A Shocking Dispatch from Zhejiang

The summer of 1840 brought unexpected developments in China’s conflict with British forces. As British Admiral George Elliot and Captain Charles Elliot sailed north with their squadron, Commissioner Lin Zexu in Guangzhou received troubling correspondence from Wu Er Gong’e, the provincial governor of Zhejiang. The message contained devastating news: British forces had captured the strategic island of Dinghai. This development stunned Lin, who had anticipated British actions would be limited to armed attempts to sell opium, not territorial conquest.

Wu’s letter revealed both alarm and confusion about British intentions. “Previously, the British only traded in Guangdong, occasionally visiting Zhejiang with but a few ships,” the governor wrote. “This time, over thirty vessels arrived together – I cannot fathom their purpose nor understand what they intend to accomplish.” The implicit suggestion that inadequate management in Guangdong had prompted the British northern expedition weighed heavily on Lin Zexu’s conscience. He recognized that if Dinghai remained under British control and their fleet continued northward, coastal officials would inevitably blame him for the crisis.

Lin immediately composed a letter to Governor Yi Liang of Guangdong, sharing the grave news and arranging a meeting to discuss their response. His message conveyed both urgency and personal responsibility: “I have just received an urgent dispatch from Brother Wu informing me that the British have dared to occupy Dinghai County. The news makes my hair stand on end. I had sent warnings about British ships heading north and urged Brother Wu to strengthen defenses, yet I never imagined they would permit the enemy to capture territory. I forward two documents for your review, as you may not have received them yet. Please keep this confidential after reading. I plan to visit tomorrow to discuss everything. My courier should return within days with further information. I can only await punishment for my failures.”

Strategic Assessment and Imperial Communication

Rather than succumbing to despair over Dinghai’s capture, Lin Zexu focused on actionable solutions. That same evening, he drafted a memorial to the Emperor titled “Memorial Regarding the British Occupation of Dinghai Being Premeditated and the Need to Rely on Dinghai’s Military and Civilians to Exterminate the Enemy Forces.” This document outlined his strategic assessment of the conflict and proposed concrete measures to address the crisis.

Lin acknowledged British technological advantages in naval warfare but identified critical weaknesses in their military capabilities. “What the British rely on is merely their superior cannons and sturdy ships,” he wrote. “If we engage them on the open sea, we must carefully assess the situation and only act when certain of success to avoid wasted efforts. However, once on land, these barbarians possess no special skills. Their bodies are wrapped in restrictive clothing, their waists and legs stiffened – when they fall, they cannot rise quickly. Not only can a single soldier cut down several barbarians, but even ordinary villagers possess sufficient means to kill them.”

The commissioner emphasized the distinct physical appearance of British forces as an advantage for Chinese defenders, noting that their “different language, foreign clothing, and distinctive eyes, noses, and hair” made them easily distinguishable from the local population. This visual distinction, Lin argued, would prevent accidental harm to Chinese collaborators during attacks on British forces.

Lin’s memorial proposed implementing a bounty system to encourage popular resistance: “Now that the barbarian bandits have established themselves on shore, we must ensure that every person can become their executioner. Regardless of whether they are soldiers or civilians, those who kill barbarians should receive heavy rewards according to the number of heads presented. Once this policy is announced, within moments we can eliminate them without leaving a single survivor. Once the men are exterminated, their ships and cannons will become ours. Thus, extraordinary rewards would not constitute wasted resources – this represents one way to share hatred against the common enemy.”

Military Preparations at Lion Ocean

Concurrent with his diplomatic efforts, Lin Zexu recognized the urgent need to assess and strengthen Guangdong’s military readiness. He decided to proceed immediately with a previously scheduled military inspection at Lion Ocean, approximately six or seven days’ journey from his position. While rainy weather had delayed the expedition, the crisis at Dinghai made further postponement unthinkable.

The inspection served multiple purposes: evaluating naval exercises, assessing the combat effectiveness of recently recruited local militias, and demonstrating Chinese military resolve to British forces still operating in the region. Lin had been organizing and training these local defense forces, known as “water braves” and “land braves,” recognizing that conventional military forces alone might prove insufficient against the technologically superior British navy.

The following morning, Lin visited Governor Yi Liang’s office to discuss the situation in person. Both officials understood the unprecedented nature of the crisis – since the founding of the Qing dynasty, China had maintained its position as the Middle Kingdom, with foreign nations traditionally paying tribute rather than capturing Chinese territory. They anticipated imperial fury at this breach of the established world order and recognized that blame would likely fall on Guangdong’s administration.

“Yue Ting,” Lin addressed Yi Liang using his courtesy name, “the British actually daring to capture Dinghai truly exceeds all expectations. I thought when they headed north, they would either rely on their warships to forcibly sell opium or proceed north to demand trade rights. I never imagined they would have the audacity to challenge the Celestial Empire. The prestige of our empire has always been sufficient to compel the submission of the four barbarians – where did the British find the courage to act so madly?”

Yi Liang responded with practical concerns about China’s defensive vulnerabilities: “What the British rely on is their sturdy ships and superior cannons. Our maritime border extends nearly ten thousand li, from south to north. Places like Dinghai, isolated from the mainland, are numerous everywhere – truly impossible to defend comprehensively. British warships gather to attack a single location, while our defenders must assess the situation and often find themselves outnumbered. Zhejiang may have a navy, but its deployments are scattered – this likely contributed to Dinghai’s capture.”

The People’s War Strategy

Lin Zexu elaborated on his strategic vision during the meeting with Yi Liang, presenting his memorial draft for review. “Therefore, I have an idea,” he explained. “Relying solely on the navy is insufficient – we must utilize our advantage in numbers. The military and civilians must share hatred against the common enemy. We must mobilize the people, creating a nation in arms, to achieve victory.”

Governor Yi Liang expressed support for the concept while voicing practical reservations: “Your proposal is excellent, and I have no objections. We can submit the memorial jointly. However, coastal civilians lack training – counting on them to kill the enemy may not prove reliable.”

Lin acknowledged this concern but emphasized the importance of organized training programs: “Therefore, we must recruit and train water braves and land braves, providing them with proper instruction that they can then share with relatives, friends, and neighbors. Guangdong has been recruiting and training water braves for some time – how effective has this training proven? I plan to travel to Lion Ocean soon to conduct naval exercises, both to drill the navy and to inspect the actual combat effectiveness of the water braves. If the water braves prove capable, I intend to deploy them alongside the navy to pursue and attack the British. Recently, the British in Guangdong waters have grown far too aggressive.”

British Technological Advantages and Intelligence Networks

Unknown to Lin Zexu at the time, British forces possessed significant technological advantages that would complicate Chinese defensive efforts. The British fleet included three steam-powered vessels that could operate independently of wind conditions, providing unprecedented mobility and speed. These steamers had already facilitated rapid communication between British units, allowing ships remaining in Guangdong waters, such as the HMS Hyacinth , to receive news of Dinghai’s capture far more quickly than their Chinese counterparts.

This technological disparity highlighted the challenges facing Qing forces. While Lin Zexu advocated for leveraging China’s numerical advantage through popular mobilization, British naval technology enabled rapid concentration of force and superior intelligence gathering. The steam-powered ships could navigate against prevailing winds and currents, allowing the British to choose when and where to engage while Chinese sailing vessels remained dependent on favorable weather conditions.

Historical Context: The Opium War and Qing Defense Policy

The capture of Dinghai represented a critical turning point in what would become known as the First Opium War . This conflict emerged from longstanding trade imbalances between Britain and China and Chinese efforts to suppress the illegal opium trade that British merchants had used to offset their purchases of Chinese tea and silk.

Lin Zexu’s appointment as Imperial Commissioner in 1838 reflected the Daoguang Emperor’s determination to eliminate the opium scourge that was causing massive silver outflows and social disruption throughout China. Lin’s successful campaign against opium in Guangdong, culminating in the destruction of over 20,000 chests of confiscated opium at Humen in 1839, had provoked British military intervention.

The Qing military system faced significant challenges in responding to this threat. The Banner armies, once formidable conquest forces, had declined in effectiveness during two centuries of peace. Green Standard troops maintained internal security but lacked experience in conventional warfare against external enemies. Coastal defenses had received insufficient investment during the long peace, leaving key positions vulnerable to naval attack.

Lin Zexu’s advocacy for popular mobilization represented both an innovative response to these institutional limitations and a reflection of traditional Chinese military thought that emphasized the importance of popular support in warfare. His approach drew on historical precedents of local militia organization while adapting these models to contemporary challenges.

Strategic Implications of Dinghai’s Capture

The fall of Dinghai had immediate strategic consequences that extended far beyond the loss of a single island. Located near the wealthy Yangtze Delta region, Dinghai provided British forces with a secure base for operations against key economic centers and a bargaining chip in future negotiations. Its capture demonstrated British ability to project power along the Chinese coast and exposed the vulnerability of Qing coastal defenses.

For Lin Zexu personally, the disaster at Dinghai threatened to undermine his position and discredit his hardline approach to the opium trade. His political opponents in Beijing would use the setback to argue for a more conciliatory approach toward the British. The commissioner recognized that his career and policy recommendations depended on demonstrating that his strategy could produce tangible results despite this initial reversal.

Lin’s emphasis on popular mobilization reflected both genuine strategic calculation and political necessity. By advocating for a “people’s war” approach, he sought to compensate for Qing military weaknesses while building political support for continued resistance. The bounty system he proposed simultaneously addressed military requirements and created economic incentives for popular participation in the conflict.

Legacy of Lin Zexu’s Response

Lin Zexu’s reaction to the Dinghai crisis exemplified the strengths and limitations of Qing officials confronting Western imperialism. His recognition of British technological superiority and attempt to develop asymmetric responses demonstrated practical strategic thinking. However, his underestimation of British determination and capabilities reflected broader Qing difficulties in comprehending the nature of the threat they faced.

The commissioner’s advocacy for popular mobilization represented a significant departure from conventional Qing military policy, which generally distrusted armed civilian populations. While his specific proposals saw limited implementation, they influenced later Chinese military thinkers and anticipated elements of the “People’s War” concept that would become central to Chinese Communist military doctrine in the twentieth century.

Lin’s memoranda and correspondence from this period provide valuable insights into Qing decision-making during the Opium War. They reveal officials grappling with unprecedented challenges while operating within established bureaucratic and intellectual frameworks. The documents show Lin Zexu as a dedicated official attempting to reconcile Confucian principles with practical military necessities in a rapidly changing international environment.

The fall of Dinghai marked the beginning of a new phase in China’s encounter with Western imperialism, one that would ultimately lead to the Treaty of Nanjing and the establishment of the treaty port system. Lin Zexu’s response, though ultimately unable to prevent Qing military defeat, represented an important early effort to develop Chinese strategies for resisting foreign domination that would influence Chinese nationalism and anti-imperialist movements for generations to come.