to have been recruited as anti-aircraft auxiliaries during the war’s final years. This generation came of age amidst the physical and moral rubble of the Third Reich, facing what philosopher Karl Jaspers termed the “question of German guilt.”

The early Federal Republic of Germany presented a complex environment for intellectual development. While Konrad Adenauer’s government pursued Western integration and economic reconstruction, the cultural and academic spheres remained populated by many who had served the Nazi regime. This continuity created what Habermas would later criticize as the “restorative” tendencies of the 1950s—a period marked by economic miracle but insufficient confrontation with the recent past.

Within this context, the Frankfurt School and its Institute for Social Research provided a critical alternative. Returning from American exile, Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer reestablished the Institute, developing Critical Theory as a means to analyze contemporary society through Marxist, psychoanalytic, and philosophical lenses. Habermas, who served as Adorno’s assistant in the 1950s, emerged from this tradition while gradually developing his own distinctive approach.

The Evolution of a Critical Theorist

Habermas’s intellectual development reflected both continuity and innovation within the Critical Theory tradition. His early work, particularly The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere , examined how bourgeois society had developed spaces for rational-critical debate and how these were being eroded in contemporary mass society. This established his enduring concern with communication, rationality, and democratic practice.

Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, Habermas developed his theory of communicative action, which proposed that human rationality fundamentally concerns reaching understanding through language rather than merely instrumental calculation. This theoretical framework underpinned his critique of contemporary society, which he saw as increasingly dominated by instrumental rationality at the expense of communicative reason.

The Historians’ Dispute of 1986-1987 marked Habermas’s most significant intervention in German public debate before the events described in our opening narrative. When conservative historians attempted to “normalize” German history by relativizing Nazi crimes and placing them within broader contexts of totalitarianism or twentieth-century violence, Habermas vigorously opposed what he saw as an attempt to evade moral responsibility. His insistence on the uniqueness of the Holocaust and the need for continued critical engagement with the past defined his public intellectual stance.

Cultural and Social Impacts of Habermas’s Work

Habermas’s influence extended far beyond academic philosophy into law, sociology, political science, and public discourse. His concept of “constitutional patriotism” offered a post-national foundation for political identity in postwar Germany, suggesting that citizens could identify with democratic principles and institutions rather than ethnic or cultural nationalism. This concept proved particularly influential as Germany struggled with questions of identity following reunification.

His theories of discourse ethics and deliberative democracy provided frameworks for understanding how moral norms and political decisions could emerge from rational discussion rather than imposition. These ideas influenced everything from legal theory to educational practices, suggesting that legitimate norms required the agreement of all affected parties through practical discourse.

Internationally, Habermas became perhaps the best-known representative of contemporary German thought. His work engaged with Anglo-American philosophers like John Rawls while maintaining distinctively European concerns with modernity, rationality, and social theory. The of his major works made him a central figure in global philosophical discussions about democracy, justice, and communication.

Legacy and Modern Relevance

The events surrounding Habermas’s nominal retirement in 1994 illustrated that his public role would continue unabated. Indeed, the subsequent decades would see him remain exceptionally active, engaging with European integration, globalization, genetic engineering, and religious pluralism. His concept of “post-secular society” offered a framework for understanding the continued importance of religion in modern public life, while his writings on European integration articulated a vision of transnational democracy.

Habermas’s work on the public sphere has gained renewed relevance in the digital age, as scholars and citizens grapple with how social media and algorithmically-driven communication affect democratic discourse. His distinction between communicative and strategic action provides tools for analyzing contemporary political communication, while his emphasis on rational-critical debate remains a normative ideal against which to measure actually existing public spheres.

His persistent engagement with German history and identity continues to inform discussions about how societies confront difficult pasts. In an era of rising nationalism and historical revisionism, Habermas’s insistence on critical engagement with history while maintaining constitutional patriotism offers a model for democratic societies wrestling with complex historical legacies.

The philosopher who refused to retire in 1994 would go on to publish major works well into his eighties, including Between Naturalism and Religion . His enduring productivity testified to his belief that intellectual work constituted not merely a profession but a vocation—one that demanded engagement with the most pressing questions of contemporary society.

Conclusion: The Critical Intellectual in Modern Society

Jürgen Habermas’s career exemplifies the potential of the public intellectual in democratic societies. His work demonstrates how rigorous theoretical development can inform practical engagement with political and social issues. From the Historians’ Dispute to his interventions on European integration, Habermas has shown how philosophical concepts can illuminate public debates while being refined through them.

The retirement that wasn’t in 1994 symbolized Habermas’s commitment to the life of the mind as an ongoing project rather than a career with fixed boundaries. His subsequent decades of productivity confirmed that intellectual contribution need not diminish with age but can instead deepen through accumulated wisdom and persistent engagement.

In an era often characterized by political polarization and communicative distortion, Habermas’s emphasis on rational discourse, mutual understanding, and democratic deliberation remains as relevant as when he first developed these concepts. His career reminds us that critical theory means not merely analyzing society but engaging with it—that thinking and acting, theory and practice, remain necessarily intertwined in the project of human emancipation.

The philosopher who declared retirement no reason to stop working ultimately demonstrated that the critical examination of society knows no retirement age. The new beginnings that freedom makes possible continue through persistent engagement with the world, through the unwavering belief that human reason and communication can create more just societies, and through the recognition that democracy requires constant critical attention from citizens who refuse to stop thinking.