In the late 19th century, as imperial powers reshaped global politics and warfare, China found itself at a crossroads. The Qing dynasty’s military, once formidable, was struggling with corruption, outdated tactics, and an inability to respond effectively to foreign threats. Meanwhile, neighboring Japan was rapidly modernizing its armed forces, drawing on Western models to transform itself into a regional power. This article explores the critical period of military reform attempts in Qing China around 1878, juxtaposed with Japan’s successful adoption of Western military practices, and considers why China’s efforts faltered despite apparent opportunities for change.

The Context of Military Decline in Qing China

By the mid-19th century, the Qing military apparatus had deteriorated into a shadow of its former strength. The once-vaunted banner armies and the Green Standard troops suffered from chronic underfunding, corruption, and low morale. Officers and soldiers alike had low social status, and widespread practices such as “ghost soldiers”—troops listed on the rolls but not actually present—were common. For example, in Guizhou province, more than half of the Green Standard troops were nominal only, existing on paper to siphon off military salaries.

Corruption permeated the military ranks: in Guangdong, Green Standard troops ran gambling dens; the Fujian navy rented out warships to merchants; and the Guangdong navy’s primary income came from opium smuggling. This endemic corruption and inefficiency severely hampered the Qing military’s ability to defend the empire, as starkly revealed during the Opium Wars when Anglo-French forces breached Beijing’s defenses with relative ease.

The historian Mao Haijian poignantly described this era as a “dark world” within Qing military history, where glimpses of competence were eclipsed by systemic rot. This decay was both a symptom and a cause of Qing China’s inability to withstand the pressures of imperialist powers.

Early Attempts at Reform: The Focus on Training and Armaments

In response to these challenges, Qing reformers recognized the need to modernize both training and weaponry. As early as 1864, Prince Gong articulated a clear vision linking national strength to military modernization: “The way to govern the country lies in self-strengthening… and the key to self-strengthening lies in training troops, with the priority on manufacturing weapons.”

This dual emphasis on “training troops” and “manufacturing weapons” became the cornerstone of the Self-Strengthening Movement, which sought to blend Chinese traditions with Western technology. Leading figures like Li Hongzhang echoed this sentiment. He argued that China’s only hope of self-strengthening lay in acquiring foreign weapons and, crucially, mastering the technology to produce them domestically. Li lamented that China’s existing military treatises on artillery were outdated and imprecise, making indigenous production nearly impossible. He suggested that importing Western manufacturing tools and methods was preferable to relying solely on foreign personnel.

Similarly, General Zuo Zongtang stressed that securing China’s coastal defenses required revamping the navy by learning Western shipbuilding and armaments. He famously said, “Western ingenuity is skillful; China need not remain content with clumsiness. Since the West has advanced technology, China should fully adopt it.”

The Japanese Model: Early and Comprehensive Military Modernization

In contrast to Qing China, Japan embarked on its military modernization earlier and with greater intensity. During the Edo period, even before the Meiji Restoration, Japanese scholars translated and studied nearly 300 Western military texts, covering topics from firearms technology to infantry and artillery tactics.

With the advent of the Meiji era , Japan accelerated its reforms, explicitly modeling its navy on the British Royal Navy from 1874 onward. Japanese naval manuals were translated from English, and organizational structures mirrored those of Britain. The Japanese government invested heavily in sending military missions abroad and recruiting foreign experts—French and British officers were hired to teach at Japanese military academies, while young Japanese officers studied in Europe and America.

Japan’s approach was systematic and comprehensive: it combined the adoption of superior technology with the wholesale importation of organizational and doctrinal frameworks. This enabled Japan to field a modern, professional military capable of defeating China in the First Sino-Japanese War just two decades later.

The Persistence of Traditional Military Structures in Qing China

While Japan embraced foreign military methods, the Qing dynasty was more hesitant and constrained by entrenched traditions. The most prominent military force of the mid-19th century Qing was the Xiang Army, raised by Zeng Guofan during the Taiping Rebellion. Unlike Western-style armies, the Xiang Army was built on Confucian ideals, recruiting officers primarily from scholar-gentry backgrounds steeped in loyalty and righteousness. Approximately 58% of Xiang Army officers were former Confucian scholars, a stark contrast to the Qing banner and Green Standard armies that often appointed officers through hereditary or martial examination systems.

The Xiang Army’s recruitment focused on “simple-minded” mountain peasants deemed obedient and hardy. Its leadership principles emphasized moral character and loyalty rather than technical military competence or innovation.

This traditionalist approach, while effective for internal rebellions, was ill-suited for confronting modern armies equipped with advanced weaponry and trained in Western tactics. The Qing court’s reluctance to fully embrace Western military science meant that reform efforts were piecemeal and often symbolic rather than substantive.

The Missed Opportunity of 1878: Reform Proposals and Rejections

In 1878, a critical moment arose for Qing military reform. The governor-general of Liangjiang and minister of the Nanyang Fleet, Shen Baozhen, proposed abolishing the archaic military examination system known as the “martial examinations.” This system, rooted in Confucian tradition, selected officers based on their knowledge of classical military texts rather than practical skills or modern military science.

Shen Baozhen’s proposal aimed to break with outdated personnel selection methods and promote a merit-based system that could better incorporate Western military knowledge. However, this suggestion was met with stern opposition and ultimately rejected by conservative factions within the Qing court.

At the same time, Japan was establishing a General Staff Office modeled after the Prussian system, signaling the emergence of a new era in military organization. Japan’s transition to a German-style military command structure in 1878 marked a decisive step toward professionalization and modernization.

The Qing dynasty’s failure to seize this opportunity to reform personnel systems and organizational structures left it trailing behind regional competitors and unable to meet the challenges posed by Western and Japanese military power.

The Broader Cultural and Political Barriers to Reform

Understanding why Qing reformers faced resistance requires examining the broader socio-political context. The Qing ruling elite was deeply invested in Confucian orthodoxy, which prized stability, hierarchy, and tradition. Military innovation was often viewed with suspicion, especially when it involved adopting foreign ideas perceived as undermining Chinese cultural identity.

Moreover, bureaucratic inertia and factionalism hampered decisive action. Military modernization threatened established interests and patronage networks, especially among the traditional military class and scholar-officials who derived status from classical education.

The Qing dynasty’s self-strengthening reforms, while ambitious, were often half-hearted. They sought to acquire Western technology without fundamentally altering the underlying social and political structures that governed military organization. This “Chinese-style modernization” proved insufficient in the face of rapidly changing geopolitical realities.

The Legacy of Qing Military Reform Attempts

Despite their limitations, the Qing military reforms of the late 19th century laid important groundwork. They introduced Western weapons manufacturing techniques, established arsenals and shipyards, and created new military academies. Figures like Li Hongzhang and Zuo Zongtang remain emblematic of the reformist spirit within Qing China.

However, the failure to overhaul personnel systems, command structures, and military doctrine left the Qing military vulnerable. This vulnerability was starkly exposed in the First Sino-Japanese War, where Japan’s modernized forces decisively defeated Qing armies and navies.

The contrast between Qing China and Meiji Japan during this period serves as a powerful example of how cultural openness, political will, and institutional reform are crucial to successful military modernization.

Conclusion: Lessons from a Critical Era

The late 19th century was a pivotal era for East Asian military history. Japan’s rapid adoption of Western military systems enabled it to emerge as a major power, while Qing China’s adherence to traditional structures and slow reform contributed to its decline.

The Qing dynasty’s experience underscores that modernization requires more than technology transfer—it demands institutional transformation, cultural adaptation, and political commitment. The rejection of reform proposals like those of Shen Baozhen in 1878 symbolizes the Qing court’s broader struggle to reconcile tradition with the imperatives of a modern world.

For historians and military scholars, this period offers rich insights into the challenges of reforming entrenched systems in times of great change—a story with resonances far beyond China’s borders.