When the Chongzhen Emperor hanged himself on Beijing’s Coal Hill on March 19, 1644, it marked the official fall of the Ming Dynasty. However, the flame of the Ming still flickered in the south, as loyalists scrambled to keep the dynasty alive. What followed was a chaotic struggle for power, culminating in the short-lived Hongguang regime, a tragic chapter in Chinese history.

A Game of Thrones: Choosing the Next Emperor

News of Beijing’s fall reached Nanjing by mid-April. With the capital lost, the first priority of Ming officials in the south was to find a new emperor. Several princes of the Ming royal family resided in Huai’an, among them Zhu Yousong, the Prince of Fu, who had the strongest claim under the principle of “brother succeeds brother.”

However, not everyone agreed. The influential Donglin faction, a group of Confucian scholars and officials, had a deep-seated grudge against Zhu Yousong’s family due to past political conflicts. They instead supported the more “virtuous” Prince of Lu, citing seven alleged faults of Zhu Yousong, including greed, drunkenness, and illiteracy. But politics is often about power, not virtue.

The Military Decides: Power Over Principles

While scholars debated, military leaders held the real power. The four major military commanders in the region—Gao Jie, Huang Degong, Liu Liangzuo, and Ma Shiying—understood that an emperor could serve as a useful political tool. Zhu Yousong, realizing this, personally sought their support. With their backing, he moved to Nanjing and was proclaimed emperor in June 1644, adopting the reign title Hongguang (meaning “vast light”).

However, this emperor was not a strong leader. He was controlled by court factions and military commanders who prioritized their own interests. As infighting and corruption plagued his government, his fate was sealed.

A False Hope: Relying on the Manchus

Hongguang’s court faced a dire external threat. The Manchu-led Qing dynasty had already established control over Beijing and was rapidly expanding southward. Instead of organizing a robust resistance, Hongguang’s government placed its hopes on an unlikely ally: Wu Sangui and his Manchu “friends.”

Wu Sangui, the general who infamously opened the gates of the Great Wall to the Manchus, had now become a Qing vassal. Some in Hongguang’s court still believed they could negotiate with him and even use Manchu troops to suppress internal rebels. This naive “borrow barbarians to fight rebels” strategy only exposed the regime’s weakness.

The Fall of Nanjing: A Predictable Tragedy

By early 1645, the Qing forces under Prince Dodo launched a full-scale invasion of the south. The fragmented Hongguang regime could not mount an effective defense. The so-called protectors of the emperor, the four major military commanders, either surrendered or fled. In June 1645, Nanjing fell to the Qing.

Zhu Yousong attempted to escape but was captured. A year later, he was taken to Beijing and executed, bringing an end to the first attempt at a Southern Ming resistance.

Lessons from a Doomed Dynasty

The Hongguang regime’s downfall was not just the result of superior Qing military power. It collapsed due to internal divisions, political shortsightedness, and a fundamental misunderstanding of realpolitik. Instead of uniting against the external threat, its leaders were consumed by factional struggles and personal ambitions.

In many ways, the Hongguang court was a microcosm of the late Ming—an empire that, despite its grandeur, was ultimately undone by its own internal weaknesses. The lesson? When survival is at stake, unity is not just a virtue—it’s a necessity.