A Historian’s Dilemma: Tacitus and the Challenge of Narrating Civil War

The First Battle of Bedriacum presents historians with an unusual challenge. Our most detailed account comes from Tacitus, yet the Roman historian famously lacked engagement with his subject matter. Unlike Thucydides, whose vivid account of the Sicilian Expedition burns with Athenian patriotism despite his physical absence, Tacitus approached Rome’s civil war of 69 AD with palpable distaste. This emotional distance creates significant gaps in our understanding – we cannot even be certain whether Britain’s XIV Legion and Spain’s VII Legion participated in the battle or arrived afterward.

The contrast between these two great historians reveals much about their subjects. Thucydides wrote about a conflict that determined Athens’ fate, while Tacitus chronicled what he saw as an inconsequential civil war between unworthy contenders. This fundamental difference in perspective shaped their narratives profoundly, leaving the First Battle of Bedriacum shrouded in unusual obscurity for such a significant military engagement.

The Troubled Context: Rome’s Year of Four Emperors

To understand Bedriacum, we must examine the extraordinary circumstances of 69 AD – the infamous Year of Four Emperors. Following Nero’s suicide in 68 AD, the Roman world plunged into chaos as provincial governors and military commanders vied for power. Galba’s brief reign ended with his murder in January 69 AD, bringing Otho to power through dubious means. Meanwhile, Vitellius’ Germanic legions marched toward Italy, setting the stage for their confrontation at Bedriacum.

This period represented a profound crisis in Roman governance. The Julio-Claudian dynasty had collapsed, and the mechanisms for imperial succession proved dangerously unstable. Military commanders increasingly recognized that their legions could make emperors, undermining centuries of political tradition. Against this backdrop of institutional breakdown, the Battle of Bedriacum would unfold as a tragic example of Rome turning its military might against itself.

Command Failures: The “Fools’ War” Takes Shape

The battle’s unusual character stemmed largely from catastrophic leadership failures on both sides. Vitellius’ forces, though numerically superior, suffered from divided command between Aulus Caecina Alienus and Fabius Valens. Their commander-in-chief remained in Gaul, leaving no unified strategic vision. Meanwhile, Otho committed an even graver error by establishing his headquarters 20 kilometers south of the battlefield at Brixellum (modern Brescello), across the Po River.

Otho’s decision to remain behind the lines proved disastrous for morale. Roman soldiers traditionally fought most effectively when their commander shared their dangers, and Otho’s absence bred resentment and defeatism. Compounding this error, he appointed his inexperienced brother Titianus and praetorian prefect Licinius Proculus as field commanders, sidelining seasoned veterans like Suetonius Paulinus and Marius Celsus. This leadership structure virtually guaranteed tactical incoherence.

The Battle Unfolds: Chaos on the Lombard Plain

On April 14, 69 AD, the two armies met near the village of Bedriacum (modern Calvatone), about 30 kilometers east of Cremona. What followed was less a coordinated battle than a series of disjointed engagements across the Lombard plain. Without clear command structures or strategic objectives, both armies descended into confusion.

Several factors intensified the chaos:
– Identical uniforms and standards made distinguishing friend from foe nearly impossible
– The emotional difficulty of Romans killing Romans undermined combat effectiveness
– No commander possessed the skill to coordinate large-scale maneuvers

Contemporary sources suggest Otho’s forces initially held their ground, but their morale collapsed as the reality of civil war became undeniable. The psychological impact of fighting fellow citizens proved more decisive than any tactical consideration. By day’s end, Otho’s army surrendered – not due to battlefield defeat so much as collective unwillingness to continue the slaughter.

The Aftermath: Otho’s Stoic End and Unfinished War

News of the defeat reached Otho at Brixellum that evening. Faced with this reversal, the emperor made his most historically significant decision – choosing suicide over prolonged conflict. Despite having fresh legions approaching from the Danube region, Otho destroyed sensitive documents, forbade reprisals against Vitellius’ family, and urged his supporters to seek reconciliation. That night, he fell on his sword with such determination that guards found him already dead.

Tacitus praised this act as noble self-sacrifice to spare Rome further bloodshed. Modern historians debate Otho’s motivations – was this genuine civic virtue, philosophical conviction (he reportedly admired Stoicism), or simply recognition of his untenable position? Regardless, his death failed to end the civil war, as Vitellius’ mishandling of the surrendered Othonian forces bred continued resistance that would culminate in the Second Battle of Bedriacum later that year.

Military Analysis: Why Bedriacum Defied Clear Narration

The battle’s confusing nature stems from fundamental differences between civil wars and conventional conflicts. Unlike Rome’s legendary commanders – Hannibal, Scipio Africanus, or Caesar – who fought with clear objectives and efficient tactics, the generals at Bedriacum lacked both strategic vision and tactical competence. Their forces blundered into what historian Edward Gibbon might later term “the fog of war” with particular intensity.

Several factors made the battle uniquely difficult to reconstruct:
– Absence of clear command hierarchies
– Lack of coordinated maneuvers
– Emotional constraints on both sides
– No decisive tactical developments
– Minimal record-keeping amid the chaos

This stands in stark contrast to Rome’s more famous battles, where even centuries-old accounts retain remarkable clarity about formations, maneuvers, and casualty figures. At Bedriacum, we lack even basic data about losses – a telling indication of the engagement’s disorganized nature.

Cultural Impact: Civil War as National Trauma

Beyond its military significance, the First Battle of Bedriacum represented a profound psychological blow to Roman self-conception. The Republic’s greatest strength had always been its military discipline and civic unity. Now, legion turned against legion in a conflict devoid of ideological or strategic purpose.

The battle’s aftermath saw disturbing social phenomena:
– Breakdown of traditional military camaraderie
– Erosion of respect for imperial authority
– Normalization of political violence
– Increased provincial awareness of Rome’s vulnerability

These trends would culminate later in 69 AD with the Flavian dynasty’s rise, marking a permanent shift in Roman politics toward overt military involvement in imperial succession.

Historical Legacy: From Obscurity to Cautionary Tale

Though overshadowed by the more decisive Second Battle of Bedriacum (October 69 AD), the first engagement holds important lessons about civil conflict. It demonstrates how quickly institutional breakdown can lead to military dysfunction, and how profoundly the nature of warfare changes when countrymen face each other in battle.

The battle’s legacy includes:
– Highlighting the dangers of divided command
– Demonstrating morale’s centrality in civil wars
– Revealing the limits of Roman military professionalism when political legitimacy collapses
– Providing a case study in how not to conduct a campaign

Modern historians increasingly recognize the Year of Four Emperors as a pivotal transition between the Julio-Claudian and Flavian eras, with Bedriacum serving as its tragic centerpiece. The battle’s confused narrative ultimately reflects the chaos of a empire struggling to redefine itself amid crisis – making its obscurity perhaps the most telling fact of all.