The Spark That Ignited the First Sino-Japanese War

On July 28, 1894, three days after the naval engagement, news of the Battle of Pungdo reached Tokyo, sending waves of excitement through Japanese society. The clash near Asan Bay marked more than just a military confrontation – it represented the culmination of years of growing tensions between China’s Qing dynasty and Meiji Japan over influence in Korea.

Chinese statesman Li Hongzhang had received the devastating news a day earlier on July 27. His telegram to the Zongli Yamen, China’s foreign affairs office, captured the shock and indignation of the Qing leadership: “Although China and Japan have not declared war, Japanese ships suddenly attacked our patrol vessels. They fired first, violating international law.”

The Unequal Contest at Sea

The naval encounter revealed stark disparities between the two fleets. Japan’s modern squadron consisting of the Yoshino, Akitsushima, and Naniwa totaled 11,000 tons with speeds exceeding 18 knots, while China’s aging Jiyuan and Guangyi combined for only 3,300 tons with slower speeds. More critically, Japanese ships boasted rapid-fire artillery capable of firing eight rounds in the time Chinese vessels managed just one.

Li Hongzhang had anticipated this technological gap would lead to disaster. His pessimistic outlook reflected a broader Qing realization of their military obsolescence compared to Japan’s Western-style modernization. Even before formal declarations of war, Li found himself contemplating not victory, but how to quickly end the coming conflict.

Japanese Jubilation and Diplomatic Anxiety

The Japanese public greeted news of Pungdo with euphoria, particularly relieved by the naval victory given widespread fears about China’s supposedly superior Beiyang Fleet. The sight of Chinese ironclads like Dingyuan and Zhenyuan during earlier port visits had left deep impressions on Japanese observers unaware of their actual limitations – including the critical shortage of main gun ammunition.

Newspapers like the Jiji Shinpo framed the engagement as defensive, reporting on July 29 that Chinese ships had initiated hostilities at 7:00 AM on the 25th near Pungdo, forcing Japanese retaliation that sank a transport ship carrying 1,500 troops while capturing the Chinese warship Caojiang.

Behind the scenes, Foreign Minister Mutsu Munemitsu faced a diplomatic crisis over the sinking of the British-flagged Kowshing transport. His initial panic – captured in private correspondence urging Prime Minister Ito Hirobumi to delay troop deployments – contrasted sharply with his composed public persona. Mutsu’s memoirs would later omit this moment of uncertainty, focusing instead on Japan’s legal justification for the sinking.

The Legal and Diplomatic Aftermath

Japan’s legal team, led by Justice Ministry official Suematsu Kencho, constructed a three-part defense:
1) The Naniwa acted under belligerent rights after hostilities commenced
2) The Kowshing had effectively been commandeered by Chinese officers
3) The ship’s contract with China included wartime transfer clauses

This careful legal preparation helped avert British intervention, though Mutsu initially feared severe consequences. Captain Togo Heihachiro’s actions in rescuing British crew members provided crucial eyewitness testimony supporting Japan’s version of events.

Parallel Realities: Contrasting War Experiences

While Japan celebrated, the Qing court presented a surreal contrast. On July 28 – Emperor Guangxu’s birthday – officials conducted celebratory rituals and operas at the Palace of Tranquil Longevity, maintaining an illusion of normalcy despite the military disaster.

At the Asan garrison, news of Pungdo devastated morale. The loss of approximately 1,000 reinforcements aboard the Kowshing struck particularly hard among troops who had recently arrived on the Airren and Feijing transports. Commanders Ye Zhichao and Nie Shicheng prepared defensive positions at Seonghwan and Gongju anticipating Japanese attacks, their deployments reflecting expectations of defeat from the outset.

The Battle of Seonghwan and Its Consequences

When Japanese forces under General Oshima Yoshimasa attacked on July 29, they exploited Qing defensive weaknesses through feinting maneuvers. Nie Shicheng fell for the deception, diverting forces from the main position at Wolpong Mountain. After two hours of combat, Qing troops retreated to Gongju, then began a month-long overland march to Pyongyang.

Ye Zhichao’s subsequent false victory reports temporarily buoyed Qing leadership, demonstrating how information control shaped perceptions of the war’s early stages. Japan’s twin victories at Pungdo and Seonghwan electrified the public, though logistical challenges in Korea – including supply shortages and transportation difficulties – revealed vulnerabilities masked by battlefield success.

The Korean Political Dimension

Japan’s justification for military action relied heavily on manipulating Korean politics. The installation of the Daewongun (former regent and king’s father) as a pro-Japanese figurehead failed to produce expected cooperation. Despite Japanese pressure, the Daewongun secretly communicated with Chinese forces while delaying official requests for Japanese intervention against Qing troops at Asan.

The new Korean government under Kim Hong-jip punished the pro-Chinese Min clan but remained cautious in other matters, uncertain about the war’s ultimate outcome. Foreign Minister Otori Keisuke’s backdated documentation of Korean requests for Japanese military action reflected these political complexities and the provisional nature of Korea’s alignment.

Imperial Reservations and Constitutional Constraints

In Tokyo, Emperor Meiji expressed reservations about the attack on Qing forces, questioning whether proper authorization had been given. His refusal to send messengers to Ise Shrine and Emperor Komei’s tomb to announce the war – traditionally marking imperial approval – signaled disapproval. “This war belongs to the ministers, not to me,” he declared, highlighting tensions between constitutional monarchy and imperial prerogative.

This episode revealed the Meiji Constitution’s limitations in restraining military action once initiated, even against the emperor’s wishes. The government’s narrative of defensive action – claiming Chinese or Chinese-disguised forces fired first at both Seoul’s palace and Pungdo – faced growing skepticism among attentive observers.

Legacy of a Pivotal Engagement

The Battle of Pungdo and its immediate aftermath set patterns that would characterize the entire First Sino-Japanese War. Japan demonstrated superior military preparation and operational coordination, while Qing forces suffered from technological deficiencies, poor intelligence, and leadership issues. The diplomatic handling of the Kowshing incident established Japan’s ability to navigate international law to its advantage, foreshadowing later negotiations.

These early engagements also revealed the war’s political dimensions – Japan’s manipulation of Korean politics, the Qing court’s detachment from military realities, and the emerging gap between Japan’s constitutional framework and actual decision-making processes. The contrasting public reactions in both countries highlighted how information management and nationalist sentiment would shape perceptions of the conflict.

Most significantly, Pungdo marked the point of no return in East Asia’s power transition – the moment when Japan’s rise and China’s decline became unmistakably clear to observers across the region and around the world. The battle’s consequences would reverberate through the Treaty of Shimonoseki, the Japanese colonization of Korea, and ultimately the turbulent 20th century history of East Asia.