The Rise of Iraq’s Nuclear Program

During the 1970s, Iraq, under the leadership of Saddam Hussein, embarked on an ambitious nuclear program with a clear objective: the production of nuclear weapons. According to Dr. Khidir Hamza, who later became the head of Iraq’s nuclear efforts in the 1980s, Saddam set a staggering goal—producing six nuclear bombs per year. Had this plan succeeded, Iraq would have surpassed China’s nuclear arsenal within two decades.

To achieve this, Iraq invested heavily in both human and technological resources. Scientists and engineers were sent abroad, primarily to France and Italy, for advanced training. Meanwhile, Iraq sought to exploit civilian nuclear projects to acquire the necessary technology, methods, and infrastructure for weaponization.

The Quest for Nuclear Technology

Iraq’s determination was evident in its relentless pursuit of nuclear capabilities. The country had already acquired a two-megawatt research reactor from the Soviet Union in 1967. However, Saddam’s regime sought more—specifically, a graphite-moderated reactor and plutonium reprocessing facilities. When France refused, Iraq turned to Canada, hoping to purchase a reactor similar to the one India used for its 1974 nuclear test.

This pressure tactic worked. France re-entered negotiations, ultimately agreeing to supply Iraq with an Osiris research reactor and a smaller reactor, both fueled by weapons-grade uranium. Italy also played a crucial role, providing hot cells and separation facilities capable of extracting plutonium from irradiated uranium—enough to produce eight kilograms annually.

Israel’s Growing Alarm

While many nations turned a blind eye to Iraq’s nuclear ambitions, Israel watched with increasing concern. Israeli intelligence closely monitored developments, particularly at the Tammuz nuclear facility (also known as Osirak) near Baghdad. Israel, which had been developing its own nuclear arsenal since the 1960s, saw Iraq’s program as an existential threat. By the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Israel was believed to possess at least thirteen nuclear devices.

The West’s indifference was striking. Britain, for instance, concluded in the early 1970s that Saddam’s regime, though oppressive, was stable—and therefore a viable trading partner. Similarly, Pakistan’s secret nuclear tests in the remote Ras Koh mountains proceeded without significant international interference. As one Pakistani scientist wryly noted, Western nations were all too eager to sell nuclear-related technology while simultaneously underestimating developing nations’ capabilities.

The Hypocrisy of Nuclear Proliferation

The Cold War superpowers—particularly the U.S., Britain, and France—often condemned nuclear proliferation while enabling it. These nations refused International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections yet profited from selling nuclear technology. The motivations were clear: economic gain and geopolitical influence.

Henry Kissinger, the U.S. Secretary of State, epitomized this contradiction. In 1976, he pressured Pakistan to abandon its plutonium reprocessing plans in favor of U.S.-supplied reactors, threatening to cut off aid if Pakistan refused. Yet even Kissinger later admitted the folly of such policies, lamenting that the U.S. was “the only country crazy enough” to push deals that undermined its own security.

The Fall of the Shah and the Iranian Revolution

While Iraq pursued nuclear weapons, Iran—another key player in the region—faced internal collapse. The Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, had long been a U.S. ally, but his regime’s corruption and repression fueled widespread discontent. By the late 1970s, economic hardship and political oppression led to mass protests.

Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, exiled in Paris, skillfully channeled this anger. He promised an end to foreign interference, corruption, and inequality—a message that resonated deeply. When the Shah fled Iran in 1979, Khomeini returned, establishing an Islamic Republic. The U.S., which had heavily invested in the Shah, found itself powerless as anti-American sentiment surged.

The Cold War’s Shifting Alliances

Iran’s revolution sent shockwaves through global geopolitics. The U.S. lost its most important Middle Eastern ally, while the Soviet Union saw an opportunity. Iraq, once aligned with the West, drifted toward Moscow. Meanwhile, Afghanistan—another Cold War battleground—descended into chaos.

American policymakers, slow to recognize these shifts, continued to misjudge the region. Even as Iran collapsed, U.S. diplomats in Afghanistan reported positive relations—just months before the Soviet invasion. The failure to anticipate these events underscored the dangers of Cold War tunnel vision.

Legacy and Lessons

The nuclear ambitions of Iraq, the fall of the Shah, and the broader Cold War competition in the Middle East reveal a pattern of miscalculation and hypocrisy. Western nations, while condemning proliferation, often enabled it for short-term gains. The consequences were dire: regional instability, arms races, and enduring conflicts.

Today, the lessons remain relevant. The dangers of nuclear proliferation, the risks of backing authoritarian regimes, and the unintended consequences of great-power rivalry continue to shape global politics. As history shows, the pursuit of dominance often leads not to security, but to chaos.