The Paradox of Constant Victory

Ancient Chinese military thought contains a profound paradox: nations that win too many battles often face destruction. This counterintuitive concept, articulated in Sun Tzu’s The Art of War and demonstrated through historical examples like the Kingdom of Wu, reveals that military success without political consolidation leads to disaster. The term “fei liu” (费留) describes this phenomenon – achieving battlefield victories but failing to secure lasting political gains, leaving nations exhausted and vulnerable.

Sun Tzu’s Warning About Hollow Victories

The core passage from The Art of War states: “To win battles and conquer territory without consolidating the achievement is ominous and may be described as ‘wasteful delay.'” Traditional commentaries focused narrowly on delayed rewards for soldiers, but deeper analysis reveals Sun Tzu’s broader concern about the transition from military to political victory.

Historical context shows this was no theoretical concern. During the Spring and Autumn period (771-476 BCE), states rose and fell based on their ability to convert battlefield success into stable governance. The text warns rulers against emotional decision-making: “The enlightened ruler is prudent, the good general cautious. Do not move unless you see advantage; do not use your troops unless there is something to be gained; do not fight unless the position is critical.”

The Wu Kingdom’s Tragic Example

The Kingdom of Wu under King Helü (r. 514-496 BCE) became the classic case of “fei liu.” With military geniuses like Sun Tzu and Wu Zixu advising him, Helü achieved remarkable victories against Chu:

– 506 BCE: Wu forces captured Ying, Chu’s capital – unprecedented in Spring and Autumn warfare
– Multiple victories against Chu and Yue over nine years
– Temporary dominance over southeastern China

Yet these triumphs proved ephemeral. Wu failed to establish stable administration in conquered Chu territories. As Sun Tzu had warned earlier when opposing an immediate attack on Ying: “The people are exhausted. We cannot attack Ying now.” The consequences of overextension emerged:

1. Yue attacked Wu’s undefended homeland
2. Chu secured Qin’s intervention
3. Helü’s brother rebelled, declaring himself king
4. Wu eventually lost all Chu territories

The pattern continued under Helü’s son Fuchai, whose initial victories against Yue gave way to catastrophic defeat and Wu’s eventual destruction by 473 BCE – demonstrating how military success without political consolidation sows the seeds of destruction.

The Psychology of Victory: Why Success Breeds Failure

Ancient strategists identified psychological traps accompanying constant victory:

– Ruler’s Hubris: As advisor Li Ke told Marquis Wen of Wei: “Frequent victories make the ruler arrogant.”
– Civilian Exhaustion: “Frequent warfare exhausts the people,” creating governance challenges.
– Strategic Overreach: Wu Qi observed: “Winning battles is easy; preserving victories is hard.”

The Wei Liaozi military text quantifies this phenomenon strikingly:

– Five victories bring disaster
– Four victories create vulnerabilities
– Three victories establish hegemony
– Two victories enable kingship
– One decisive victory achieves imperial rule

This reflects the premium ancient strategists placed on achieving definitive, politically consolidated victories rather than accumulating battles. The Western Han dynasty’s founding exemplified this principle – Liu Bang secured empire through his single decisive victory at Gaixia (202 BCE), while his rival Xiang Yu’s numerous victories proved meaningless.

Modern Parallels: From Ancient China to Contemporary Warfare

Sun Tzu’s warnings about “fei liu” find eerie modern echoes:

– U.S. Military Campaigns: Rapid victories in Iraq (2003) and Libya (2011) gave way to prolonged instability, mirroring Wu’s experience in Chu.
– Resource Drain: Like Wu stretched thin between Chu, Yue and Qin, modern powers struggle with multiple commitments.
– Victory’s Psychology: The “arrogant ruler governing exhausted people” dynamic appears in various modern conflicts where initial success bred complacency.

The ancient texts emphasize emotional discipline absent in many modern conflicts: “The ruler must not raise an army out of anger; the general must not provoke war out of resentment… Anger can revert to joy, resentment to contentment, but a destroyed state cannot be restored, the dead cannot return to life.”

The Art of Strategic Restraint

True mastery in ancient Chinese thought involved knowing when not to fight:

1. Non-engagement Principle: “Do not move unless you see advantage”
2. Cost-Benefit Analysis: “Not victorious do not use troops”
3. Last Resort Fighting: “Not critical do not do battle”

This philosophy created a strategic culture valuing decisive, politically consolidated victories over martial glory. The Han dynasty’s seven-decade peace-building after Gaixia exemplified successful “xiu gong” (修功) – consolidating achievement through governance reforms, economic development and cultural integration.

Enduring Lessons for Statecraft

The ancient Chinese insights remain relevant because they address timeless strategic dilemmas:

– Military-Political Transition: Battlefield success must transition to governance quickly
– Resource Allocation: Continuous warfare drains state capacity
– Psychological Awareness: Victory creates blind spots requiring conscious mitigation

As Sun Tzu concludes: “The enlightened ruler is cautious, the good general vigilant. This is the way to secure the state and preserve the army.” In an era of asymmetric warfare and complex international relations, these ancient warnings about the perils of victory retain striking prescience. The true test of strategy lies not in winning battles, but in building peace.