A Statesman’s Weary Reflection in 1888

The year 1888 found Li Hongzhang, the Qing dynasty’s foremost diplomat and statesman, sorting through documents in his Tianjin office with uncharacteristic melancholy. At sixty-six, the viceroy who had shaped China’s foreign policy for decades felt the weight of time and the shifting tides of empire. As he reviewed dispatches from Korea—a kingdom China had long considered its tributary—Li confronted an uncomfortable truth: Qing dominance in East Asia was eroding, and Seoul’s politicians were mastering the art of diplomatic evasion.

This moment of private reckoning occurred four years after the Gapsin Coup (1884), when Japanese-backed reformers briefly seized power in Korea, and one year after Taiwan’s elevation to provincial status (1887)—a development that had distracted Li from Korean affairs. Among the papers, one brief report stood out: Yuan Shikai’s furious note about Korea’s dismissal of Kim Yun-sik, leader of the pro-Qing Sadae faction. The marginalia in Yuan’s distinctive hand—”Consider retaliation necessary!”—revealed more about Qing frustrations than the official text.

The Chessboard of Late Joseon Politics

Korea in the 1880s became a battleground for imperial ambitions, with China, Japan, and Russia vying for influence. The Joseon court, far from being a passive prize, developed sophisticated strategies to navigate these pressures. Three factions emerged:

– Sadae (Pro-Qing): Traditionalists upholding the centuries-old tributary relationship
– Gaehwa (Pro-Japanese): Modernizers inspired by Meiji reforms
– Pro-Russian: Officials seeking Moscow’s counterbalance

Yet as Li suspected during his document review, these labels obscured a deeper current. Korean officials like Kim Yun-sik (ostensibly pro-Qing) and Min Yeong-jun (dispatched to Japan after Kim’s dismissal) shared an underlying desire for autonomy. The “three-faction system” allowed Seoul to play powers against each other—a strategy Li grudgingly admired.

Yuan Shikai’s Blunt Diplomacy

As Qing Resident in Seoul, Yuan Shikai embodied China’s increasingly assertive—and clumsy—approach. His stormy confrontation with Korean officials over Kim’s dismissal typified Qing methods:

1. Demand explanations for any perceived slight
2. Threaten consequences through military or economic pressure
3. Accept vague assurances that changed little

When Tokyo reported that acting envoy Kim Ga-jin avoided visiting the Qing legation (a protocol breach), Yuan again erupted. The Korean response—claiming Kim hesitated due to his “acting” status—revealed their skill in crafting plausible excuses.

The Illusion of Tributary Control

Li’s realization in 1888 exposed Qing policy’s fatal flaws:

– Overreliance on individuals: Propping up figures like Kim Yun-sik created vulnerabilities when they fell from favor
– Misreading Korean motives: Interpreting every action through a pro-Qing/pro-foreign binary missed Seoul’s strategic ambiguity
– Institutional decay: The Qing system lacked the agility to counter Korea’s nimble diplomacy

The “post-notification” tactic (sending envoys abroad before informing Beijing) exemplified Korea’s quiet resistance. Park Jeong-yang’s prolonged stay in Washington as “ambassador”—contrary to promises of quick return—signaled Seoul’s defiance.

A Shifting Regional Order

Events beyond Korea compounded Li’s challenges:

– 1885: Treaty of Tianjin temporarily stabilized Sino-Japanese rivalry
– 1887: Taiwan’s provincial status demanded administrative attention
– 1888: Portugal secured new trade concessions through Li’s negotiations

Amid these distractions, Russia’s shadow grew. Kim Ga-jin’s alleged pro-Russian leanings—and subsequent rehabilitation—highlighted Moscow’s emerging role. Li suspected Korea’s factions might secretly collaborate to play all foreign powers, a suspicion reinforced by diplomat Li Shuchang’s observation: “The Koreans cling stubbornly to ‘independence’ in their hearts.”

The Limits of Gunboat Diplomacy

Li’s May 1888 tour of the newly acquired warship Zhiyuan symbolized Qing attempts to project strength. Yet military modernization couldn’t resolve political dilemmas. Bedridden after the inspection, Li confronted a paradox:

– Qing needed Korea as buffer against Japan/Russia
– Coercion alienated Korean elites
– Accommodation risked losing control

Yuan’s eventual “success” in compelling Kim Ga-jin’s legation visit provided hollow satisfaction. As Li mused about Yuan’s so-called “diplomatic finesse,” he recognized the unsustainable nature of Qing dominance.

Legacy: The Foreshadowing of Collapse

Li’s 1888 reflections anticipated East Asia’s coming storms:

– 1894: Donghak Rebellion sparks Sino-Japanese War
– 1895: Treaty of Shimonoseki formally ends Qing suzerainty
– 1910: Japan annexes Korea

The bureaucratic papers that troubled Li that year documented more than personnel changes—they revealed an international order in transition. Korea’s deft maneuvering between empires presaged the Qing’s inability to adapt to modern diplomacy.

For contemporary observers, this episode offers enduring lessons about the perils of overextension, the importance of understanding local agency, and the fragility of hegemony. Li Hongzhang—often called “the Bismarck of the East”—ultimately couldn’t preserve the Qing system, but his late-career insights into Korea’s strategies remain a masterclass in the complexities of asymmetric power.